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Chronological Note:
(The 1934 Edition of Ritter and Preller, Historia
Philosophiae Graecae, gives (pp. 575-7.) an "tndex Temporum",
from which the following dates are taken.).
Thales: floret a. 585.
Anaximander: natus c. a. 610, obit c. a. 546.
Anaximenes: floret c. a. 546.
Pythagoras: natus c. a. 572, obit c. a. 500.
Xenophanes: natus c. a. 580, obit c. a. 480.
Heraclitus: floret c. a. 504.
Parmenides: floret c. a. 504.
Anaxagoras: natus a. 500, obit a. 428.
Zeno Eleates: floret c. a. 464.
Protagoras: natus a. 480, obit a. 411.
Empedocles: floret c. a. 445.
Melissus Sarnum contra Periclem defendit a. 441.
Gorgias: natus c. a. 483 ••• , obit c. a. 375.
Dernocritus: natus c. a. 460, floret c. a. 420.
Socrates: natus a. 469, obit a. 399.
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Chapter I: Introductory.

.'

In undertaking this work, advisedly entitled an Essay,
it has been our purpose to set forth certain considerations,
from a Scholastic point of view, on the subject of the pre-Socratic philosophy, with special reference to its teaching on
human knowledge. Naturally, we have not been able to enter as
thoroughly as we might like into all the points worthy of attention and discussion in this field, but have sought rather to
bring out those features of the early philosophy which bear
witness to what Gilson has aptly styled the incurably metaphysical character of the human mind.
This entails a special view of the history of philosophy. For it is possible, and indeed worthwhile, to expend
one's labors entirely in the painstaking exposition of every
last phase - and even phrase - of each thinker's work. Much has
been done along this line and we must assuredly acknowledge a
real debt to those scholars who have undertaken it. The task
to which we have addressed ourselves is, however, of a rather
different kind. Aware of the dangers of reading too much in
the endeavors of the ancients, we nevertheless thought that an
approach to them which would be especially valuable was to be
found in a study of their doctrines in so far as they contributed in some way to the development of the perennial philosophy.
In this, after all, lies their deepest meaning for us as thinking men, and it will make for a better understanding of the now
wonderfully elaborated systems Which, tha~~s to the genius of
Plato and Aristotle, of Augustine, Thomas and Bonaventure,are
ours to study at the present time, if we see and appreciate the
elements which have entered into them and the manner in which
they have been arrived at.
Jacques Maritain, in his Introduction to Philosophy,
has eloquently delineated the great tradition of philosophy,
noting that one modern writer has called it "the natural philosophy of the human mind, for it develops and brings to perfection what is most deeply and genuinely natural in our intellect
alike in its elementary apprehensions and in its native tendency
towards truth".l In addition to its numerous and indisputable
claims to the title of philosophia nerennis, it may, he remarks
profess to be "abiding and permanent ••• in the sense that before
Aristotle and St. Thomas had given it scientific formulation as
a systematic philosophy, it existed from the dawn of humanity
in germ and in the pre-philosophic state, as an instinct of the
nderstanding and a natural knowledge of the first principles
of reason and ever since its foundation as a system has remained firm and progressive, a powerful and living tradition, whi~e
all other philosophies have been born and have died in turn. It
Investigating the first recorded philosophic efforts of men in
our tradition, then, we may come better to understand the value
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of the whole. NOw, as we conceive it, the most important note
of this perennial philosophy is the high place that it gives to
metapHysics and the rela~ionship that this has to a prop;rly
humanistic view of life.
For if we grant that man is a rational animal, and if we
grasp the true significance of what we are saying,3 we will see
that for him to live that life which is specifically his he must
exercise his highest powers on their proper object. The highest
that he has are his intellect and will and, as St. Thomas has
shown, the Good which the latter desires is ultimately the Truth.
The object of the intellect, we may say, is found in Being itself, to which the intellect would be conformed and adaequated.
~an is accordingly interested, whether he will or no, in Being.
With an intellect infinite in its capacity for knowledge, he
must come to know Being, not merely under its diverse manifestations, but, as far as he may: as such. He must organise his knowledge, that is, create a science, and that science will be metaphysics.
The point of our present discussion is this,
that all men suppose what is called Wisdom to deal
with the first causes and the principles of things;
so that ••• the man of experience is thought to be
wiser than the possessors of any sense-perception
whatsoever, the artist wiser than the men of experience, the master-worker than the mechanic, and the
theoretical kinds of knowledge to be more of the
nature of wisdom than the productive. Clearly then
Wisdom is knowledge about certain principles and
causes. 4
It is doubtful if any man has pointed out more forcibly than
Aristotle that the knowledge which the wise man, who would govern things well in view of his properly human destiny, is the
knowledge of being itself, a knowledge that is to be had in the
light of its causes. Hence, the science which we would obtain
is one that investigates the first principles, among which there
is numbered the good as final. Such is a truly divine science,
and none can claim such distinction on the merely natural level:
For the science which it would be most meet for
God to have is a divine science, and so is any science that deals with divine objects; and this science alone has both these qualities; for (1) God
is thought to be among the causes of all things,
and to be a first p~neiple, and (2) such a science either God alone can have, or God above all
others. 5
Men have accordingly served the cause of wisdom and, in
fact, of mankind when they have undertaken to search after the
ultimate causes of reality. Their initial efforts may have been
somewhat crude, but even when Thales assigns water as the uni-
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versal principle we can observe the striving of the human mind,
under the impulse of man's desire for the Truth, after the One
behind the manifold, the reason for all things. As time ~asses,
those efforts will be better directed as men come to refine
their notions and to push their quest at once deeper and higher.
Along with this, such men had to have some sort of attitude, implicit or otherwise, on the relationship which obtains
between the human mind and the object known. The attitude is
generally bound up closely with the metaphysical views of the
~iven philosopher and must be studied accordingly. At the same
time, since, as we are now fortunate in knowing, God is the
supreme Being and the End of the intellectual life, it will be
uertinent to our study to note where it is feasible the opinions
of the Pre-Socratics on matters divine.
On the whole, we shall find that the age which we are
studying was one noteworthy by reason of the many great men who,
despite numerous handicaps, tried their best to set up integrated views of reality. Their best efforts, as, for example, the
"Being tf of Parmenides or the "Nous If of Anaxagoras, insistently
pointed the way to and emphasised the need for a metaphysic in
the true sense and for a science of knowledge organised accordingly. The progressive forces of the period culminate in the
master works of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle; the errors issued
in the anarchism of Sophistry and in the rank materialism of the
Atomists.
The field is interesting as well by reason of the parallels which are readily to be found between the ancient errors,
intermingled with often splendid contributions to the cause of
Truth and its perennial philosophy, and those of more recent
times, when the excuse of a too early advent on the philosophic
scene could hardly be offered •
••• this boasted originality which comes from
playing fast and loose with common sense is not
really original at all. Philosophical errors are
redmcible in principle to exag~eration or defect.
This is a corollary of the principle that being
and truth are convertible, Nothing which is, is
essentially false. These two possible errors into
which thought may fall, namely,exaggeration and
defect, have already been exhausted. They were
exhausted in great part before the time of Aristotle, and in their entirety before the birth
of Christ. The Greeks had their James and Dr.
Schiller in Protagoras; they had theirBradley in
Parmenides; they had their M. Bergson and Professor Alexander and the whole School of Becoming in Heraclitus. They had their dynamists and
their Atomists. In a word, they sawall philosophy from its highest reaches in Aristotle to
its shallows in the Sceptics. All modegn aberrations were foreshadowed in the Greeks.

p_··
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r-Notes to the First Chapter:
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1. Jacques Maritain, An Introduction to Philosophy,
pg. 99·

2. Ope cit., pg. 100.
3. "The psychological and anthropological studies of the
Western world since the age of Plato and Aristotle have revolved about the proposition, 'Man is a rational animal'. Always,
in some form or another, this thesis has been the central point
of debate in any and every theory of the nature and destiny of
man. There have been those schools of thought (Aristotelianiam
and Thomism in particular) which have accepted the proposition
as stated, and have builded their psychologies around it. Then
there have been the:3materialistic and mechanistic anthropologies
which have stressed the element of animality to the exclusion
of the other element; and with this principle as the foundation
of their constructions, have developed their monistic systems."
J. Loftus, "Psychology Today," pg.164 of The New Scholasticism,
XII, 2. We can find such a difference among the Pre-Socratics,
often in such a way that the two viewpoints are at conflict in
the thought of the same man or the same school.
4. Aristotle, .etaph~sica I.i 98lb-982a. In view of the
familiar nature of Aristotle s works we shall generally refer
to them by their titles alone, save, of course, where the possibility of confusion may advise naming the author.
5. Ope cit., ii 983 a. "Solus (i.e., Deus) quidem habet
secundum perfectam comprehensionem. Maxime vero habet, inquantum
suo modo etiam ab hominibus habetur, licet ab eis non ut possessio habeatur, sed sicut aliquid ab eo mutuatum." st Thomas, In
I Metaph., lect 3,64.
-5. F. Sheen, God and Intelligence in Modern Philosophy,
pg. 146.

~--------~--~--------------~
Chapter II: The Early Ionians.
The Milesians.
When one begins to study Greek philosophy,
one is impressed by the following facts: first,
that it originated in the Greek colonies; second,
that its subject matter was the origin of the
world; third, that it Was naturalistic, as opposed to supernaturalistic; fourth'lthat it was
rationalistic rather than mystical.
As we know from History, the Ionians of the Hellenic
mainland established colonies in and off the coast of what we
now know as Asia Minor, and these grew and prospered into great
and even cosmopolitan centers of Hellenic culture. Being on the
frontier, the colonials were in contact with the men and the
ideas of other civilisations. Confronted with a variety of ways
of life and constantly meeting with new subjects to invite their
reflection and investigation, they were, on the whole, well situated to begin the long quest after the truth that underlies all
the diverse phenomena of existence.
Though neither the time nor the milieu can
explain the rise of so personal a thing as philosophy, they may have considerable influence on
the form it assumes. It is not, therefore, without interest to observe that Miletus, "the pride
of Ionia", is just the place where the continuity
of prehistoric Aegean civil~sation with that of
later times is most marked.
rofessor Burnet adds some interesting comments on the Milesian
tradition, now borne out by the findings of archaeology, to the
effect that the city was founded in the "late 1Vfinoan period"
and, submitted by easy stages to other influences, passed into
the "early Ionianll. The great city, we may believe,-owed not a
little to its heritage from the civilisation of Crete, so distinguished for its achievements in the physical order of life. 3
ossessed thus of a significant background in material attainments, the Milesians were associated, moreover, with Egyptians
and ASians, especially from Lydia, ~nd had domains which reached
to the far shore of the Black Sea.
The times were equally as interesting, for history was
very definitely in the making: Chaldaea and Egypt were succumbing to the Aryan yoke, Croesus the Lydian was threatening Ionia,
and, after his spectacular ruin, the Persians were to fall upon
that rich maritime; in Hellas itself, political and social change
Was the order of the day. On almost every side the old was breaking up and giving place to the new. It was all calculated to dis-

~b
men's
erman ent ,

m1nds and to Bt1mu:::e them to search after someth1ng
some truths fundamental even to these universal mutaiion s • Men were turning §o look for some reasons behind.~ tall,
nd philosophy was born.
a
The earliest to make attempts along this line sought
first of all an explanation of that reality in which we are
situate and thanks to which we derive our natural knowledge.
Being the first, they naturally began with the first data, made
the external world the subject of their considerations, and did
not realise all that the data contained or all that is necessary
to account for them. Remaining on this level, they attained only
to the material cause of the external world amd supposed only
accidental changes of things. Since they did not recognise the
immaterial nor the special character of mind, they gave a partial and unsatisfactory account,6 yet, in so doing, witnessed - as
all thinkers must witness - to the exigencies of the human mind
when facing reality.

Of the fir.~t ~hilosophers, then, most thought
the principlesX~~~~ of the nature of matter, were
the only principles of all things. That of which
all things that are consist, the first from which
they come to be, the last into which they are resolved (the SUbstance remaining, but changing in
its modifications), this they say is the element
and this the principle of things, and therefore
they think nothing is either generated or destroyed, since this sort of entity is always conserved,
as we say Socrates neither comes to be absolutely when he comes to be beautiful or musical, nor
ceases to be when he loses these characteristics,
because the substratum, Socrates himself remains.
Just so, they say, nothing else comes to be or
ceases to be; for there must be some entity either one or more than one - from which all
other things come to be, it being conserved. 7
They looked, in other words, for the material cause of
things in the presentations of the senses, based their speculation on the perception of nature, and, accordingly, conceived
the universal reality in a material fashion, in some such sensible element as water or air or fire. Even so, they were seeking
the One in the many and recognising, however imperfectly, that
there must be some one source of all that is. Such endeavor at
least marked a definite progress of philosophic enquiry over
spontaneous judgments, in that it entailed an implicit preference of the intelle.ctual knowledge to the sensible.
The first figure in the Histories of Philosophy, even as
he is first in the history of philosophy, is Thales of Miletus, 8
son of Examyes •
••• after engaging in politics he became a
stUdent of nature ••• He seems by some accounts
to have been the first to stUdy astronomy, the

-
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first to predict eclipses of the sun and so fix
the solstices ••• And some ••• declare that he was
the first to maintain the immortality of the so~+.
He was the first to determine the sun's course .
from solstice ••• He was the first to give the
last day of the month the name of thirtieth, and
the first, some say, to discuss physical problems. 9

He was a prominent member of the Seven Wise Men and his importance is suggested by the stories which grew up about him, representing him now as an impractical draamer whose star-gazing
tumbled him into a well and again as one whose knowledge made
him superior to thf ordinary man of practical affairs, as in his
famed deal in oil. 0
These stories tell us not~ng about Thales
himself, but they do bear witness to the impression produced by science and scientific men when
they first appeared in a world that was half-inclined to marvel and half-inclined to scoff.
There is, however, another set of traditions about Thales from which something may be
learnt. They are not af a popular character,
since they attribute to him certain definite
scientific aChievements. 11
This rather remarkable man was of opinion that the earth floats
upon the water, that water is the nrinciple of all things, and
that all things are full of gods. 12 Since we are not in possession of any writings of his, we are not in a position to determine precisely for what reasons he adopted these views or what
his own development of the theory was. The stUdies of Aristotle
and a general consideration of the Ionian school VIi II , however~
give us some grounds mn which to base our account of the Thales
who exe~cised an historical influence.
The statement that water is the princiule of all things
may at first seem a little absurd, but it is all the same a very
significant pronouncement, because, as the evidence would indicate, Thales reached his conclusion only after some serious speCUlation and enquiry. Thanks are accordingly due him for his deliberate effort to discover the cause of all things:
Thales, the founder of this type of philosophy, says the principle is water (for which
reason he declared that the earth rests on water) ,
getting the notion perhaps from seeing that the
nutriment of all things is moist, and that heat
itself is generated from the moist and kept alive by it (and that from which they Bome to be
is a principle of all things). He got his notion
from this fact, and from the fact that the seeds
of all things have a moist nature, and that rater
is the origin of the nature of moist things. 5

~
light

With Burnet we may well interpret this theory in the
of other Milesia~ doctrines, and particularly that of
Anaximenes. For then ~,~was regarded as a purer form of.~ist,
d ~{9~~ - the Blue of the Archipelagic Sky and Fire rather
~an air - was purer still. This fire and that of the celestial
bodies were supposedly fed by vapor from the waters - and this
would shoW that evaporation was known. On the other hand, water
freezes and, in the eyes of Anaximes, could freeze extra hard
to become earth. Quite likely, then, that Thales would look upon
water as the source of air and fire. IIThat,of course, is a more
or less conjectural account; but, if Anaximenes was in any sense
his follower, the views of Thales must have been something like
this. His greatness, however, would lie is his having aSked the
question rather than in the particular answer he gave it. III4
Even if we are not certain of the extent to which he elaborated his theory, there are interesting indicationsl~hat he
taught the presence of a soul or of life in all things.
Like
the later lonians he quite possibly regarded the primitive matter as animated, as having evolved by powers of its own into
the various things of the world, and, perhaps, as a God. Aristotle, as we saw, mentions him as saying that all things are full
of gods and that the lodestone, since it moves the iron, has
a soul. Certain later commentators, such as Cicero, inferred
from this (and perhaps from other indications) that he believed
also in a divine mind which, superior to the water, pervades
and governs the world that it has fashioned of water. This does
not seem warranted, however, on the basis of available evidence
and certainly contradicts the traditional honors of Anaxagoras;
it would seem that Aristotle was the man to fasten uP£g any such
early strand of truth if he could have seen any trace. Thales
"may have believed in the existence of i,1rLworld-soul, but probably not in the existence of an independent, world-orderi~ mind:
dualism originated later in the history of philosophy." To him,
h~s world-stuff was probably something in which life and movement were naturally inherent and which did not stand in need of
government by some external power •
••• better still, we might say that just as
Greek religion did not for a long time distinguish things from persons or the animate, so
Greek philosophy dia not at first disc~m±tahe
between the ideas of matter and motion and
force and life and consciousness, but left them
all fused together in the as yet unanalysed n£Sion
of the Something of which the world was made.

Since we do not have a complete account of what Thales
thOUght, we cannot with exactness outline an epistemology which
would be specifically his. There are, nonetheless, in his attitude and influence several things of considerable importance to
the development of philosophy in general and of the science of
knowledge in particular. He left much work to be done, but he
had taken the first ste ~"

---- - - -...~... - - - - - - - - - - - ,
Never have more pregnant words been spoken,

~.~.

they acted like a/erment on the Greek mind, they
were the grain whence grew a tree that has overshadowed the whole earth. At one stroke they su~~
stituted a scientific, because a verifiable principle for the confused fancies of mythologising
poets. 1 9
For it is in deed a philosophic enquiry when the pursuit of the
ultimate cause, albeit conceived as material, is founded on
reasons drawn from that very reality which is under consideration, rather than on a largely fictitious cosmogony. Hence it is
that Thales is distinguished in wisdom from ~is fellow sages in
that he was the only one known to history who carried his investigation beyond the bounds of practical needs, and is thus the
first in the West in whom there appears something of a disinterested love of knowledge, the first to seek a principle of unity
in the world, and the firs~, therefore, to suggest that things
are intelligently produced and, as thus intelligible, can provide proper objects for the reason of man. In directing men's
attention to a problem which he could not yet wholly solve he
was implicitly recognising that human thought must attain to
some unity in the common principle of all things. 20
We should not take this as meaning too much, that he was
an Aristotle who left less of his works, or even that he explicitly and consciously recognised the intelligible character of
reality and of its source. The fact remains, despite these ne.cessary qualifications, that it is significant for so early a
figure~o try to assign some reason for things; it witnesses to
man's natural desire for truth and his natural employment of
reason to secure it. "It implied the assumption that things can
be understood, that the world is rational. And so Thales, though
little he knew it, was the first to drive the thin end of the
wedge of mind into the stubborn and intractable mass of matter."2
In due course there will come acknowledgement of the distinction
between matter and spirit, between things that are and change
and the persons which can know them; as yet, the philosopher
considered the material world and man as a part of it, addressing his entire conscious effort to a discovery of the stuuf it
was all made of.
Even this, let us remind ourselves, meant that they had
to use their reason and involved their implicit admission of the
superiority of that reason over the matter which it can explain.
It argues the self-evidence of the intellectual character of our
knowledge, dependent though~ it may be here on abstraction from
sense data and subject as it is to misinterpretation whenone~s
introspection is not well grounded and well disciplined. Thales
probably did not know of "intellectual knowledge"as such, but
he was by nature a rational bemng, as yet unsophisticated by
epistemological doubt, and he acted according to his rational
nature. Even the fact that he regarded the material substance
of water as the universal principle manifests him putt~ng his

-lOttlng his reason to work, for the senses may perceive water in
sea or in the well into which one falls, but they do not pe
:e~ve water qua cause of things. .
.'
p~

••• water as the fundamental cause of things,
the primitive sUbstance underneath nature's manifold- changes, can only be an object of thought,
not of sensuous perception. To say that all things
are made of water is to say also that these many
appearances of nature perceived by the senses
proceed from one cause. Multiplicity is traced
back to unity; the Many are comprehended in the
One. 22
Since it is the whole endeavor of rational man to know
things in their causes and to see many in the light of the one,
the man who advances in these lines is precisely that man who
grows in wisdom. 23 Our own experience and that of mankind in
general, as interpreted by those who have so grown, bears testimony to our natural impulse toward the quest definitely initiated by Thales. Of him we may regrettably know but little, yet
that little suffices to show him as a lover of wisdom and a
valuable witness to the spirit of man with its need and power
to conquer the truth. nOn putting these scattered notices together, we reach the conception of Thales as a true master of
those who know, combining great practical sagacity with a firm
grasp of scientific realities, so far as they were then accessible, and an instinctive feeling out after that universality whi
alone can lift positive science to the supreme heights of synthetic philosophy.tl 24
According to the traditional account, the next outstanding philosopher was Anaximander of Miletus, son of Praxiades,
the first inventor Qf the gnomon, a constructor of clocks, the
first c~ographer,2~ and the author of a book Concerning Nature,
still extant in the time of Theophrastus. A man of considerable
accomplishments, he addressed himself, like his master Thales,
to the problem of finding the principle of all things, but he
arrived at an interesting and original conclusion.
For he did not set up water or any such definite subitance as the element of the real, but preferred instead. the
~~t\QOY , a boundless something whence it had all arisen and
whither it will all return.
Anaximander ••• , a fellow-citizen and associate of Thales, said that the material cause and
first element of things was the Infinite, he being the first to introduce this name of the material cause. He says that it is neither water nor
any other of the so-called elements, but a substance different from them which is infinite,
from which arise all the heavens and the worlds
within them. And into that from which things take

~_'__--------------~-~ll~-------------------~
"

their rise they pass away once more, lias is
meet; for they make reparation and satisfaction to one another for their injustice according to the ordering of time ll , as he says
in these somewhat poetical terms. 2b
For this view he had his reasons, inasmuch as he had been impressed, as so many others were later to be impressed, by the
opposites in the world, among which hot and cold, wet and dry
were first. Hence it appeared to him that Thales had laid undue
emphasis on the wet, at the expense of the dry, and that the
presence of the opposites was better conceived as the result
of a "separating out" from some undifferentiated thing than as
owing to but one element. 27 His teachings on the satisfaction
and reparation which things make for their injustice may well
have reference lito the encroachment of one opposite or element
upon another. It is in consequence of this that they are both
absorbed once more in their common ground. As that is spatially
boundless, it is natural to assume that worlds arise in it elsewhere,,~§an with us. Each world is a bubble in the boundless
mass.
Anaximander, thus interpreted, would hold that the
boundless is one according to extension, but it is not known
with certainty whether he believed it to be a mixture of all
the elements, as Ritter takes it, or something material oon~ii=
ved as being yet w~thout determinate quality, as Zeller has it.
At least, he did regard it as being itself without any 6..~~"')
and so without end and incorruptible, in a word, divine. Living
and mov 5g itself, such a boundless cOhtains and governs all
things.
It is not to our purpose to undertake the indubitably
interesting enquiry into the details of theories proposed here
or elsewhere, for we are concerned, in the case of Anaximander
as with others, with the manner in which, like Thales, he attempts to give a scientific explanation of reality and, es p eci
ally, with the progress in thought which his suggestions mark. 3
liThe interest attaching to this notion of the t."1tt\\7ov is ••• that
it marks the first step in the progress, which the Greek mind
took with remarkable rapidity, of abstr~ction from the concrete
reality. "32 For, in explaining what the senses present of a
material world made up of many concrete changing things, he
looked to a somewhat different reality, of which the existence,
implied in the sensory data (e.g., the series of opposites), is
logically necessary if they are to be accounted for.
This boundless principle of all reality is, no doubt,
seen as involved in material conditions, yet it can be conceived
only by denying of it much that characterises the objects of
ordinary experience. "In the Infinite of Anaximander there is
the germ of a principle not mere~y physical but metaphysical;
for the infinite, as such, cannot be grasped by the imagination
or sensuous thought, but must be apprehended by abstract and
pure thought ll ,33 even if such is not done consciously and explicitly.
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Thales had already given one reasoned explanation when

e said that water is the cause of things, for this entailed
some sort of consideration of the notion of principle and, as
e have seen, some deliberate abstraction from sense dat~. The
ork of Anaximander evidences that reflection and further stu~y
are leading to still more abstract conceptions and to a better
exposition of the manner in which things issue from their principles.34 Neither is his thought yet disciplined to the requisie purity and precision nor is his method wholly clear, but he
as done better along both lines than his predecessor and has
rought to men's attention the power and significance of the
egative element in thought. Unfortunately, he failed to grasp
hat, if the infinite negates that finite which is con3~rtible
ith the material, it should negate also the material.
We could hardly maintain that he, any more than Thales,
efinitely assigned a place in the world to the spiritual or acnowledged the specific character and operation of the intellect.
ndeed, his evolutionism would point to a theory that would conradict them, in that he held that man is der! ved 'from an animal
f another species. 36 The internal logic of his system, however,
ith its unrecognised implications, had germs of development
hich better prepared minds would later discover and cultivate.
t all events, he too bears witness to the ineradicably metaphysi
cal character of human thought.
The ne~t prominent early Ionian brought about a retroression so far as the question of abstraction is concerned, but
ade forward steps in describing the manner in which beings have
corne from their source. This was Anaximenes of Miletus, son of
urystratus, disciple of Anaximander, and somewhat less the p~ly
th.37 It was something of a step back from the achievements
f his master for him to say that the principle of all things is
he~~~, from which it all comes and whither it all returns; it
as, in effect, a return to Thales for him to posit as the worldtuff some definite substance which is an object of direct senseexperience. Still, he had his reasons, since air is necessary to
ital activities, as in our own case, and, by analogy to man, he
aw the entire world vivified by air. 3ts "Just as our soul, being
ir, holds us together, so do breath and air encompass the whole
orld."5~

Air naturally seemed to Anaximenes to be the
primary substance, because it stood mid-way between
the rarer form, fire, and the denser form, moisture,
or mist, so that here again we have the primary opposites, hot and cold, as transformations of the
primitive air. 40
.
he air is apparently conceived as perpetually moving itself, as
dentified with our soul, and as being infinite in its extension.
t may be that Cicero was right when he observed: "Anaximenes
erem deum esse statuit eumque gigni esseque immensum et semper
n motv" , for there is no distinction made between god and the
rvorld. 41

-13Even if this is so far retrograde, his description of
the process whereby things come from that air is indica~~ve of a
(Treater care in analysis .;ind of a search after more precise knowledse. To say with Anaximander that all things are "separated
outll of the original element is to be extremely vague; to say
with Anaxi~~nes that they are produced by rarefactlon and condensation
is not to give a perfect answer, but one on which
criticism and investigation can more readily bear. Eccrisis might
mean a good many things; the other two processes are more familia
to men. It probably carried some unsa.t·~sfactory and therefore
stimulant significance to his contemporaries when they were told
that the original air was rarefied into fire or condensed into
wind, clouds, water, earth, stones, and finally all bodies. He
adduced an interesting experimental proof, itself an argument of
greater care in thought, to the effect'~hat air exhaled in a
rarefied condition from the open mouth is warm, whereas air
blown out in a condensed state through compressed lips is cold. 43
We have, then, in Anaximenes a representative of the
Greek tendency to conceive the world after the anal06Y of man,
in that he did significantly compare man to the world at large,
the microcosmos to the macrocosmos. In common with his school,
he was a hylozoist, and a reactionary one at that. He is commended to our attention by his discovery of the formula of rarefaction and condensation, which made the early Ionian theory coherent and which is, perhaps, the only way of rendering somewhat
intelligible the constitution of all things from one simple substance.For it is simple and hardly difficult of imagination to
say that things differ because more or less of the original substance is present. The approach is a quantitative one, that proved quite influential in the ancient world and that is still
in some respects maintained, though now with better developed ~
terminology.
.
Heraclitus.
Also an Ionian was Heraclitus of Ephesus, a ~~n of royal
lineage, whom Aristotle mentions with the Milesians,
and who
wrote a book Concerning Nature. With him the definite influence
of personality on the history of philosophy· may be said to make
its appearance. His writings, although preserved in a fragmentary form, aue of a distinctive style and well entitle him to his
nickname, 0 rt<I>Tt'vos.
He was himself aware of his oracular obscurity, fo~he
refers to parallels in the Pytho; lithe lord whose is the oracle
at Delphoi ~~ither utters nor hides his meaning, but shows it
by a sign".
His veiled mode of expression may render the evaluation of his opinions more difficult, but it does not prevent it.
Quite possibly, his manner is like in its kind and causes to that
Which we find in Thucydides and, as such, might have been present even at a la"t:er period as well; at any rate, "the immaturity
of prose composition doubtless aded
the difficulty which Heraclitus found in expressing himself".
So too, we find in a man
like Herodotus a generally clear and fluent narrative of events,
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.-wbUt a more complicated'Syntax-often renders the discussions in
. hiS speeches less easy to understand, and philosophy would present more problems than oratorical argument. Nor should we forget that Heraclitus was trying to express imperfect, yet~novel
ideaS in this undeveloped prose.
He neither analyses his ideas nor takes care
to make them acceptable by showing their interre~ations. On the contrary, he takes pleasure in
forcing them violently together, with a vivid
imagination and a sort of passion that animates
all his work. Therefore his phrases seem strange
at first, ~ut sink deep, penetrate, and take
fast hold. 1
It is worthwhile to remark the strength of his views, for it may
help us to appreciate the readiness with which he adopted his
radical philosophical opinions. An aristocrat and hereditary
Basileus, he did not beat around the bush when he wished to voice
his thoughts concerning the Ephesians, who "would do well to end
their lives, and leave the city to beardless boys, for th~t they
have driven out Hermodorus the worthiest man among them".48 He
refused to become a maker of laws because of the bad constitution that the people already had, and he declared that crapshooting with the temple b~~s was to be preferred to participation in such a civic life.
For the common herd and their ways
he had nothing but contempt: an attitude which may well have influenced him in the search after truth as opposed to mere vulgar
opinion.
Despite these feelings which drove him to solitude and
so hastened his death, he was profoundly concerned for the general v~elfare. For, he was possessed of a strong though rather misdirected sense of social solidarity and his harsh judgments were
against those who in his eyes stood for a selfish individualism,
obstructive of the common good. "Moreover, his assumption of
superiority wears a different aspect in the light of the fact
that he never regards the knowledge he claims for his own as an
exclusive individual possession, but rather, as something'common!
something that all might share if they would open their minds
to it. nSO
.
Interestingly enough, Descartes was many centuries later
also very much concerned with transcending the error which he
saw on every side and with arriving at the truth. Finding that
his ordinary stmdies revealed his ienorance to him at every turn,
yet sure of his own abilities as compared with those of others,
he essayed some measure of correction through experience and
then, as he says:
Iais apres que j'eus employe quelques annees
ainsi dans Ie livre du monde et
tacher
d'acquerir quelque experience, je pris un ~our resolution d'etudier aUBsi en mOi-m@me, et d employer
toutes les forces de mon esprit a choisir les chemins

a etudier

a

~-----:-------.;~--
~'r--

que je devais suivre. Ce qui me r~ussit beaucoup
mieux, ce me semble, que si je ne me fusse Jamais
eloign6, ni de mon pays, ni de mes Ii vres. 5I .'

Heraclitus, we are told, was no less exceptional a person; as a
outh he too said that he knew nothing, but he grew up to know
lt all. "He was nobody's pupil, but he declared tg~t he enquired
of himself, and learned everything from himself."
We might
work the parallel out at some length, but it will suffice to
note that both of these professedly self-enlightened men were
to exercise a considerable and pernicious influence on the development of thou~ht, thanks to systems founded on bases which
contradicted self&evident data of experience. Both were, moreover, to have a rather hieh and important place for their God
or logos.
,
The Greek qeserves less of censure, for he came somewhat
early and his errors did help to provoke an earlier solution
of the problem of knowledge than might otherwise have come. The
preceding thinkers, with all their virtues, had not probed deeply enough; naive realists, they were content with rather superficial explanations. But the radicalism of Heraclitus, coming
upon the views of his teacher Xenbphanes (of whom more in good
season), compelled men to seek a better answer, and even those
who lapsed into sophistic anarchy were to stimulate Socrates.
These earliest Greek philosophers were nalf
realists because they gave no thought to the conditions of, or to the limits of knowledge, and because they took for granted that their sense perceptions gave them a true representation of reality. It does not even seem to have occurred to
these~eA~lY Greek philosophers specified that
their cognitive expe ence was a phenomenon that
might have a~roblem.

S3

They had not studied the part which the subject who perceives
must play in the process of knowledge. For them cognition would
consist in a passive mirroring of external realities in the
senses and all the realities would be material. They had done
some good things, but it remained for Heraclitus to disturb
what has well been called the lIepistemological innocence of the
pre-Socratic philosophersll.54
Heraclitus, like Descartes again, entertained low opinions of his predecessors and spoke of them in disparaging terms.
He feels that Xenophanes may have been justified in passing his
strictures on Homer, but that he too is blameworthy, because,
like many another noted man, he had failed to put his knowledge
to good use. "Much learning does not teach understanding; else
it would have taught H5~iod apd Py}hagoras, or, again, Xenophanes and Hecataeus II.
The (.<:s''TOPLo..\. of Pythagoras, as in such
matters as harmonics and arithmetic, he esteemed a mere knowledge of many thi§6s and indeed an imposture, to be rejected
with indignation.
No knowledge of many things could ever con-
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r, ~i
tute wisdom, the clear knowledge of one thing. This, he says
in oracular fashion, is the Logos, which "is true evermore, yet
roen are as unable to understand it when they hear it for the
first time as before they have heard it at all. For, although
all things come to pass in accordance with this Ac)YOS, men seem
as if they had no experience of them, when they make trial of
words and deeds such as I set forth, dividin~ each thing according to its kind and showing how it truly is. 57 His whole work
was directed, then, to the expression of a great Logos, which
would replace the erroneous opinions everywhere prevailing.
The fragments reveal him as interested in various oppositions which his predecessors had not satisfactorily explained.
The Milesians held to the theory of a single world-stuff which
some regard as unchanged beneath its diverse manifestations, for
it would in time work its way back to its primitive'state. The
indubitable fact of change would then demand an explanation allow
ing for it. To be sure, Anaximander had proposed a system that
would give some answer when he suggested that the Boundless would
give separate the opposites out. This was hardly staisfactory
and certainly did not show whether that Boundless would exist
as such or not in the opposites. The rarefactions and condensations of the Anaximenean stuff are clearer, but leave considerable room for improvement.
Heraclitus carries the hypothesis of Anaximenes a stage farther. Instead of regarding
change as an awkward intruder upon the permanence of one unchanging world-subs~ance, he declares that change is the very nature of the
world~substance itself. It is a fundamental
fact, which has merely to be accepted and calls
for no explanation. Being is in fact a constant
process of Becoming: permanence is but the permanence of the fact of change; the unity of the
whole is the unit~80f law, the harmony that binds
opposites in one.?
The man who would escaoe from error must appreciate this first
lesson of reason: the senses are deceived in attributing permanence to the things of the world, and hence it is that there
springs the belief in immobility, the greatest of errors. The
truth is that all things are involved in the str~am of change,
that al~ things change-- and that nothing abides.?~ "You cannot
step twice into the same rivers; for fresh waters are ever
flowing in upon you."bO It is just the same with ourselves, for
\I
we step and do not step into the same rivers; we are and are
not".61
Thus identifying all that is real with change, Heraclitus
denounced the many and the sages as well for their added ignorance of the divine and all-pervading fire. "All things," he inSisted, "are an exchange for Fire, and Fire for all things, even
as wares for gold and gold for wares." 6 2 It is, if we look at
it from our metaphysical standpoint, the material cause of

· here the Ephesian is in the full tradition of the physioers'and introduces a suggestion that it may also have efficicharacteristics, for there is a force which is coeternal
th the fire, and thi s is Strife or War, lithe father of all and
king of all; a~d6~ome he has made gods and some men, some
and some free •
None of tg~se whom he had heard recognised that wisdom
apart from all
n~r that many thi~ga are one, and that this
is in turn many. Ken do not know how what is at variance
ees with itself. It is an attunement of opposite,tensions,
that of the bow and the lyre."bS The war of the opposites
thus in reality an attunement and IIfrom this it follows that
dom is not a knowledge of many things, but t~6 perception of
underlying union of the warring opposites".
He was thus
aying far more than he appreciated, inasmuch as "the identity
ch Heraclitu4 explains as consisting in difference is just
t of the primary substance in all its manifestations. "67 All
more reason, then, for insisting that fire is the primary
tance, since he wanted something of such a nature that it
d pass into everything else and that everything else would
s into it. While the fire burns steadily its quantity seems
stay the same and its flame to ~e a thing, while its substance
always changing; gases pass away and new matter is consumed.
the world is a fire, then we have an explanation for the
tan~ change and exchamge of which he speaks.
This world, which is the same for all, no
one of gods or men has made; but it was ever, is
now, and ever shall be an ever-living Fire, with
measures of it kindling and measures going out. 68
can see his reasons for choosing so mobile a substance, reaso
ch may well have included a thought of the vivifying heat of
sun and of that destructive power of tire which can change
many things. For man and the world'6a.ccordingly, "the way up
the waY, down is one and the same". ':j Part is always going
and part coming down, even as the process of combustion would
est. What is fed to the fire it returns in everlasting exe and this constant strife in reality is what ~onstitutes
just ce: "it is the opposite which is good for uslf."ro Even if
do not have wisdom enough to see it, it remains true that
the hidden attunement is better than the onen".7 l
Without exploring these theories in~ detail, we may see
man has likewise originated from the~ernal fire, in a
IBClmf:IWl1 t
roundabout fashion. "For it is death to souls to bewater, and death to water to become earth. But water comes
earth; and from water, soul. "72 While the body itself ocions some distress to Heraclitus, he conceives the soul of
to be of the nature of fire, preserving some of the divine
e. It is the more nerfect according as that fire which iL
is the purer, for lIthe dry soul is· the wisest and best".73
water and earth may enter into the malee-up of man, but
the fire in man, constituted as a microcosm, which is the

~nscioUS
part, even as Fire 1s Wisdom 1n the macrocosmos. Once
•.
the soul has departed, th corpse is worthier of being cast
74

forth than the very dung.
Man is also in a constant flux: the fire become~ water,
which turns into earth, but the opposite process keeps on as
well and seems to maintain us the same. Heraclitus very likely
thought of sleep as produced by the encroachments .of the moister
portion of the body, as a result of which man's fire burnt low
and his self was cut off from the Common Fire. "The waking have
one common wQSrld, but the sleeping turn aside each into a world
of his own. If'r A soul Which has its elements well balanced will
revive in the morning, thanks to a replenishing of the fiery
portion. 7 6
If either the moist or the dry attains to dominauce,
death ensues. Since "it is a pleasure to become moist",f( we
must repress tendencies to such a state, for "wantonness needs
putting out, even more than a house on fire".7(5 The satisfaction
of desire entails the exchange for moisture of the dry fire of
the good soul: "It is hard to fight with one's heart's desire
V'lhatever it wishes to get, it purchases at the cost of soul fl. t9
The predominance of fire will also bring about death, but now a
better and well rewarded one, for "greater deaths win greater
portions", 80 and"there awaits men when they die such. things as
they look not for nor dream of ••• that they rise M~ and become
the wakeful guardians of the quick and the dead tl •
Furthermore, since "mortals are immortals and immortals are mortals,
the one living the other~ death and dying the other's life, If
and since all the living and all the dead are constantly changin~ their places, "the former are shifted and become the latter
and the latter in turn are shifted and become the former".(52
It is in change alone, therefore, that men find rest, since it
would be tedious always to serve the same lords and any other
form of rest would be dissolution. 83
Man must then be careful not to pollute his reason in
any way - certainly a piece of good advice, and he should consider that in our present form of life the soul is buried in
the body and only at a fiery death will it escape to a real life,
which it can enjoy - for a time •
•.• man &lsa Is a worthless thing on the
purely bodily side and is hence called the naturally
reasonless. Life and soul, and since the latter
is still regarded as identical with consciousness
and cognition, these also, man acquires only by
participation in the all-animating fire, and in
its purest appearance, the enveloping. It is
this which is alone rational, and the Soul partakes of it the more fully the warmer and drier
it is, and hence more easily in warm and dry
countries. As consistency requires, the soul's
entrance into the body is to man a mOistening,
and hence an extinguishing and dying. The death
of the body, on the other8~and, is the true return to life of the soul.
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In Heraclitus, then, we meet a nhilosonher who gives
some specific consideration to the significance and processes of
human knowledge. Since his philosophy is early and rather on
the crude sude, we might expect difficulties in his epi~temology,
and we find them. We also find that, where the Milesians in addressing themselves to one problem arrived at conclusions that
would exclude intellectual knowledge, Heraclitus, in taking up
both cosmology and epistemology, constructed a sys'tem which
would render such knowleage impossible.
As we have seen, he would have the human soul - and it
is well to note the importance Which he attaches thereto - a
part of the ever-changing nature. It is a spark of the Fire; and
a flame, which is being extingUished into gas~ needs feeding from fire; thus man, if he is actually to have reason, must be
united to the universal source. liThe breath is a physical medium
of obtaining this nourishment, and cessation of breath stops
activity. A further medium of life, however, is sense-perception,
which is the absorption of the outer throu~h the inner fire;
and this accounts for the depression of soul acti vi ty in sleep. ,,8
When we breathe, we take into ourselves some of that universal
and vital element of all being, some of that force which produces and sustains all, which constructs and unifies our being,
which is our very life. It is as in this way united with the Universal that we have our consciousness: "The eternal and omnipresent wisdom becomes, through the channels of our senses and 86
especially through the eyes, in fragments at least our wisdom."
We do have certain means of striving after the truth,
which means we must be careful to use aright, for the widespread
ignorance which so perturbed him is due largely to men's taking
for the entire truth the superficial view of what experience presents. We should distrust sensible knowledge, since "eyes and
ears are bad witnessg~ to men if they have souls that understand
not their language tl • '( If we would be Wise, we will not receive
the data of the senses as true without further investigation.
No matter how many the sense-perceptions may be, theY8~annot
equal the truth, Which, since "nature loves to hide", b is underneath the obvious.
Perhaps Heraclitus is thinking of that fault of senseperception by its self, to wit, a naive realism Which, as we
saw, would trust all the data of the senses as given and which
could never bring us beyond mere surface views: "They do not
bring us to understand the underl~i8~ principle or law; may,
they rather disguise that from us'. 9 Unfortunately, however, he
went on to quarrel with the implicit-data of the senses, which
the reason may recognise, as to the presence of something permanent in reality. It was well for him to urge men to study to
find the universal law, but hardly advised to undertake that
study in contradiction of its very grounds.
The senses deceive by giving the appearance of fixedness to things not fixed. The reason
is the real source of knowledge. By reason man
ceases to be a dreaming individual and becomes
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the universal reason, the !cOl-VOl ¥yAS, that we know
and do that which is true and right. 90
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FeW would wish to deny that he had some good ideas or that he
was offering some valuable suggestions. It was high time that
men did investigate the true significance of the r~ality disclosed by the senses. On the other hand, to make such a thoroughgoing repudiation of the worth of sensible presentations would
prevent them from getting any place. The way. of genuine progress
was to be a middle one, consisting in a correct interpretation
of all the data, with the investigator neither superficial nor
completely distrustful.
Heraclitus finds pleasure in conceiving
everything as contradicting itself ••• Connected
with this continual flux of things is the uncertainty of the senses. For the flux escapes
their notice although it is perceived by rational cognition; and it is because what we see is
stark and dead, that t~l eyes and ears are untrustworthy witnesses.
.
It is also very well to stress the importance of the reason, yet,
if such advice is to be taken to heart and applied with profit,
its processes should be satisfactorily explained. Heraclitus
did not do so and, larpely as a result, his assaults upon sense
knowledge and his theory of the flux prepared the way for Sophistic attacks on all possibility of knowledge or truth.
For want of positive knowledge and of
method, science and philosophy alrke were ultimately endangered in the confusion to which undisciulined sueculation led the followers of
Heraclitus. 92"
Still, the integration of some of his proposals in a better system could mean a great deal to constructive philosophy, for he
Was certainly the enemy of mere subjective opinion, having no
time for one who would follow his individual persuasions in
place of the common law or universal reason Whic~overns all.
Despite his imperfections in these respects, he 'reaches the
grand thought that the consciousness of truth is a cpnsciousness
of the universal, and that error consists in the separatio~30f
thinking from the divine reason in which it participates."
The truth concerning the world is for him changeless in
a sense, for he sees behind the ever-living Fire a Logos which,
behind the flux of things, directs the ceaseless change along
the upward and the downward ways. If we turn from a sensory world
view to that of wisdom, reason shows us that "Wisdom is one thing
It is to kno~4the thought by which all things are steered through
all things."
Further, there can be no violations of the ordinances of this directing thought: tiThe sun will not overstep his
measures; if he aoes , the Erinyes, the handmaids of Justice,
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find him out ...
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The Fire evolves into things by a rational and ordered
process; there ia a method which the seeker of wisdom mi6ht discover by a search for the impulse of the Fire. There is: we must
remember, a Logos, to which man should address himself and "whic
it is the business and the reward of philosophy to discover amid
the kaleidoscopic instability of the Flux b whic~ our senses
are bewildered and our thinking confused ll • 96 Authorities may not
be agreed as to the exact meaning of the Logos, but many have
seen in it a sort of Eternal Reason and been influenced accordingly.It can also be regarded as something of a natural law,
both descriptive and prescriptive, as a wisdom immanent in the
world. It seems to fulfill some at least of the attributes that
better developed philosophies were to assign to God and it has
been said that for Heraclitus the Logos was GOd: "Ipse ignis
coincidit cum Deo, quem Heraclitus sub novo nomine ~'~OS'intro
ducit in philosophiam ••. Deus est ille ignis purissimus qui omnia
penetrat." For our part, and in good company, we are uncertain
whether Heraclitus consistently and explicitly made of his Logos
a God, but, had he erected a definite theology, he might well
have combined the two~ That he speaks of the Fire as Zeus, the
Deity, or Justice would not of necessity argue that he did so,
but it evidences his high esteem for the Fire and the "divine"
character that he would assign it.
He is not very clear as to the manner in which we may
best adhere to the Logos, but he is most insistent on the presence in the Fire and the Flux of something that corresponds to
our desire for knowledge. "The qorld is a rational world. Its
ways can be understood. And this responsive, systematic and
intelligible character of things corresponds to thought and
reason in man, and is, as it were, the ObJegtive and external
counterpart of his wisdom and philosophy.'~ We should look,
therefore, for the law of things behind the change and so arrive
at some universal knowledge, at a knowledge of the reason for
the constant changes and exchanges.
H~raclite se compla1t si bien a souligner
la variabilit~ et la contradiction intime des
objets, que l'affirmation absolue semblerait
vraiment n'y plus trouver ~ quoi se prendre;
car il n'est point d'affirmation possible sans
une certaine unite objective coh~rente et stable. Toutefois, par une sorte d'instinct m~ta
physique, plut6t que par un raisonnement rigoureux, il restaure tant bien que mal cette unit~
necessaire: il la d~couvre dans la forme m~me
de l'universel devenir et dans l'harmonie de
l'universel contraste: veritable Logos divin,
immanente aux choses. Le parallelisme realiste
de la pensE!e et des objets demeure entier, mais
ir.choses et pensees, anim~es par un m~me principe
actif (Ie "feu"), sont emportees du.Pl~me rythme
dans Ie mouvement vertigineux d'un devenir infini. 99

~'spark ofHeraclitus
suggests, of course, that is thanks to the
Fire in our make-up that we are able to know of the
change produced from that Fire for what it is and to sevch It
out. "The burning stream of consciousness within us recognises
the eternal flux without -~recognises it also as reasonable, mr
rather as more reasonableOin proDortion to its vastly ~reater
dominion and duration. ,,10 Jlan derives his being a,nd his power
of knowled~e from the source of all; he neither is nor has knowledge save by Its virtue. There is in this a germ of great possibilities for the future: being and truth are seen as intimately
related, as having one principle and that divine.
Yet, not only were these good points vitiated by the
system taken as a whole, but his successors were to seize upon
and emphasise the bad Doints until they had brought about a
grave crisis in thought. We say that his system was bad, even
though we willingly acknowledge the wonderful powers of his mind
and the great advance which he made over the Milesians, for he
did reason more abstractly to a more complete system.
But therein he contradicted a fundamental principle of
all sound philosophy, namely, that "to have a real chi8¥e there
must be two actually existing termini of the change".
Change
cannot take place without something that changes; there must be
a term at which a changeable thing is at or in a given stare and
a passage to another term at which it is in another state. We
need not labor the point here. Let it be enough to note that
Heraclitus did not take this fact into account. As for his teaching on the one subject which by its'changes'along the ways up
and down gives rise to all things, "patet per se, doctrinam, ex
igni fieri omnia, esse falsam. Affirmatio Lasalle et aliorum,
ipsum intellexisse ignem ut quid immateri.le, et sic iDtroduxisse
conceptum spiritus in philosophiam, sustineri nequit." 102
The cause of all things, the Fire, is moreover inextricably bound up with them and is as material as they are. It is
a good sign for a man to choose something as cause because it is
less grossly material and can transform matter, but the Heraclitean explanation is still with reference only to a material
cause and assumes the ternal, unproduced character thereof. It is
another good sign that in his quest after something which would
unify all things he lighted upon a Logos, which some men were
to take as an eternal wisdom. Even so, 18~s was still material:
the purest fire, but fire all the same.
It is not until we
come to Anaxagoras that we have an explicit, though imperfect recognition of the distinct reality of mind and its influence on
the production of things.
With everything material and with our knowledge obtaining
thanks to a material communion between internal and external
fires, it is plain that knowledge as we properly understand it
could have no place here. So concerned in deed was Heraclitus
for the universal character of change that, as the remains show,
he held that contradictory proiositions could at once and in the
same sense have equal weight. Perhaps if one had questioned
Heraclitus himself ••• one might have forced him to confess that
opposite statements can never be true of the same subjects. But,
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as it is, he adoptedl~~is
statement involves."
A good, forthright denial of the principle of contradiction, even if one can not very well live up to it, is a~ood way
to destroy any science of knowledge at the start. The development
of such a denial are interestin~, for, as St Thomas pOints out,
a man who says that It man exists and I1man does not exist" are at
one and the same time true assumes this as a certain affirmation,
and that to say this is not so is a denial of the original statement. Now, if affirmation and negation are at once true, it must
also be true to deny the affirmation that affirmation and negation are at once true. If any negation is true at once Wira5its
opposite affirmation, such must hold with every negation.
Heraclitus may mot have realised all this, but it remains that
his teachings, by destroying the fundamental principle of contradiction, were thus fraught with disaster. "Car l'application du
premier principe exige, dans l'~tre, un point fixe: lerrr~YT~~'t
1a pure variabilit~ est incompatible avec la v~rit~ ~e6premier
principe: H~raclite engendre fatalement Protagoras."
Even if Heraclitus thought of a fixed, recurring order
of change which men could affirm (although how they could do so
is another question) and did hint at some kind of stability in
the constant exchanges , his followers were to find that the principle of change wasla7"corrosive solvent, too powerful for any
vessel to contain". U His disciples became impossible relativists, impossible to argue with. Once the principle of contradiction was discarded, it was but consistent for Cratylus to confine his expression to a dumb show, since any proposition would
no sO~88r be spoken than it would be false in that ceaseless
flux.
Even so, Heraclitus exhorted men in a moving and noble
manner to study after truth, and so deserves credit. It is, however, a little startling to find him also declaring: "Though
thisl\oyoS is true evermore, yet men are as unable to understand
it when they hear it for the first time as before they have
heard it at all". 109 We might think of practice in this line as
help fu1 but Heraclitus, while avowing that "thought is common
to all",110 tells us that even "the most esteemed among them
knows but fancies, and holds fast to them, yet of a truth justi!!
shall overtake the artificers of lies and the false witnesses".
The truth is to be sought, but its discovery is something of a
problem and, as we saw, he hever quite explained the right process of getting there. Small wonder, then, that men, impressed
by his doctrine of change and prone to Sophistic errors, would
be discouraged by this and find it hard to avoid scepticism.
As we are now aware, men cannot comprehend the Truth,
but can attain to some knowledge concerning it. There may have
been an adumbration of this in Heraclitus, but it was not taken
as such, and the everlasting quest without satisfactiori, however
it may commend itself to certain moderns, proved discouraging
and even a source of despair.
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As a natural corollary of such a philosophy, the sensescannot possibly apprehend truth
and soskepticism is the highest pinnacle man's ~
knowledge, as derived from his senses, can attain. Man has, it is true, reason; but it has
been granted him evidently for the sport of
the eternal taw, since by its use man can never
attain the truth of Lafe, resident in the Law.112

The fiery death may turn the trick, perhaps. At any event, we
find the system of Heraclitus involved from its very start in
the gravest contradictions, and at variance with common sense.
Man's experience does, after all, reveal to him that he knows of
substances; he can by analysis show that, despite the constant
changes which things are doubtless undergoing, there is something
which abides. Were this not so, change itself, demanding the
two termini, would be impossible, for with the sublation of
reality the changes of realities must also pass.
Furthermore, to know pf all the change in the higher
way which Heraclitus demands (if there is to be any hope of
truth) that we be able to recognise change as such, which means
recognising the termini. If it all were in the ceaseless flux,
we could never know of it at all, let alone with the certainty
he recommends.
If we add to this the materialism of his doctrine in
general and the rather inconsistently present germs of scepticism, we can see that his initial destruction of the principle
of contradiction is almost completely vitiating.
On the positive side, there is still his cogency of
thought and his v~gor in prosecuting such deep questions until
he arrived at answers which could not but stimUlate reactions.
At least, he opposed the superficial and the common place,
stressing the universal truth, even though his own system led
him to a yet more destructive individualism than the one which
he fought. He put the important problems forcibly to the notice
of thinking men and did love wisdom.
In the theory of Heraclitus, scientific reflection as the sole true method already so far
strengthened itself in the abstract devevelopment
of his concepts that it set itself over against
customary ouinion and sense appearance with a
rugged self:cbnsciousness. 113
Notes to the Second Chapter:
1. G. Boas, The Major Traditions of European Philosophy,
pg. 1.

2. J~ Burnet, Greek Philosophy: Part I, pg. 17.
3. Christopher Dawson has given an excellent description
of the early civilisations, including that of Crete with its
material accomplishments (which he woukd suggest as marvelous~
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,.. f;.n his book, The Age of the Gods. His observations on the rela• tionship between the organisation and attainments of the ancient states, and their religious views deserve notice.
.'
4. Burnet, op.cit. As to the importance of these contacts
we should remember that if the Asiatics nad,c:not only elaborate
systems of theology, but rudiments of a scientific astronomy.
The Egyptians not only had a religion which fires the popular
imagination even today, but had also the beginnings of geometry,
a gift more precious for the subsequent history of the European
intellect than any other which the Greeks received from foreign
lands." Boas, op.cit., pD. 1-2.
5. efr. E. Mitchell, A Study of Greek Philosophy, pg. 7.
6. The early philosophers did their best and could not
altogether be expected to provide from the start a sound and
integrated scientia rerum per causas, but, if we are to judge
their work, we must have a standard. This, as the first chapter
brings out, we find, at the instance of reason, in the Metaphysics of Aristotle and St Thomas.
7. Metaphysica Liii 983b.' "Dicit ergo primo, quod plurimi eorum qui primo philosophati sunt de rerum naturis, posuerunt
principia omnium esse sola ilIa, quae reducuntur ad speciem
causae materialise Et ad hoc dicendum accipiebant quattuor conditiones materiae, quae ad rationem principii pertinere videntur.
Nam id ex quo res est, principium rei esse videtur: hujusmodi
autem est materia; nam ex materia dicimus materiatum esse, ut
ex ferro cultellum. --Item illud ex quo fit aliquid, cum sit et
principium generationis rei, videtur esse causa rei, quia res
per generationem proced1t in esse. Ex materia autem primo res
fit, quia materia rerum factioni praeexistit. Et ex ipsa etiam
non per accidens aliquid fit. Nam ex contrario vel privatione
aliquid per accidens dicitur fieri, sicut dicimus quod ex nigro
81 t album. -- Tertio illud videtur esse rerum princ1pium, in
quod finaliter omnia per corruptionem resblvuntur. Nam sicut
principia sunt prima in generatione, ita sunt ultima in resolutione. Et hoc etiam materiae manifeste contingit. -- Quarto, cum
principia oportet manere, id videtur esse principium, quod in
generatione et corruptione manet. Materia autem, quam dicebant
esse substantiam rei, manet in omni transmutatione; sed passiones
mutantur, ut forma, et omnia quae adveniunt super sUbstantiam
materiae. Et ex his omnibibus concludebant, quod materia est
elementum et principium omnium eorum quae sunt.
" ••• Quando fit aliqua mutatio circa passiones substantia manente, non dicimus aliquid esse ~eneratum vel corruptum simpliciter, sed solum secundum quid .• ~ Vateria autem, quae
est rerum substantia, secundum eos, semper manet. Omnis autem
mutatio fit circa aliqua quae adveniunt ei, ut passiones. Et ex
hoc concludebant quod nifil generatur vel corrumpitur simpliaite
sed solum secundum quid ••• Quamvis autem sic convenirent in
ponendo causam materialem, tamen differebant in ejus positione
quantum ad duo: scilicet quantum ad pluralitatem: quia quidam
ponebant unum, quidam plures: et quantum ad speciem, quia quidam
ponebant ignem, quidam aquam etc. Similiter ponentium plura, q~i
dam haec, quidam ilIa principia materialia rebus attribuebant.
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st Thomas, ;n I Metanh., lect. 4,74-76.
8. Dicitur autem Thales speculativae philosophiae prin~
ceps fuisse, quia inter septem saplentes, qui post theo~gos
poetae fuerunt, ipse solus ad considerandum rerum causas se
transtulit, aliis sapientibus circa moralia occupatis." St Thoma
.Q1?cit., 77.
9. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Phtlosonhers, I.
23-24. (Hereafter, we shall refer to this source by the name of
its author.)lnterestingly immortality of the soul as a doctrine
is ascriBed to this first philosopher; even if it is not his,
the implied association in people's minds between his profession
and such a key doctrine is worth noting.
10. Aristotle speaks of ways of making money, and recommends "the contrivance of Thales the Milesian (which was certainly a gainful one, but as it was his it was attributed to his
wisdom, though the method he used was a general one, and would
universally succeed}, when they reviled him for his poverty, as
if the study of philosophy were useless: for they say that he,
perceiving by his skill in astrology ,that there would be great
plenty of olives that year, while it was yet winter, having got
a little money, he gave earnest for all the oil works that were
in Miletus and Chios, which he hired ati.ca~.low price, there being
no one to bid against him; but when the season 'Came for making
oil, he all at once let them upon what terms he pleased; and
raising a large sum of money by that means, convinced them that
it was easy for philosophers to be rich if they chose it, but
that that was not what they aimed at; in this manner is Thales
said to have shown his wisdom." Poli tica I. xi 1259a.
As John Marshall has observed, "it is interesting to
find that the man who was thus the first philosopher, ••• and
so became the predecessor of all those votaries of 'other-world'
ways of thinking, --whether as academl c idealist, ob 'budge-doctor of the stoic fur', or Christian ascetic or what not, whose
ways are such a puzzle to the 'hard-headed practical man', was
himself one of the shrewdest men of his day, so shrewd that by
common consent he was placed foremost in antiquity among the
Seven Sages, or seven shrewd men, whose practical wisdom became
a world's tradition, enshrined in anecdote and crystallised in
proverb. 11 A Short History of Greek Philosonhy, pg. 4.
11. Burnet, on. cit. , pg. 18. He adds, concerning the
stories which treat of Thales and the right triangle, that "What
we are told of Thales suggests that he invented some further application of this primitive piece of knowledge, and if so that
was the beginning of rational science." (pg. 20.).
Herodotus narrates that, in the course of an encounter
between the Medes and Lydians in the sixth year of their war,
"during the battle the day was turned to night. Thales of Miletus
had foretold this loas of daylight to the lonians, fixing it
within the year in which the change did indeed happen. II Again,
When Croesus was at a loss as to how he might lead his army
across the Halys, "Thales, being in the encampment, made the
river, which flowed on the left hand, flow also on the right of
the army (by dividing it into two fordable channels)." That he
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he was a sagacious statesman is shown by his advice at the Panlo nion to the effect that "the Ionians (should) make one common
place of counsel, which should be in Teos, for that was.the center of Ionia; and that the state of the other cities should be
held to be no other than if they were but townships." Herodotus,
Histories, I.lxxiv, lxxv, clxx.
-12. Metaphysica I.iii 983bj de Anima I.v 411a.
l~. l/IIetanhysi ca, loco ci t. "Utebatur tri bus s ignis ad ostendendfum.aquam esse principium essendi rebus: quorum primum est,
quia nutrimentum viventium oportet esse humidum. Ex eodem autem
viventia nutriuntur et sunt; et sic humor videtur esse principiu
essendi. -- Secundum signum est, quia cujuslibet rei corporeae,
et maxime viventis, per proprium et naturalem calorem conserVatur; calor autem ex hUmore fieri videtur, cum ipse humor sit
quasi caloris materia; unde ex hoc videtur quod humor sit rebus
urincipium essendi. -- Tertium signum est, quia vita animalis in
humido consistit. Unde pronter desiccationem naturalis humidi,
animal moritur, et per ejus conservationem, animal sustentatur.
Vivere autem viventibus est esse. Unde ex hoc patet quod humor
sit rebus principium essendi. -- Et haec etiam tria signa seinvicem consequuntur. Ideo enim animalhumido nutritur, quia calor
naturalis humido sustentatur; et ex his duobus sequitur, quod
vi vere animalis 8i t semper humidum. Id autem ex quo :'aliquid fit,
idest ex quo aliquid esse consequitur, et principium omnibus hoc
accepit hanc opinionem quod humor esset omnibus principium.
"Similiter etiam accepit signum ex rerum generatione,
quia generationes viventium, quae sunt nobilissima in entibus,
fiunt ex seminibus. Semina autem sive spermata omnium viventium
habent humidam naturam. Unde ex hoc apparet, quod humor est generationis rerum principium. Si autem omnibus praedictis conjungatur quod aqua est humiditatis principium, sequitur quod aqua sit
primum rerum principi urn." St Thomas, In I Metanh., lect. 4, 80-8
14. Burnet, on. cit. , pg. 21.
15. Diogenes Laertius I. 24.
16. "Ciceronis assertio, quam multi posteriores sequuntur,
Thaletem admisisse Deum diversum ab aqua et ex ea formantem
mundu:n: Thales dixit, Deum ess e mentem, quae ex aqua cuncta fingeret" (de Nat.Deor. I.x.), fidem non meretur, cum nimis aperte
sit cpntra Aristotelem dOeentem, Ionios non distinxisse causam
efficientem a materiali et Anaxagoram demum primo posuisse divinam mentem uti mundi ordinatorem." I. Schaaf, S.J~, Instituti
Historiae Philosophiae Graecae, pp. 17-8.
17. B. Burt, A Brief History of Greek Philosophy, pg •. 2
We would take it as referring to exnlicit dualism.
18. B. Fuller, mistory of Greek Philosonhy, pg. 86.
19. A. Benn,The Greek Philosonhers, vol.i, pg. 8. "His
answer,~ftll is water', was the first word of Ionian philosophy.
It had been anticipated even in the Homeric cosmogony, which
spoke of Ocean and Tethys as parents of the gods; but the new
departure consists in saying not what things come from, but what
things are, and in conceiving of the world as all. That in some
sense this great utterance found an echo in contemporary minds
may be reasonably inferred from Pindar's saying more than once,

'water is the best thing in the world', a phrase which otherwise
would seem unmeaning. But Pindar is too much tinctured with
tradit}on and legend to have any clear conception of th~ philosopher s aims. Another saying of Thales is more on a level with
Greek feeling, but also carries with a meaning above the reach
of ordinary Greek thoug~t - namely, 'all things are full of
godS'. If we take the two sayings together, they may be held to
anticipate the fine expression of Hippocrates of Cos, that'all
occurrences are equally natural and equally divine'." L. Campy
bell, Religion in Greek Literature, pp. 164-5.
20. efr. J. Ferrier, Lectures on Greek Philosophy & c.,
pp. 44-5·
21. M. Taylor, Greek Philosophy, pp. 13-4.
22. Mitchell, op.cit. "Because he first makes the attempt
to explaI~ natural appearances from their universal ground. He
draws back from the world of nature, where he sees only change
and multiplicity, and seeks to reduce all things to one simple
substance, uncreated and imperishable. This substance he calls
water, giving it a physical form, but meaning by it the essence
of things, that which is not perceived by the senses, the unity
underlying multiplicity. It was a grand affirmation of the human
spirit, this affirmation of the One made by Thales in that old
Greek world where the very gods had a theogony and were many and
changing." on. cit. , pg. 11.
23. nSecundum Philos. in princ. Metaph. 'ad sapientem pertinet considerare causam altissimam, per quam certissime de alii
judicatur, et secundum quam omnia ordinar± oportet'. Causa autem
altissima dupliciter accipi potest: vel simpliciter vel in aliquo genere; ille ergo, qui cognoscit causam altissimam in aliquo genere, et per earn potest de omnibus quae sunt illius generis judicare et ordinare, dicitur esse sapiens in illo genere, ut
in medicina vel architectura; secundum illud I ad Cor. 3: ut
sapiens architectus fundamentum posui: ille autem, qui cognoscit
causam altissimam simpliciter, quae est Deus, dicitur sapiens
simpliciter; inquantum per re~ulasRivinas omnia poteat judicare
et ordinare. 1t St Thomas, Summa Theologica II-II.xlv.l.
24. Benn, on. cit. , pg. 9.
25. Diogenes Laertius II. 1-2.
26. Theophrastus, Ph~Sic.opinion. fro 2. (In Ritter and
Freller (hereafter R.P.), 1 ; Burnet, Early Greek Philosonhy
(E.G.P.), p~. 52.).
27. He did not ascribe the origin of things to any alter tion in matter, but said that the oppositions in the substratum,
which was a boundless body, were separated out." Simplicius,
Phys. p. 150, 20; in Burnet, OPe cit., pg. 53. "Further, It Aristotle remarks, IIthere cannot be a single, simple body which is infinite, either, as some hold, one distinct from the elements,
which they then derive from it, or without this qualification.
For there are some who make this (i.e., a body distinct from the
elements) the infinite, and not air or water, in order that the
other things may not be destroyed by their infinity. They are in
opposition to one another - air is cold, water moist, and fire
hot - and therefore, if anyone of them were infinite, the rest
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have ceased to be by th~:9~ime. Accordingly they
what 1s infinite is something other than the elements,
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say that
and from
it the elements arise." Physica III-v. 204b (in Burnet, 00. cit.)
28. Burnet, op.cit., pp. 22-3.
~ ~
29. Cfr. Schaaf, oD.cit., pg. 19. There he points out
that Ritter bases his view on the Aristotelian f.ll '(\A-Q.. from
vlhi ch singular things are said to be separated out by eccrisis
or segregation, and cites Zeller (T.5, 204.), and notes that
Aristotle distinguished the boundless from any determinate body,
while !h,eophrastu,s (apud Simpl~cium, Physic. p. 157) calls it:
,sUG"l y (J..o~L~'TOV ~\. \(0.., J t.tcfas 'Well )(o.,.~ /LiY2I),oS'
30. Cfr. Aristotle, Physica III-iv 203b.
31 "To Thales water, the all-embracing element, became as
such the first cause of all things, the first principle of exist
ence. His successor ad0pted the same general point of view, but
looked out from it with a more penetrating gaze. Beyond water
lay something else which he called the Infinite ••• a storehouse
of materials whence the waste of existence could be perpetually
made good." Benn, Ope cit., 1.9.
32. Adamson, op.clt., pg. 15. As a matter of interest,
efr. Windelband, Histo!y of Anc~ent philosophy, pg. 40.
33. Burt, op.cit., pp. 3-4. Theterm1nology is not unexceptionable, but he makes a good p01n:t.,
34. "Anaximander conceptum inflniti induxit in philosophi
am eoque etiam progressum fecit, quod prlncipium suum abstractius concepit, quam Thales, et quod, licet confuse, m010 quo res
fiant ex illo principio, assignat." Schaaf, on.c:1:t., pg. 20.
35. Ferrier, op.cit., pg. 54.
36. This is described as in R.P. 22.
37. Laertius Diogenes II.3 ff.
38. Schaaf, op.cit., pg. 21.
39. Agtius, Placita I.3,4. In Burnet, 00. cit. , pg. 73.
40. Taylor, op.cit., pg. 17.
41. Cicero, de Natura Deorum I.x., in Schaaf, op.cit.,
q.v. We should not take this too strictly, but rather as implied.
"Cicero/i·gays that Anaximenes regarded air as a god, and adds
that it came into being. That cannot be right. Air, as the primary substance is certainly eternal, and it is quite likely that
Anaximenes called it ~ivine', as Anaximander did the Boundless;
but it is certain that he also spoke of ~ods who came into being
and passed away. This is expressly stated by Hippolytos, and
also by st. Augustine. These gods are probably to be explained
like Anaximander's. Simplicius, indeed, takes another view, but
he may have been misled by a Stoic authority." Burnet, op.cit.,
pg. 78.
42. Cfr. R.P. 25.
43. Schaaf, op.cit., pg. 22.
44.Metaphysica I.iii 984a.
45. Fr. 11. The fragments here quoted are according to
Burnet, E.G.P., pp. 132 ff.
46. F. Jevons, History of Greek Literature, pg. ~66.
47. Mm. Croiset, Abridged History of Greek Literature,
Dg. 155.

48. Laertius Diogenes, IX. 2. Cmp. fro 114 in Burnet,where
hanging is specifically advised. Cicero puts it more generally:
"universos ait Ephesios morte mulctandos". Tusc. Disp. 1{.xxvi.
105·

49.
50.
51.
52.

Laertius Diogenes, IX. 2-3.
M.E.J. Taylor, op.cit., pg. 24.
R. Descartes, Discours d~ lac M~thode, I, ·ad finem.
Laertius Diogenes IX. 5. Indeed, Heraclitus thought tha

he could say: "I have sought for mys elf". (Fr. 80.).
53. Joseph A. 1:cLaughlin, S.J., The Prob:Lem of Knowledge,
pg. 10. He goes on to observe: "What a crude state of mind naif
realism implies may be seen by reflecting that it is a commonplace of our experience for an object moving away from us to become smaller and smaller until it dwindles to a me':""'e speck on th
horizon. If then, as the credulous and unreflecting naif realis:
imagines, all of our sense perceptions must be taken without
question a3 passive and yet true representations of reality, we
should have to believe that any object of visual perception, for
instance, diminishes in size as its position relative to us
takes on more and more distance.
fI • • • Our senses,
it is true, do not err if they are sound
and rightly disposed, but not for that reason is the validity or
truth value of knowledge infallibily guaranteed, s~nce the cognitive act is something more than the nroduction of sense images
or phantasms in a knowing subject inactively receiving them."
Ope cit.
54. ~.r:cLaughlin, on. ci t.
55. Laertius Diogenes IX. 1.
56. Fr. 17.
57. Fr. 2
58. Taylor, QP.cit. , pg. 25.
59. Plato, Cratylus, 402 A. (R.P. 33.)
60.
Fr. 41- 2.
61. Fr. 81
62. Fr. 22. As Aristotle says, "Heraclitus, again, mal ntains that 'contra~ety is expedient, and that the best agreement
aris es from things di f J:ering, and that all things come into being
in the way Of the principle of antagonism'." (Ethic.Nicom.VIII.
i. 1155b.).
63. Fr. 44
64. Fr. 18
65. Fr. 45
66. Burnet, E.G.P., pg. 143.
67. Ope cit., pg. 14468. Fr. 20.
69. Fr. 69
70. Fr. 46.
For a general summary of his teachings at
71. Fr. 47.
greater length than is to our interest here, we may refer to
Burnet, E.G.P" ch, 3, or Diogenes, IX. 7 ff.
72. Fr. 68.
73. Fr. 76.
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74. Fr. 85.
75. Fr. 95.
76. "Man kindles a light for himself in the nigh~-time,
when he has dled, but ls alive. The sleeper, whose visio~ has
been put out, lights up from the dtad; he that is awake lights
up from the sleeping." Fr. 77.
17. Fr. 72.
78. Fr. 103.
79. Frs. 105-7.
80. Fr. 101.
81. Frs. 122-3.
82. Frs. 67 and 78.
83. "It is a weariness to labor for the same masters ana.
to be ruled by them. Fr. 82. "It rests by changing." Fr. 83.
"Even the posset separates if it is not stirred." Fr. 84.
84. J. Erdmann, A History of Philosophy, pg. 51. One
author has observed: "The soul is, as it were, a wandering spark
shot forth from that universal F1re or universal Reason Which encompasses heaven and rules all things, and is maintained only by
constant accessions from the source whence it came. It derives
no advantage from its union with the body; the birth or man is a
misfortune, inasmuch as he is born only to die. It is only when
the soul returns again to the primal fire that its true life begins." A.Stoeckl, Handbook of the History of Philosophy, pg. 37.
85. Windelband, op.cit., pg. 37. efr.Burnet, E.G.P.,
sectn. 74 ff.
86. J.Marshall, A Short History of Greek Philosophy, pg.
87. Fr. 4.
88. Fr. 10.
89. Adamson, op.cit., pp. ~3-4.
90. Burt, pp.cit., pp. 22-3.
91. Erdmann, op.cit., pg. 49. Continuing, he says: "Per.
the preference which he displays for the sense of smell is based
on the fact that it perceives volatilisation, and this is most
of all dependent on the change of form. Schuster acutely shows
that the passages which seem to imply Heraclitus' contempt for
the senses may also be dlfferently utilised, especially as to
make him appear the champion or the 1nductive method , in oppositlon to one-sided deduction." J. Beare has an interesting discussion of the Heraclitean views on the sense of smell, in hls
Greek Theories of Elementary Cognition, pp. 148 ff.
92. Beare, op.c1t., pg. 4.
93. Mitchell, Ope cit.,· pg. 29. Brehier comments: ttHerac11
a eu l'intuition que la sagesse consiste a decouvrir la formule
generale, .le logos de ce changement." Histoire de la Ph1losophie,
tom. I, 58.
94. Fr. 19.
95. Fr. 29. It is important, after all, to lay stress
on the need of l1ving.up to laws, and to recogn1se the purpose
therefor, even 1n an imperfect faShion.
II
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96. Fuller, op.cit., pg. 96. As to the meaning of the
"LogoS "? Dr Adam has written: "There are few questions appertaining to the history of ancient philosophy which have beena'more
widely and warmly debated than the meaning of the word ). oy os in
Heraclitus. By the ancients, it was understood to mean reason -cosmic reason -- universally dtffused, present both in nature
and in man, not of course one incorporeal entity, but identical
with the ever-living, ever-thinking Fire ••• which constitutes
the changeless because ever-changing reality of things: and this
~&'i()~ or universal reason was held to be synonymous with God. In
other words, if the ancients are to be trusted, the Heraclitean
concept of the logos does not really differ from the Stoic, except that on its material side, Logos is in Heraclitus Fire,
whereas, according to the strictest Stoic definition, it is aethere The ancient interpretation has been followed by many exponents of Heracliteanism in modern times, such as Bernays, Patin
Teichmueller, and, with certain reservations, Zeller; but others
have taken a different view. Thus, for example, Heinze denies
that the attribute of intelligence or thou~ht belongs to the Hera
clitean Logos: it is merely what he calls objective reason' or
law, the universal reason manifested in the development of the
world, a principle destitute of anything analogous to consciousness or personality: and Professor Burnet, goes so far as to
maintain, if I understand him rightly, that the Logos doctrine
is entirely Stoic, the world Logos, in the relevant passages of
Heraclitus, meaning only 'argument' or 'discourse' •••
lilt will conduce to clearness if I say at the outset
that, 'as at present advised, I believe the ancients were right
in regarding the Heraclitean Logos as virtually identical with
the Stoic, although the Stoic theory was of course far more fully
developed and elaborated in detail. " The Vitality of Platonism,
and Other Essaxs: Essay on "The Logos of HeraClitus", pp. 77-8.
~he point9ihich particularly interests us is, obviously, that it
was Heraclitus, interpreted in this way, that influenced the development of philosophy. The precise meaning of his doctrine is
an interesting and important question, but in discussing its influence we must also study how men have taken it: adhlc sub judic
lis est.
97. Schaaf, op.cit., pg. 26.
98. Fuller, Ope cit., pp. 130-1.
99. J. Mar~chal, S. J., Le point de depart de la Metaphysiaue, I. 42.
100. Benn, op.cit.
101. J. Mccormick, S. J., Scholastic Metaphysics, I. 58.
102. Schaaf, op.cit., pg. 28.
103. Yet, there is something to the opinion of W. A. Butler that "of all the physical theorists of his time who looked
~pon the world as a vital organism, Heraclitus, perhaps, arrived
~early a~ the purely spiritual conception of its author. II Lecturef
~n the History of Ancient Philosophy, I. 312. The opinion seems
~efensible, if it is taken to mean that 'none arrived nearer,
rather than that he came very near.
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Aristotle, Metaphysica XI. v 1062 a.
As St Thomas notes, "Pnnebat autem Heraclitus duo,
scilicet quod affirmatio et negatio sit simul vera. Ex quo
sequebatur quod omnia propositio tam affirmativa quam ~egativa s
sit vera. - Ite, ponebat quod inter affirmationem et negationem:
sit aliquod medium. Et sic sequebatur quod contingeret neque
affirm~tionem neque negationem esse veram.
Et per consequens
omnem propositionem esse falsam. 1t (In XI M:etanh.· lec. v,222l).
105. Cfr. Sn Thomas, op.cit., 2222. After this analysis
~lhe notes the views of Aristotle: "Inducit rationem contra hoc,
quod ponebatur quod nulla affirmatiosit vera. Si enim nihil
contingat verum affirmare, qui autem dicit nullam affirmationem
veram esse, aliquid affirmat, hoc scilicet quod verum sit nullam
affirrnationent esse veramj ergo hoc ipsum falsum eri t. Et sl
aliquid affirmative dictum verum sit, removebitur 9pinio talium
qui contra omnia instant. Et qui ista positione utuntur,auferunt
totaliter disputationemj quia s1 nihil est verum, non potest
aliquid concedi ex qua disputatio possit procedere. Et si
affirmatio et negatio slnt simul vera, non erit significare aliquid per sermonem, ut supra dictus est. Et sic cessabit disputatio". (op.cit. I 2223.). Clearly, knowledge as we know it
would have no meaning for a consistent Heraclitean.
106. Marechal, Ope ci t., pg. 58. This author later on remarks the teaching of St. Thomas in speci·al contrast with the
Heraclitean: "st. Thomas, comme il Ie declare expressement
(S.T.I.lxxxiv.6.), se range donc aux cdtes d'Aristote, pour
affirmer, contre Democrite aussi bien que contre Platon, la necessit~ d'une collaboration intime du sens et de l~entendement
dans toute connaissance intellectuelle.
"Mais l'apport du sens, c'est la multiplicite des choses
individuelles et changeantes. -Saisie par l'entendement, cette
multiplicite s'unifie et s'immobiliae. Mes yeux voyaient, c~e
a cote, Socrate et Calliaa, et Antisthene, et tant d'autrea:
mon intelligence les soude, pour ainsi dire, en un concept unique, qui les repr~sente tous et chacun: "L'homme" ••• Hercaclite ,1·
disait: liLa main ne touche pas duex fois l'eau d'un fleuve qui
s' ~coule"; la sensation, exprimant un objet essentiellement
changeant, ne saurait se repeter identique; et pourtant, mon
intelligence, immobile sur la rive, contemple sous l'ecoulement
mat-eriel inceBsant, sous Ie flux du temps qui fuit, l'''eau'',
toujoura la m~me. (S. Th. I.84, art. 1).
"Q,u' est-ce done? De la Nobilita' 1,~lntel::ligence fait une
per-manence: la substance. De la multiplicite des individus,
elle fait une unit6: l'espece. Vais-je comme Heraclite,taxer
d'll1usion cette metamorphose antinomique? ••
"Non, continue Saint Thomas, Heraclite a tort, incontestablement: je ne puis sacrifier ainsi la valeur de mon intelligence ••• " (op. cit., pp. 77-78.).
107. Benn, Ope cit., pg. 25.
108. "Its adherents became famous relativists and believed
that it was nonsense to speak of objects in the ordinat'y sense
of the word, since what seem:, like objects change constantly
and are no sooner n&~ed than they are something else. Each man

has his own perceptions; one man's are as good as another's;
and there is no truth binding on all alike.
Out of this doctrine and its apparent implications came the theory of~one of
the most interesting of Gteek heresies, the movement known as
sophistry." Boas, Ope cit., pg. 17.
109. Fr. 2.
110. Fr. 91 a.
111.
Fr. 118.
112. M. McDonald, Progress of Philosophy, pg. 14.
113. Winde1band, ODe cit., pg. 59.

~------~~------~
Chapter III :

The Pythagoreans.

As Gilson has brought out so well in his Spirit of~ediaeval
FhilosoDhy, it is indeed t rue that philoro phy, by definition an
abStract science, is, as realised by men, a way of life, and the
hiShest natural way for a rational animal. In view of their
p~actical interests, we c~n well believe that the earliest represent~tives of our philosophical tradition were aware of this,
but the full consciousness comes with the P~tha.goreans. These
men were, as it seems, influenced by the 8rphio movement and
were in quest of a way of salvation. The science begun at ~ile
tus and paralleled by the learning of neighboring peoples at
least tried to bring man to the ultimate realities and to tell
him of the worlill. of which he was a member.
It was not a very
difficult thing to see in what to some degree perfected man's
highest powers the desired way. "Pythagoras was himself especial
ly honored for this, and his successors, even tolthis day, denominating a certain way of life the Pythagorean."
Althou,cr,h the master of this school fus thus one of the most
significant figures in the history of human thought, not very
much is known concerning him. A number of Lives have been handed
down, "but they were written hundr&ds ')f years after the event,
and are filled with a tissue of extravagant fancies, and with,
stories of miracles and vvonders worlted by Pythagoras. "2 Legends
early attached themselves to his name, so that the actual details of his life (if we may grant that he did live) are obscured
As nearly as 'Ne can make out, he must have been born about the
first third of the sixth century (B. C.). Accordingttro the tradition, he was a native of Samos; if this is true, it would allow
for his early contact with the physio.ogers of ~iletus, as he is
reported to have been the student of Anaximander,whose theory
of planetary rings might well have developed into the Pythagorean
ast ronomYi much of the Pythagorean mathematic might be cited
to this same effect. 3 Other accounts have him studying also un::e
Pherecydes, who would likely have given him a mystical bent,
such as he did have.
In addition, he is said to have undertaken rather extensive
travels in the Orient and in Egypt, where he studied the remarkable civilisation and stored-up wisdom of the venerable theoorac!l:es.
While still young, so eager was he for knowledge, he left his own country and had himself
initiated into all the mysteries and rites not
only of Greece but also of foreign countries •••
He learnt the Egyptian language ••• , and he also
journeyed among the Chaldaeans and i,~agi. Then
while in Crete he went down into the C8,ve of Ida
wi th Epimenides; he also entered t ~~e Egyptian
sanctauries, and was told their secret lore
concerning the gods. 4
Thus prepared and broadened, he fared to Crotona, in the South
of Italy and, settling there, gathered about him a group of men
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interested in his teachings. He did not organise a philosophic
school, so much as a society of religious and moral reformers,
something not unlike a religious order.
~
The Pythagorean ethical views were rigorous and ascetic in character. They insisted upon
the utmost purity of life in the members of the
Order. Abstinence from flesh was insisted upon,
although this was a0parently a late development •
••• They forbade the eating of beans. fhey wore
a garb ~ peculiar to themselves. The body,they
taught, is the prison or tomb of the soul ••• It
was largely a mystical society. The Pythagoreans
developed their own ritual, cermonial and mysteries ••• They cultivated the arts and crafts
gymnasti cs, musi c, medi cine and mathemati cs. ~

The school, which interested itself for a time and without lasting success in aristocratic government, continued after
the death of the master. Its career was long and varied,so much
so, in fact, that it is now quite difficult to determine with
what views it started and what ones came later. Ppthagoras himself attained to considerable fame, because of his learning and
wisdom the fruit, his followers would have it, of his many
lives. 6 Empedocles, who is reported to have been a renegade
member of the school, spoke of him in terms of hichest praise:
And there was among them a man of rare
knowledge, most skilled in all manner of wise
works, a man w!~,o had won the utmost wealth 0 f
wisdom; for whensoever he strained with all his
mind, he easily saw everything of all things that
are, in ten, ye q , twenty lifetimes of men."r
Of the doctrines ·which the master or his earlier disciples
probably expounded we shall deal with those touching on the
constitution of reality and on human knowledge. Their views her
were interestingly different from thl)se of the Asian cosmologists
for thei did not posit some quite determinate element as the
material principle of bodies, something which the senses readily
perceive. Rather, being of a mathematic"l turn of mind, they
hhose to consider the extension of the bodies which they were
endeavoring to explain. Attending,moreover, to mathematical relatmonships, they built up a somewhat elaborate system, wherein
tiley affirmed numoers, the equal and unequal, and the Limited
and Unlimited to be the principles of things.
Now, there is an almost universal tradition to the effect
that Pythagoras, in a smith or elsewhere, discovered the harmonic
intervals, and was much impressed by the fact that it was possible exactly to represent the harmonic proportions: - 12 : 8 : 6,
so that 12 : 6 is the octave, 12 :8 the fifth, and 8 : 6 the
fourth. Interested as he was in the ethical value of music,
Pythagoras was brought to reflect that "if musical sounds can be

- 37reduced to numbers, w~1Y no~ everythi~g else? "rhere are many
likenesses to nUwber In thlngs, and l t may well be that a lucky
exneriment, like that by which the gctave was discoveredf' will
reveal their true numerical value." Their physiological researches had also convinced the Pythagoreans that health is to be
found in a due measure, not ,et exactly formulated, so that they
felt they wey'e sure of their ground in this matter.'
It is really an extraordinary theory, and one whi ch is not
easy to understand.
If we speak of the nu:::nbers only as a measur,
t is conceivable that they are somet~i.t}5 in the way of exemplary
causes, somehow repres ented by thethill?',s of this world.
Such
ight be the interpretation put on Aristotle's cOIl1.'TIent that "the
,thagoreans say that things exist by , imitation' of numbers,
nd Pla.to says they exist by participation (in the Ideas), chang~
the name.
But what ,the participation or imitation Forms could
be they left an open question."9 If, h~'lever, vve take these remarks as caating a reflection on the fsilure of Platonists and
pythagoreans alike to clari fy their terminology, we can see that
they do not exc.lude the possibility that the things so imi tate th
numbers as to be identified with them. Other observations bear'"
out the belief 'that things are intrinsically constituted by numbers in such a v(ay that they can be simply saio to be numbers.
In this vein" Aristotle says that Plato differed from the Pythaoreans in that he set the One and the Numbers a,art from things,
sneaking of "his view that the Humbers exist apart from sensible
thinss, wh~le they say that the thinf,S themselves are ::umbers,
nd" do not place the 8bjects of mathematics between the Forms
nd sensible things. I
"
Wr are told also of some of the more detailed reasons because of vl'hich the Pythagoreans thus regarded numbers. Thanks
to their background, the principles of mathematics were grasped
as the most evident and so it seemed but lo~ical to look upon ~"
them as the first by nature itself. Their esoteric research,
furthermore, disclosed to them close resemblances between numbe~s
and the objects of sensible experience, resemblances which seemed more likely and assuredly more important than those betvl"een
the same things and any of the determinate substances so far
proposed as the first cause of reality.
For them,accordingly,
there was 1/ such and su ch a combination 0 f numbers being justi ce I
nother being soul and reason, another being opportunity - and
imilarly almost all ott:er things being numerically expressible".
his was, as iNe said, especially to be observed in the modificaions of the musical scale.
~
With things apparently modelled upon the numbers and the
umbers in seeming th e first in nature, the elements of numbers
lere taken as the elements of all reality, and the he0vens became
great musical scale and a number. 12 Everything comes from
umber and is to b2 understood properly in terms of it.
The nrinciple of all things is the monad or
unit; ariSing from this monad the undefined dyad
or two serves as material SUbstratum to the monad,
Which is cat.se; from the monad and the undefined
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pOints, lines; from lines, plane figures; from
plane figures, solid figures; from solid figunes,
sensible bodies, the elements of which are four,;'.i_
fire, water, earth and air; these elements interchang e and turn into one another comnletely, and
combine to produce a universe animate, intelligent, spherical with the earth at its centre, the
earth itself too being spherical and inhabited
round about. 13
Just how all these events would be accomplished has never been
made quite clear. Insofar, of course, as the undefined dyad
may be regarded as something potential with reference to the
causative activity of the priw1tive monad, the Pythagoreans are
among the ~irst to include in their philosophy ~ome important
.ugSeat~on of the doctrine of matter and form. 14 So far,
umber acts both formally and materially, and is itself a deriation from one or monad.
These thinkers also consider that number is
the principle bothas matter for things and as
forming their modifications and their permanent
3tates, and hold that the elements of number are
the even and the odd, and t~at of these the
latter is limited, and the former unlimited; and
th$ the One nroceeds from both of these (for it
is both even and odd), and number from the One;
and thatlthe whole heaven, as has been said, is
numbers. 5
There is one feature of the theory and its supporting
easons which deserves especial notice. Pythagoras had been
ncouraged in his work b °cause the harmonic proportions enabled
im better to know the subject of TIlusic. Elsewhere too number
erved to make things in a way clearer, and it could stand for
ome aspects of reality and so facilitate our thou~ht concerning
hem. Number, in other words, appeared to be intimately related
to the kriowabili ty of things, and so to what makes them importm t
for us. "Now truth is a peculiar innate attribute of Number; it
is of the very nature of Number or Harmony to reject deception
s ini~~cal and antagonistic. It is its function to rule and
regulate, and to teach the hitherto unknown. Hence the concluion that what is the most fixed and indefectible in our knowedge must also be the unc:-:angeavle essence of things in themelves."16 It is a notion which needs a sood deal of analysis
nd development, but a su~~estion all the same which will bear
ruit in the philosophy of-Plato and thereafter be perfected by
ristotle and Thomas.
As Aristotle at least unde~stood the Pythagorean teaching,
he soul and intellect of man were likewise numbers, and so would
e rather difficult nicely to distinguish from other things,which
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are, after all, numbers too. Some members of the school had views
e~en less proper touch1ng on the soul, and Aristotle likens them
to the materialists of an atomic cast: I1Quidam enim eorum affirmabant animam non esse nisi ramenta, quae in aere invenrllntur,
alii autem eam esse id, quod ista movet. Et addebant hanc praeoise esse rati~nem, cur motu constanti agitentur, etai nU~iUS
adal t ventus. t1"(Certain of the later Pythagoreana appear to have
carried the notion of harmony over into their psychology, and
to have regarded the soul as a harmony, or, more strictly, an
attunement of the body. Although it is comparatively easy to
trace the mathematicai and medical origins of such a theory, it
was probably not entertained by the early followers of the
master, who was so strongly persuaded of the endurance of the
soul after death - whereas this "attuaement could not outlast
the bOdy:
When the soul is in a manner strung and
held together by the elements of hot and COld,
wet and dry, then the soul is the harmony or
due proportionate admixture of them. But if so,
whenever the strings of the body are unduly
loosened or overstrained through disease or
other injury, then the soul, though most divine,
11ke other harmonies of music or or works of
art, of course perlshes at once; although the
material remains of the body may last for a
considerable ti!~, untll they are either decayed or burnt.
No, sucn a theory cannot very well have been that or a man wnose
keen feelings about the survival of the soul led him to recog- 1
nlse ln the yelps or a beaten dog the voice Of a departed rrlena.
This doctrine of transmigration he quite prObably plcked up rrom
the Orph1c cults, and reenrorced it with eiements borrowed t"rom
the Egyptians. nIt was on thls that the doctrine of Reminiscence
Which p~ys so great a part ln Plato's .eno and Phaedo , was
based.
Such is certalnly ln accord with the statement ot" Empedocles that hls master was wlse wltn the wlsdom of a score of
11ves.
The theory of pal1ngenesis, sometlmes, as Burnet aptly
polnts out, mistakenly refferred to as that or 'metempsychoS1S',
ls not a notably logical one. For, it would have it that tne
same soul can come back as another sage or as a neighbor's
watCh-dog; accordingly, it contradlcts tne notlon - a very sound
one - that thlngs are constituted by their forms. All this would
moreover, seem to cast some reflectlon on the veracl ty 0:1' the
numbers, slnce they make us such varlabie essences.
II

Sed en absurdum, qUOd accldlt et hulc tneoriae et plurlmis, quae de anlma habentur; conJungunt enim simp~iciter animam cum corpore eamque
ln ipso cOllocant, quln uilo mOdO ulterlus explicent, quam ob rem hOC fiat et qua~es dlsposltlones

in corpore talis unio subaudiat. Et tamen omnino
necessarium videtur esse factum hoc explicare;
nam haec praeeise animae et corporis communio efdicit, ut unum agat, alterum patiatur, ut unum .'
moveatur, alterum moveat, cum nulla ex hisce relationibus mutuis exsistat inter quascumque res.
Illi autem describere conantur tantummodo" qualisnam sit animae natura; de corpore eam recepturo, nihil ulterius determinant ac si fieri
posset, ut, quemadmodum mythi Pythagorici narrant,
quaevis anima in quodvls corpus ingrediatur; cuius
theoriae falsitas iam exinde elucet, quod evidenter unumquodque cOrPus habet speciem atque
formam sibi propriam. 21
From the Pythagorean standpoint, the soul is at present imprisoned in the body, for reasons which are not altogether clear;22
this same thought will make its appearance in Plato, who is no
more definite as to the original reason for the soul's being
united wlth the body. It is, however, important to remark that
such a theory means that the true abode of the soul, ill though
it may be conceived, is elsewhere. Western thought was never
afterwards wholly to lose this conception of the soul as being
here on a journey through an alien country to a tar better f
land.
As for subjects properly dlvine, we have no direct evidenceas to the views ot the early P~goreans. Connected as he
was with the Orphlcs, Pythagoras would unquestionably have been
interested in religlon, although his scheme of things, as so
far revealed, does not leave much place for the gods. At Delos,
he made it his custom to offer sacrifice only upon the oldest
altar, the Altar of Horns, and then to Apollo the Father, the
Giver of Life, without fire or the shedding of blood. This might
suggest a definite interest in a return to the purest available
religious traditlons. 23 His later followers espoused a variety
of opinions on this matter.
On the whole, then, we can see that Pythagoras succeeded
in considering reality after a fashion more explicitly abstract
than that of the early Ionlans; for he put the proper-sensibles
aside and chose to consider only extension and the mathematical
properties of physical things. This is not quite rising to the
level of the immaterial, for, as st Thomas has pOinted out,
"species autem mathematlcae possunt abstrahi per lntel1ectum a
materia sensibili, non solum indivlduali, sed etiam communl;
non tamen a materia intelligibili communi, sed solum indlvidua1i: ••• materia vero intell~,ibllis dicitur substantia, secundum
quod subjacet quantltati."
Yet, for as much as the subject of
mathematics is in this way the further removed from the concrete,
material individual than ls water or aether in general, it is
true that Pythagoras marks a forward step. Since mathematlcal
reallties do not in fact exlst outside the thinklng mind, he
was at least driving at the necessary correlation between mind
and reality, belng and truth. Unfprtunately, he never qulte suc-

ceeding in formulating a distinct notion of the spiritual, for
bis numbers, when he comes to deal with the real order~ are represented as things extended. His school did Dot atta~ to the
supersensible, but it did point the way thither.
The Pythagoreans treat of principles and
elements stranger than those of the physical
philosophers ••• ; yet their discussions and investigations are all about nature; for they generate the heavens, and with regard to their
parts and attributes and functions they observe
the phenomena, and use up the principles and
causes in explaining these, which implies that
they agree with the others, the physical philosophers,that the real is just all that which
is perceftible and contained by the so-called
'heavens. But the causes and the principles
which they mention are ••• sufficient to act as
steps even up to the higher realms of reality,
and are more suited to these than to theories
about nature. 25
They were thus enabled to exercise a considerable, and
often beneficial influence on the development of ph1losophy as
well as of the lesser sciences. This we may see in the case of
Plato, whose own teachings are often the expansions and rectificat1ons, accomp11shed by his genius, of what the Pythagoreans
had ear11er hinted.
In some respects, their most important work was their
insistence that philosophy is a life, that the man who would
live as he shoul must cultivate his highest faculties, according
to an ordered plan, and must through discipline and study direct his whole self to the end of Truth. Even before Plato, they
saw the need for a properly constituted soc1ety, if men are to
live the good life, conceived in these terms. Their attempts at
Crotona may well be interpreted as an early endeavor on the
part of those who love the truth to set up the social framework necessary for l1fe in accordance with the4;r principles principles which bear on the complete man. Interestingly, it was
not a democratic organisat1on which they sought to establish.
Finally, we owe them the very title of philosopher itself, express1ve at once of the modesty which should pertain to
such a one and of his belief that here he is not yet wise.
Pythagoras noluit ~g sapientem profiteri,
sed sapientiae amatorem.
Notes to Chapter Three:
1. Republic X.iii 600. _"This way of regarding philosophy 1s henceforward characteristic of the best Greek thought.
Aristotle is as much influenced by it as anyone, as we may see
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Eth~cs ~

from the Tenth Book of his
and as we should see still
more clearly if we possessed his n~o'\"Pt"lClflX~S in its entirety.
There was a danger that this attitude should degenerate into
mere quietism and 'otherworldliness', a danger Plato saf and
tried to avert. It was he that insisted on philosophers taking
their turn to descend once more into the cave to help their
former fellow-prisoners. rt Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy,pg.83.
2. w. Staae, A Critical History of Greek Philosophy,
pg. 31.
3. Cfr. Burnet, Greek PhilOSOPh~ Part I _pg. 39. Moreover, the "importance of the intinl te (KllelfO\1) in the Pythagorean cosmology suggests the Milesian influence. and the identi
fication of the infinite with 'air' by at least some Pythagoreans pOints to a connexion wi~hthe doctrines of Anaximenes. The
way in which the Pythagorean geometry developed also bears witnesS to its descent from that of Milevos." op.cit., pp. 39-40.
4. Diogenes Laertius VIII.2-3.
5. Stace, op.cit., pp. 32-3.
6. This rather interesting point of view has something
of a parallel in the teachings of Roger Bacon: "Voici done comment Bacon se repr~sente l'histoire de la philosophie. Elle a
ete rev~l~e d'abord ~ Adam,et aux patriarches, et st nous savons
bien interpreter les ~critures nous verrons qu'elle se retrouve
tout enti~re, quoique sous une forme imagee etcolor~e, sous
leur sens litt~ral. Les ph1losophes pa~ens, les po~tes de l'antiquit~ et les Sybilles sont tous post~rieurs aux philosophes
vrais et fid~les qui furent les descendants de Seth et de Noe.
Dieu leur a donn' de vivre six cent ans parce qu'il ne leur fallait pas mains de temps pour achever la philosophie, et speciale
ment l'astronomie. Dieu leur a donc tout revel~ et leur a accord~ une longue vie pour leur permettre de compl~ter la philosophie au moyen des experiences ••• Mais ensuite la malice des
hommes et leurs abus de toutes sortes devinrent tels que Dieu
obscurcit leur coeur et que l'usage de la ph1losophie tomba en
d~su~tude. C'est l'epoque ••• de Promethee, de Mercure ••• , d'Esculape, d'Apollon et d'autres qui se faisaient adorer comme des
dieuxa cause de leur science. II faut en venir au temps de Salomon pour assister ~ une sorte de renaissance et voir la philosophie retrouver sa perfection premi~re. Apr~s Salomon l'etude d
de la sagesse dispara~t de nouveau ~ cause des peches des hommes
jusqu'a ce que Thal~s la reprenne et que ses successeurs la d~
veloppent de nouveau ••• Les philosophes grecs sont donc les 4isciples et les successeurs des h~breuxl ils ont retrouv~ la rlv~lation faite par Dieu aux proph~tes et aux patriarches, revelation qui n'aurait pas eu lieu si la philosophie n'av~it ete
conforme a la loi sacr~e." E. Gilson, La philosophie au moyen
age, pp. 210-1. The Friar's suggestion deserves study.
7. Empedocles, fr. 129. (Found in Burnet, Early Greek
Philosophy, pg. 224.). "Timaeus in the ninth book of his Histories says that Empedocles himself mentions Pythagoras in these
lines (that is, the first portion of those which we have cited
in the text) ••• Others say that it is to Parmenides that he is
here referring. Diogenes Laertius IX. 54.

-438. Burnet, op.cit., pg. 107. "Gaudentius quidam, de
musica scribens, P~thagoram dicit huius rei invenisse primordia
eX mall eo rum sonitu et cordarum extensione percussa." C,ssiodori
senatoris Institutiones, II. v, pg. 142, 11.13-5. Zeller finds
that "the fundamental doctrine of the Pythagoreans is the proposition that the nature of things is number. There can be no
doubt that the Pythagoreans were led to this surprising statement by their musical studies Which served ethical ends ••• They
reoognised indeed that the pitch of tones depends on the length
of the strings on musical instruments and that musical harmony
is determined by definite mathematioal proportions. The recognition of this fact led him to the prinoiple whioh was not contained in matter itself, but was supersensua1. rt Outlines of the
History of Greek Philosophy, pg. 35. We take up toward the end
of our own study the ways in which their principle might be regarded as supersensuous.
9. Metaphysica I.vi 987b.
10. op.cit.
11. Ope cit., v 985b. "But one can easily imagine that
once the21dea of Number became associated with that of the knowable in things, a wide field of detailed development and experiment, so to speak, in the arcana of nature, seemed to be opened.
Every arithmetical or geometrical theorem became in this view
another window giving light into the secret heart of things.
Numberbecame a kind of God, a revea1er, and the philosophy of
number a kind of religion or mystery. And this is why the second
grade of disoiples were called Mathematicians." J. Marshall,
Short History of Greek Philosophy, pp. 25-6.
12. Having p01nted out the number of stUdies for which
a knowledge of Ar1thmet1c is necessary, Cassiodorus the Senator
further remarks: "Propterea h1S fons et mater ar1thmetica reperitur, quam disc1p1inam Pythagoras sic laudasse monstratur,
ut omnia sub numero et mensura a Deo creata fuisse memoraret,
dicens a11a in motu, a11a 1n statu ita esse formata, ut tamen
nulla eorum praeter ista quae d1cta sunt substantiam percep1ssent; credo, trahens hoc in1tium, ut multi philosophorum fecerunt, ab ilIa sentent1a prophetali, quae dicit omnia Deum mensu.rg, numero et pondere disposuisse. tf op.cit., II.iiii, pg. 132,
1. 21 to pg. 133, 1. 7. Father Schaaf remarks. that Pythagoras
was undoubtedly correct in looking upon the universe as a most
beautifully ordered work, as a true cosmos, but he read it in
the wrong way. tfVerum quoque et semper magis est probatum vigere
ordinem multis in rebus secundum fixam numerorum proportionem
(cogita praeter fixa tempora motuum siderum de legibus combinationis chimicae, de numero undarum in sono, luce, electric1tate
etc.). 'Omnia secundum mensuram, numerum, pondus ordinasti'
(Sap. 11, 21.).' Falso vero ex eo quod res mundanae secundum
numeros sunt ordinatae, Pythagoraei concluserunt eas cum numeris
identificar1. Proprietatem rei eius essentiam fecerunt. Et si
ipsorum doctrina etiam sic intelligeretur, quod numeri non abstracte sumunt.ur, sed prout extensionem corporum et eorum superficies et lineas significent (numer1 numerati), esset tamen
falsum in extensione sola qua . tali, corporum extensionem con-
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sistere. Tendent1a plur1um recent10rum, d1fferent1as omnes qua1itativas corporum 1n mere quantitat1vas resolvere, (solum atomi extensae et motus) iam sese manifestat apud Pythag~raeos."
Inst1tutiones Historiae Ph110soph1ae Graecae, pp. 38-9. As Msgr,
Sheen suggested (cfr. Chap. I, not. 5.), there is not very much
that is new under the "scientif1c" sun.
13. Diogenes Laertius VIII. 25. The summary as given 1s
based upon the Successions of Ph11osophers, written by Alexander Polyhistor. Mr. Hicks, the editor of our text of Diogenes
Laertius, commends the biographer for taking his mater1al from
a Hellenistic writer of the First Century before Christ, rather
than from some of the numerous and imaginative Neo-Pythagoreans
who intervened. Vol. II, pp. 340-1, Loeb Classics Edition of
The Lives.
14. This point is discussed at some length by B. Fuller
1History of Greek Philosophy, pp. 114 et seq.), who makes out
rather a good case for the Pythagorean adumbration of the later
hylomorphism.
15. Metaphysica I.v 986a. Cfr. St Thomas In I Metap~
lect. viii, 124 ff.
16. Stoeckl, Handbook of the History of Philosophy,
pp. 47-8. Ferrier points out that if we say the substance of
things is what is true for some and is to be apprehended by
man's particular faculty, we shall come to regard something
material as being that substance. On the other hand, if we say
it is in something that is true for all, then something less
material, perhaps like number, is found to be 1t. "Number is
this, because number is the truth of the universal. for all intel
llgence, matter and its qualities are not the essence of the
universe, not the ultimately and absolutely real, because they
are not the truth for all, but only the truth for some intelligence, that is, for intelligence constituted with sense like
ours. If Lectures on Greek Philosophy etc., pp. 64-5.
l7.de Anima I.ii 464a. "The soul of man, he says, is
divided into three parts, intelligence, reason and passion •••
Reason is immortal, all else mortal ••• The faculties of the
soul are winds, for they as well as the soul are invisible,
just as the aether is invisible. The veins, ~eries, and sinews
are the bonds of the soul. But when it is strong and settled
down into itself, reasonings and deeds become its bonds. When
cast out upon the earth, it wanders in the air like the body. It
Diogenes Laertius VIII. 30-1. "Sense generallr" and sight in
particular, is a certa1n unusually hot vapor. I op.cit., 29.
A proper grasp of mind and spir1t as such is still to be attained.
18. As Socrates says, "Simmias (whose words we have cite
in the text) has reason on h1s side". Phaedo 86. Cfr. Burnet,
op.cit., pp. 276 et seq. as to the various teachings of the
later Pythagoreans.
19. Xenophanes, fro 7. (1n Burnet, op. cit., p~. 118.).
20. Burnet, Greek Ph110sop~v: Part I, pg. 43. I am
confident," Socrates tells Cebes ,that there truly is such a
thin as livin a ain, and that the living spring from the dead,

~good
and that the souls of the dead-are in existence, and that the
souls have a better port1on than the ev1l. -- Bebes added:

Your favor1te doctrine, Socrates, that knowledge 1s s1~ly remembrance, 1t true, necessar1ly 1mp11es a prev10us t1me in
which we have learned that wh1ch we now recollect. But this
would be 1mposs1ble, unless our soul had been 1n some place before exist1ng in the form of man; here, then, 1s another proot
of the soul's 1mmorta11ty. tt Phaedo 72-3.
21. de An1ma I.iii 407b. "Ex quo conven1t e1s illud
quod 1n fabu11s Pythagor1c1s habetur, quod quaelieet an1ma in
in quodlibet corpus 1ngred1atur, puta si casu cont1ngat 1n corpus elephant1s intrare animam muscae. Quamv1s hoc non poss1t
esse, cum unumquodque corporum, et maxime an1ma11um, habeat
propr1am formam et propriam spec1em, et proprium movens et proprium motum, et multum d1fferat corpus verm1s a corpore cu11c1s.
Hoc tamen d1centes, scilicet quod quae11bet an1ma quodlibet
corpus ingreditur, dicunt s1mile, ac a1 qu1s dicat artem textrinam 1ngred1 1n f1stulas, et aerar1am in telariam. Et tamen
si ips1s artib~s inesset natura 1ngred1end1 corpora, seu organa
ex seips1s, non quae11bet in quodllbe~ ingrederetur, sed fistulativa 1ngrederetur in fistulas, non 1n lyra~, cytharat1va
autem in cytharas, et non in f1stulas: eodem 191tur modo s1
animae cu1l1bet sit corpus, unaquaeque an1ma non quodlibet
corpus 1ngred1tur, 1mmo 1psa an1ma idoneum format s1b1 corpus,
et non assumi t paratum. S1c ergo Plato et ali1 philosoph1
loquentes tantum d~ animae natura, 1nsuff1c1enter d1xerunt, non
determinantes quod sit corpus vonveniens cu11ibet an1mae, et
qualiter et quale ex1stens un1atur s1b1. tt st. Thomas, In I de
An1ma, lect. viii, 131. Cfr. Stoeckl, op.c1t.,.pg. 51 •.
22. "He was the first, they say, to declare that the
soul, bound now in-this creature, thus goes on a round ordained
of necess1ty." Diogenes Laert1us VIII. x1v. We are not told
who or what it is that does the orda1ning or how he or 1t accomp11shes the b1nding.
23. Cfr. D10genes Laert1us VIII. x111.
24. Summa Theolog1ca I.lxxxv.lad 2um. "The objects
of mathemat1cs are not substances in a higher degree than
bodies are, and ••• they are not pr10r to sens1bles 1n be1ng,
but only in definit10n, and ••• they cannot ex1st somewhere
apart. But since 1t 1s not possible for them to ex1st 1n sensibles e1ther, it 1s pla1n that they either do not exist at all,
or exist 1n a special sense, and therefore do not 'exist'
.
without qualificat10n." Metaphys1cs. XIII.11 l077b. -Ar1stotle
goes into this at some length, Meta. II.i1 998a.
25. Aristotle, 0i.c1t., I.v1i1.989b-990a. liThe Pythagoreans,1t Bundy observes, ... 1dentif1es
rea11ty with. that which
could be perce1ved by the senses. tf tt "The Theory of Imag1nation
in Class1cal and Mediaeval Thought ,.pp.196-7. Univ. of Ill.
Studies 1n Lang. and Liter., XII.ii-ii1.
26. St August1ne, de C1v1tate De1 v1i1. 2. As G1lson
very fitt1ngly remarks 1n another context: "The ph1losopher
cannot be separated from the man and we shall know the man only
inspfar as we know what 1dea he had of the form of lite wh1ch

rf:
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. was in his eyes the highest form." The Philosophy of st Bona1/enture. pg. 40. The hlstory of the term phllosopher is inter! eating and may not be thus traoeable direotly to Pythag9ras.
WbAt interests us is that, thanks partly at least to his influence, the attitude of philosophy as disoipline and a life is
from now on to be remarked in those who have made genuine oontributions to the history of the mind.
;

Chapter IV: The Eleatio Philosophers.
Though it oannot, strictly speaking, be
said that the sohool of Elea founded metaphysics,
sinoe it failed to keep a firm grasp of the
truth, it must receive the oredit of having
raised Greek Thought to the metaphysioal level
and attained the neoessary degree of abstraction. l
Xenophanes.
With the widely travelled Xenophanes of Colophon there
begins the so-called Eleatio School, which was to take a stand
the very opposite of that defended by Heraclitus of Ephesus,
a new stand which, both in itself and by reason of this opposition, was powerfully to influenoe the development of philosophy
The life of Xenophanes covered a long span, and, while
he could speak of Pythagoras as one in the past,2 Heraolitus
was in tum to speak of him a~ of one whom muoh learning had.
not brought to understanding. Aooording to Theophr&stus, he
bad been the disoiple of Anaximander the Mllesian,. and Sotion
has reQorded that he was a oontemporarY of that early physiologer. ~
Apparently driven from Ionia by the Medio irruptions,
he visited many different parts of the Hellenio world and must
in this way have had a w~dely diversified experienoe in the
course of seven deoades. It is not altogether oertain that
he ever happened upon Elea in the oourse of his wanderings. At
any rate, if he was still engaged in his trav§ls at the age of
ninety-two, he oan hardly have settled there."' No matter where
his journeys took him, he appears to have kept up the usage of
his native land, by oomposing and reoiting at dinner parties in
elegiao and satirio vein. As we have notioed, it was by now
customary for a thinker to write a book Conoerning Nature, but
the available evidenoe does not show with olarity whether he
followed the fashion or not. "It is more probable that Xenophanes expressed sUah soientifio opinions as he had inoidentally 1n his satires."
The great questions of human life seem to have interested him quite a little, and he was really oonoerned with attaining to a oorrect idea of the divine. The sentiments of the
poets in this respeot he found unsatisfactory and reprehensible,
for "Homer and Heaiod have asoribed to the gods all things that
are a shame and disgraoe amon§ mortals, stealings and adulteries
and deceivings of one another .9 His objeotions along this line
manifest for one thing the independenoe which rational speculation was now assuming in relation to the anoient myths; suoh
speCUlation was itself fortified by a sound tradition reaching
baCk to Thales. "Chez lui se pr~cise une id~e ••• , l'inoompati-

~11it~ de
p~r1ence,

la raison humaine, mOrie par la science et par l'exavec les images traditionelles du my the. "10
As it seems, Xenophanes was also the first to a~vance
the One when he wished to make an explanation of the universe.
It 1s quite possible that he was influenced in the beginning by
the unbounded which his master, Anaximander, had proposed as
the universal principle. Such an idea might well have made a
special appeal to a man who was so profoundly concerned with
the purity of being:
Instead, however, of aitt.empting to supplement and perfect this conception by uniting it with its opposite, the Finite, as the
Pythagoreans had done, he lifted it above all
opposition and held (more or less unconsciously perhaps) the real infinite \0 be not existent in or for anything other than itself, but
existent in and for itself. ll
The doctrine of Xenophanes is not always easy to make
out; indeed, he does not appear to have grasped the complete
significance of the One, or the way in which it is all things.
Aristotle has stated that, whereas Parmenides considered the
One as such in definition and accordingly as limited, and whereas Melissus maintained it to be such in matter and accordingly
unlimited, the man who initiated this way of thinking was none
too explicit. 12
The One, which the world is, he moreover identified
with the God, whose being he has been so careful to preserve
from poetic misconceptions. It may be that "mortals deem that
the gods are begotten as they are, and have clothes like theirs,
and voice and form",13 but the truth of the matter is that
what is divine is quite different from the mortal things of
~.
our experience, and is repugnant to the anthropomorphic crudities prevalent in popular and literary fancy. For there is
"one god, the greatest amon~ gOds and men, neither in form like
unto mortals nor in thought .14 It is an interesting viewpoint
and a sign of hope for the future that this man, whose reason
was being emancipated from idolatry, should thus insist upon
the special character and the universality' of the divine being.
Of course, inasmuch as this one god sees, thinks and
hears all ~er (admittedly a rather crude way of putting it,
which tends to bear out the contention of Aristotle that the
god was the material world), it follows that "Wi'Shout toil'" he
swayeth all things by the thought of his m1ndt~.
This god
would be somewhat of a sentient being, therefore, and would
particularly be marked by his greatness of thought; in view of
Xenophanes' inconsistent expressions, just what this implied
1s not altogether plain. It might be taken to mean that the
universe depends in an important way upon an intelligence of
aome sort; such is not by any means explicit, but it may have
furnished some food for profitable thought, and may adumbrate
_the work of Anaxagoras.
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If we would want to regard him as being the first monotheist, we would have to be careful to understand the sense in
.b1ch he might merit that title. It is easy to see wher~ln his
stress on a divine unity and a divine dominance by "thought"
.ould hold promise for the future, but the fact remains that
Aristotle, the indefatigable searcher after evidences of metaphYsics, to whom the notion of one living God and 'its traces
meant so much, "While warmly acknowledging the anticipations of
Anaxagoras", tlnowhere speaks of Xenophanes. The latter might
be called a pantheist, weee it nOr6that Pantheism belongs to a
much later stage of speculation."
He was a monotheist insofar as he disliked the idea of
many gods in the traditional acceptation and as he spoke of
one god, which he seems to have understood as being the universe
Whatever influence his thought or language may have exercised
on the development of monotheism in the sense of the metaphytic
of the Schools, he was not properly a representative of the
tradition.
Of this god, the world, he tells us that it is true "he
abideth ever in the self-same place, moving not ar7all; not doth
it befit him to go about now hither now thither".
This entailed the admission by Xenophanes of the unchangeable character of
the world. It has been suggested that "world and God to Xenophanes are identical, and all the single things of perceptions
lose themselves in that one, unchanging, universal essence".l
There may be a case for this in logic, but it does not seem
that this philosopher consistently maintained such a view in
all its strictness. He did argue the immutability of his god
and accordingly of the universe, but in other places he will
speak of the parts of the universe as being subjected to change.
Prdably under the influence of the Milesian phySics, he says:
flAIl things are earth and water that come into being and grow,,;l
indeed, he becomes more specific in stating that ~&ll things
come from the earth and in earth all things endll.~
From these indications it may be gathered that he believed in the unchangeableness of the universe taken as a whole,
while allowing for the co-existence of changing parts. Just how
this would obtain in his system is not now evident and it is
possible that Xenophanes did not recognise the incompatibility
of his universal principle with the individual changes. Or, it
might be that the later shifts of Empedocles and Anaxagoras
to reconcile the Eleati being with change are reflections of
this primitive monism. 2I
Consensus videatur esse, quod Xenophanes
docuerit quidem, totum universum esse immutabile, quatenus semper fuerit et sic non sit
factum, simul tamen cum immobilitate hoc sensu
intellecta nondum rigorosam2~ocuisse immutabilitatem partium unlversi.
What with his references to water and earth and comings

into being and passings out thereof, he can hardly have made

an open denial of the sensible world itself. At the same time,

however, his eloquent emphasis on that one being, whic~'ls at
once God and the world, does not leave to the world of our ordinary experience any reality in itself, for all such is properly
the One s. Even if he were not fully aware of this, he was to
have followers who would work out the logic of his system.
Xenophanes did speak of various phenom~na as "all of
them that are visible for mortals to behold",@;'; as it seems,
therefore, "in the science of Physics, Xenophanes advocates
empirical knowledge, which, however, he holds to b merely
opinion and to be unworthy of entire confidence".2 Indeed there
is apparent in several of the fragments a certain disposition
to doubt of man's powers of attaining the truth. This is somewhat surprising, for, despite his own emphasis on the one, he
was not willing to be certain even as to his own opinions. The
situation is a difficult one: he has constructed a system which,
in the final analysis, leaves no room for the data of ordinary
experience and makes a large place for the thinking One, and
yet he says: "Let these be taken as fancies something like the
truth". 25
Maintaining, then, that the mass of things will fall
short of our powers, he was not disturbed to hear Emr,edocles
avow that it was impossible to discover a wise man. ffNaturall~~
he replied, 'for it takes a wise man to recognise a wise man'",
and there are none who could be found or who could find them•.
He quite definitely excludes the possibility that there could
be a man who might attain to Wisdom; even if someone should
somehow happen upon the truth, he would be unable to recognise
it:

4

There never was nor will be a man who has
certain knowledge about the gods and about all
the things I speak of. Even if he should c~e
to say the complete truth, yet he himself knows 27
not that it is so. But all may have their fancy.
His doctrine thus presents rather a confusing picture.
At one time, he will discuss the generation of things out of
earth and water, and their corruption into earth once more,
and at another he will defend the immutable unity of nature,
and finally he declares that man should remain content with
Whatever strikes his fancy. Very probably he was sincere and
dOing his best to be helpful, as his religious spirit would
suggest, but it is at best difficult to reconcile his various
opinions. Coming as early as he did in the search after the
one behind the many, he was so impressed by phases of both that
he could not effect their integration, although he leaned to
the side of unity.
All of these are more or less intelligible
if we assume that the distinction between real
existence (t,he One) and apparent or unreal existence

(the Many) was approaohed, however vaguely, by
Xenophanes. But all this leaves in the dark .
what exactly is to be understoo~8by the 'One
.'
God', the 'One Real Existenoe'.
The explanation has been advanoed that Xenophanes maintained that the sensible world, far from en~oyingany reality
in itself, had its reality only in and for the mind of man.
This would appear somewhat oredible, in view of the faot that
he allowed for fanoies; if aooepted, it leaves him logioally,
if not avowedly a subjeotivist. For, granting him suoh a point
of view, it would follow that "this (sensible) form of existenoe has no existenoe in and for itself, no existenoe irrespeotive of the mind and the senses of man, no existence at all
resembling that whioh must be oonoeded to the One, th~ permanent and the real; but an existenoe in all respeots the opposite
of this, and therefore an existenoe in all respeots unreal and
untrue". 29
Suoh an exposition may be carrying the system out a
little farther than Xenophanes himself did, but it is important
to note that it is susoeptible of this interpretation, that it
is in oontradiotion with the facts of experienoe, and that at
the same time it hesitates to affirm our possession of wisdom,
the knowledge of the One. We may well believe that the failure
of XenQphanes to oome to a deoisive answer to the questions
that he raised with respeot to the One and the many prepared
the way for the soeptioal attitude whioh was soon to develop
and to play a considerable part in the history of philosophy.
All his knowledge enabled him only to
know how little he knew ••• And 1t was the cry
of despair whioh esoaped from Xenophanes, the
cry that noth1ng oan be oertainly known, wh10h
first oalled men's attention to the nothing~:~:e~:3~owledge, as knowledge was then oonIn some ways, of oourse, 1t was a good thing to have so
of the truth jolt the Hellenes out of their oomplacenoy in the usually accepted and usually faulty ways of
str1ving after that desired object.
Even though we may also have to admit the rather unhealthy tendenoies of hitl doubt and the bad influence wh10h 1t
was to exer01se, we should not be led ~~to th1nking that he
was himself what we know as a sceptic.
At least, his was not
a systematic (sio) skepticism, for he was probably too earnest
to hold that all things were entirely beyond the hope of man's
reach through knowledge. One passage may support an extreme
1nterpretat10n, but it is also possible and, perhaps, preferable to read in it the expression of d1soouragement or even of
bafflement; unable to be oertain as to the absolute value of
the knowledge whioh he had acquired, he felt that he could but
tr his best and cons1der his opinions or fan01es as 11kely.
s1ncere~over

.
Such an att1tude may be all too eaay to pervert, but
1t hardly constitutes the formal scepticism of which we have
later examples. It does not grow out of a direct study ef the
nature of the mind and the sources of knowledge, but rather
develops as a result of the perplexities which confront the
early philosopher, who is constantly find1ng new aspects of
the truth and cannot as yet harmonise them. With Xenophanes,
hiS many travels, his reading of the~rroneous poets, his studies under Anaximander (whom Anaximenes so soon corrected),
hiS contact with other philosophic influences, and his widespread associations with all sorts of men and schools would
have brought him up against many sides of truth which he
could not with his limited resources organise in a balanced
whole.
Whenever he obtained, or thought he obtained, a glimpse of her (i.e., Truth's) celestial countenance, he proclaimed his discovery,
however it might contradict what he had before
announced. (It (his noble, rather touching kind
of scepticism) was the combat of contradictory
opinions in his mind, rather than disdain of
knowledge. His faith was steady, his opinions
vacillating. He had a profound conviction of
the existence of an eternal, all-Wise, infinite Being; but this belief he was unable to reduce to a consistent formula. 33
He wanted very much for knowledge to mean something to
him, but he could not see how he might bring this to pass. Nonetheless, he put forth valiant efforts and offered Buggestions
which were to stimUlate others to find the answer and, by so
doing, to dispel the doubt which he had also occasioned.
Further, with his rigorous insistence on the One Being
and on its special characteristics, he did much to bring men
to a consideration of the comparative unreality of the changing things whereby they are surrounded and to seek only the
Unchanging One. It was unfortunate that in this he tended to
deny any reality to the world a{ our every-day experience and
value to our proper knowledge.~
Thus, he achieved a place in history as the founder, at
least in spirit, of a new philosophic school, Which, under the
name of the Eleatics, was to uphold the immutability and unity
of the world. As Aristotle could see, he was confused in his .
discussion of that unity and was. far from satisfactory in his
handling of the quest10n of immutability.
Universum en1m non est simpliciter unum
ens, unitate nempe numerica, quod ceteroquin
nec Xenophanes iam asseruit, sed est solum umum
per accidens, compos1tum ex pluribus entibus re
distinctis, in quibus viget unitas ordinis,
originis, finis. Et alia assertio, totum uni-
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versum esse immutabile, quatenus non potuisset
produoi, etiam non est aoourata, cum distinctio
universi a deo et possib11itas oreationis non ~
in considerationem adduoantur, quae omissio
faoilius intelligi potest, oum isti duo oonceptus tunc temporis in philosophla nondum haberentur. 35
Apart from his traoes of pantheism, he is often exoellent in his assaults upon the orude polytheism of his times
and in professing the unity, supremaoy, perfeotions and immutability of his God: "One God, the greatest among gods and
men, neither in form like unto mortals nor in thought ••• He
seeS allover, thinks allover, and hears allover ••• But
without toil he swayeth all things by the thought of his mind •••
And he abideth ever in the self-same plaoe, moving not at all."3
There is still a long way to go, but men have at least been
told to look upon God as a most exalted being, whose perfeotions are always His and who, let us again mark the suggestion,
governs by his thought.
Unitatem dei strenue defendit et sio PQlytheismum impugnat ••• Splendida sunt pluraoapita
ejus de Deo ••• Et praeolara etiam est ulterior
probatio pro unitate dei desumpta ex perfectione
divina. His pro dootrinis meretur sinoeras gratias philosophiae ohristianae, quae omnes illas
fundamentales veritates in suum thesaurum reoepit. 37
Up to the time of Xenophanes and Heravlitus, the Helleni
philosophers had been interested in aocounting for the oosmio
process and in disoovering that one reality in terms of which
their whole sohemes would take on meaning. So it was with Thales
and his water, Anaximander and his Infinite, Anaximenes and
his air. But now, there is observable a tendenoy to stress the
one and subordinate the other, to hold to process or prinoiple
and let the other go by. Henoe, Xenophanes has said that there
is indeed one permanent being and that ohange is diffioult Parmenides will say it is impossible - to bring into harmony
with this postulate; on the other hand, Heraclitus deolared
that the oeaseless change of the world prooess 1s the One. Both
theories are contradiotory, not only mutually, but of the fundamental facts of experience, whioh reveal the One as implioit
in the Many for the reason of the existenoe of which it is necessary.
The more diffioult their reoonoiliation
appeared, the more oonoeivable is it that. the
young scienoe, at whose oommand there was as
yet no wealth of mediating data, should fall
upon the expedient of thinking out eaoh §otif
by itself without regard for the other. 3

- 4The way was to be along, hard one before such a 'reconciliated solution' was reached, and knowledge was to be called
seriously into question during the interval. Yet Xenopbanes as
well as Heraclitus made his contribution to the good work, and
stirred others with a richer background and a greater talent
to its further prosecution. We may say of him that 'the is
mainly significant on the one hand as exemplifying the growth
and extension of the habit of critical re.flection, and on the
other because of the emphasis he laid on the unity of existence'.
After all, whatever doubts he may have entertained at times,
he had a deep faith in mants power when rightly orientated towards the gods and left one word of hope, saying that "the gods
have not revealed all things to men from the beginning, but
by seeking they find in time what is better".4O
Parmenides.
The doctrine of Monism in Greek philosophy is to be
found more fully developed in Parmenides of Elea, who, if we
may credit one tradition, was the disciple of Xenophanes the
wanderer. 41 In view of the fact that the older man did spend
so much of his time in travelling about the Hellenic world,
we cannot be altogether certain as to the nature or extent
of any influence of his,42 but there is evidence that Parmenides was in his early life associated with the Pythagoreans,
who won him to a life of stUdies from a career in politics,
and, moreover, that he later turned away from their school to
cultivate the philosophy now forever bound up with his name.
It may well be that he ~ntered upon this last course at the
instance of Xenophanes,43 whose views were to find many an echo
in the work of the younger man.
Xenophanes, said Aristotle, looked into
broad heavens and asserted that unity 1s GQ£~
His younger contemporary, Parmenides of.Elea,
envisaged the same doctrine, not with the eyes
of a religious reformer and ethical poet, but
of one who deale with a distinctly metaphysical conception. 44
As his search under various auspices after an acceptable philosophy would argue, he was quite interested in discovering the means of arrival at the truth and in calling them
to the attention of his fellows. When he had found an answer
to his liking, he set it forth in a poem, entitle, according
to the fashion, Concerning Nature. Therein he depicts truth
as indicating to him the two paths of knowledge which are
Open to men. One of these will bring those who choose to follow
it to the knowledge of the truth; the other leads to the knowledge - if such it can be called - of the ofinions of men.
He accordingly proceeds to deal first with metaphysics' and

after that takes up a cosmology of the realm of appearances,
at the start of which he warns the reader: "Here shall I close
my trustwarthy speech and thought about the truth. Henc~or
.ard learn the beliefs Qf mortals, giving ear to the deceptive
ordering of my words". 4 ~ At least, there was something which
oould in some sense be regarded as trustworthy.
For it is his contention that the Truth is to
be found in the knowledge that being is, and that not-being, far
from existing, cannot even be conceived. This is the account
which Truth itself makes to him.
Come now, I will tell thee - and do thou
hearken to my saying and carry it away - the
only two ways of search that can be thought of.
The first, namely, that It is, and that it is
impossible for it not to. be, is the way of belief, for truth is its companion. The other,
namely, that It is not , and that it must needs
not be, -- that, I tell thee, is a path that
none can learn of at all. For thou canst not
know what is not -- that is impossible, nor
utter it; for it is the saml6thing that can
be thought and that can be.
That which he insists upon is a profound and stimulant Truth,
and his approach marks an advance over Xenophanes by reason of
its definite and original oharacter as well as by the fact that
it is founded upon the concept of being. Where the older philosopher had made some important suggestions, the Elestic came
to conceive being itself in an abstract manner and to aSSign,
by a dialectical reference made a priori the attributes of
being so conceived to things themselves. 47
If men hold such beliefs as he proposed, they
can hardly escape the conclusion that being is the concept of
being, that these make but one. It will accordingly make but
little difference at which aspect they begin their enquiries
in the pursuit of truth: "It is al1 Qne to me where I begin;
for I shall come back again there". 4~. The students will always
come to the same conclusiQn, inasmuch as "now it is, all at
once, a continuous one".49 Parmenides is very definite on this
pOint and on several occasions repeats his belief that thought
and the one being are the same.
The thing that can be thought and that
for the sake of which the thought exists is
the same; for you cannot find thought without
something that is, as to which it is uttered.
And there is not, and never shall be, anything
besides what is, since fate has ch~ed it so
as to be whole and immovable. Wherefore all
~hese things are but names which mortals have
given, believing them to be true -- cOming

into being and passing away, being and notbeing, change
place and alteration of
bright colors. ~
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In this brief compass we can find most of what was significant
in his teachings, whether of great value for the development
of a metaphysic or what was to prove all but ruinous to philosophy.
It was, first Qf all, a good thing that a philosopher
should at last lay such forcible strfss on the intimate relation which obtains between thought and~being, and upon their
ultimate union. Parmenides, in fact, had formulated the notion
of being, and he was intoxicated by it. With him, philosophers
come to recognise that the proper object of their st*dies is
being itself.
The experience was too intoxictting and at first swept
men away, leading them, as in the case of Parmenides, to deny
in its holy name all that contradicted the Being. It was a
sound attitude in many ways, but danger lay in the fact that
men were as yet so dazzled by the brilliance of that idea that
they were unable to conceive it perfectly. Hence, their profound respect for being was to induce them to deny the existence
of beings, and so to contradict the primary data of experience.
Truth belongs entirely to thought. As
being alone is thinkable, so also that alone
which is thinkable and is thought is Being.
The senses do not bring us truth. They only
deceive us, and it is precisely this deception
of the senses which seduces men into the belief in, and the graceful tricks of speech
about the multiplicity and the changes of
things. 51
\
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The first advocates of being were moreover involved in
unfortunate misconceptions as to the real nature of that being
which would fulfill the definitions that they sought to apply
to all that is. Their unchanging One may seem to be like God,
but in the Parmenideao2system taken as a whole it appears as
material and limited.~ It is chained to its condition of
stability b; fate, which in this way banishes the deceits of
change.
Moreover, it is immutable in the bonds
of mighty chains, without beginning and without end; since cOming into being and passing
away have been driven afar, and true belief
has cast them away. It is the same, and it
rests in the self-same place, abiding in itself. And thus it remaineth constant in its
place, for hard necessity keeps it in the
bonds of limit that holds it fast on every
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side. Wherefore it is not permitted to what is
to be infinite; for it is in need of nothing;
while, if it were infinite, it would stand in
need of every thing. 53
These views on the subject may seem strange to us and
not free of contradictions, but to Parmenides it appeared that,
since the perfection of existence is indeed here found always
in a limited measure, the Being must also be limited. To the
Greek mind in general measure and proportion, the imposition of
seemly limit was requisite to genuine perfection. Parmenides
involved himself in some difficulties by speaking of Being as
without beginning or end, which may refer to its spherical shape
Again, that which is is held fast by the hard necessity of -what?, for there is nothing but that which is and nothing could
thus institute itself in being. Very likely his trouble lay
in a materialism which prevented him from seeing that form,
the perfective element in this order, is not restricted as suCh,
while it is the perfection of matter to be limited by the form.
At the same t1me, the matter contracts the form without thereby
enhancing its intrinsic value.
On the terms of Parmenides, there is no room for anything beside his Being. Since nothing simply 1s not, It could
not derive thence, nor on the other hand could it come from
something, inasmuch as It is Itself all. On the same terms, it
oannot be either more or less, for that would entail the change
which the believer will reject at the start. In a continuous
and indivisible wor1d-~lenum, there will be as much here as
there is there. If !t is regarded as thus co~lete, It will not
move, for it has no place in which to move. 54-Since, then, It
has no oa11 for indefinite extension in a space in a space that
he has ruled out, its finite and everywhere equal being will
assume a spherical shape. 55
Since, then, it has a furthest 1im1t, it
is complete on every side, like the mass of a
rounded sphere, equally poised from the center
in every direction; for it cannot be greater
or smaller in one place than in another. For
there is no nothing that could keep it from
reaching out equally, nor can aught that is
be more here and less there than what is, since
it is all inviolable. For the point from which
it is equal in every direction tends equally
to the 1imits.50
Muoh like Spinoza, Parmenides held, in effect, that the
concept of being is univocal and argued from this to the unioity
of being and sUbstance alike. Taking as his pri!fcip1e that bare
statement, that being is one, and noting that there is nothing
beSide being, he contended that it was impossible for being to
be diversified, whether by itself or by something else. In the
Thomistic interpretation, his l1ne of reasoning might be ex-

-58in a syllogism like the following:
A thing that is simple cannot be diversi-~
fied by itself, but only by something other than
itself. Now being as such is simple; and what is
not being is noth1ng. Therefore, being cannot be
diversified, and so there is only one being. 57
Inasmuch as the modes by which differences might be introduced
are thus all extrinsic to that simple being which 1s all, they
are nothing and avail nothing.
A reply on the basis of our principles is fairly clear
to see, and all the more appropriate since the difficult1es
which such a monist v1ewpoint provoked helped to bring it forth.
Being, as we are now aware, is analogous, and possessed only
of the un1ty of proportion.58 This obtains as 1n the case of
such a word as Know", which may stand for sense perception in
relation to the sens1ble object or for intellectual perception
in relation to the intelligible object. The proper method of
procedure, therefore, is to speak of being analoglce.
Hujus autem praedication1s duplex est
modus. Unus quo a11quid praedicatur de duobus
per respectum ad aliquod tertium, sicut ens
de qualitate et quantitate per respectum ad
sUbstantiam. Alius modus est quo aliqu~d praedicatur de duobus per respectum unius ad alterum,siout ens de substant1a et quantitate. In
primo autem modo praedicationis oportet esse
aliquid prius duobus, sicut substantia ad
quantitatem et qualitatemi in secundo autem 59
non, sed necesse est unum esse prius altero •.
Parmenides came a little too early to appreciate the
fact that being, even as such, will contain actually and 1mplicitly the several modes of its diversification. We may predicate
Being with analogous meanings not only of God, the Pure Act,
Who is Being, par excellence, but also of potency and act, and
of those being which are composite of the potential and the
actual. We can escape the monism of Parmenides if see be1ng
thus as analogous rather than as univocal, and it was their
inability to appreciate this point that caused the failure
of the Eleatics:
In hoc decipiebantur, quia utebantur ente
quasi una ratione et una natura sicut natura est
alicujus generis; hoc enim est impossibile. Ens
enim non est genus, sed multipliciter dicitur
de diversis. Et ideo in primo Physicorum dicitur quod haec est falsa,-ens est unum; non enim
iihabet ugam naturam sicut unum genus vel una
species.
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Obsessed as he was with the notion of being, Parmenides
waS quick to utilise its first principles of identity and of
contradict10n in behalf of the One. As he saw it, Bein~cannot
come from being, for that whefh becomes does not yet ex1st,
whereas the being simply is. Neither can it come from that
wh1ch does not ex1st: ex nihilo niBil fit. "The lim1tation,
d1versity and multipl1city in beings cannot evidently be expla1ned by being itself, nor by a princ1ple foreign to it, for
apart from being, there is only- non-being, and non-be1ng is
noth1ngness. There is only one existing substance, and a second
substance is absolutely 1mpossible of realisation. "02 If we
read the principle of contradiction in th1s way: "It 1s imposs1ble for a thing to be and not to be at the same t1me", if we
take being to mean only that wh1ch is being in act or which is
altogether act, we can not well fail to agree with the Eleatics.
In such a case, only tgat which enjoys actual ex1stence would
be, and the gulf between it and s1mple non-being could never be
br1dged.
.
Even if we confine our attent10n to sens1ble movement,
it 1s plain that such motion, even if it be only accidental,
supposes passiv1ty in the movable object. Now, this passivity
w111 1n turn presuppose the pure potency of pr1me matter. 6 3
Unde eam qui negat, negare debet in corporibus omnem passivitatem, et cons1derare, ut
Parmenides, omne ens corporeum, velut totum actum, in sua essentia. Tunc, iuxta illud dilemna,
nulla mutatio intr1nseca est posslbilis. Slmili
modo demonstratur 1mposs1bil1tas mult1plicat1onls corporum. Ergo ens corporeum est unum tantum et o~lno immobile. Possuntne dari ma10ra
absurda?
.
We need not enter here too deeply 1nto the ontology underlying
our view. The answer of the Schools ls well known, and so far
conclusive. It was flrst clearly advanced by Ar1stotle, whose
solutlon consistgd fundamentally in dlscrim1nat1ng between
act and potency. 5
It is imposs1ble that a th1ng may be
of be1ng and not be, and capable of
not being and yet~, and similarly with the
other k1nds of predicate ••• And a th1ng ls
capable of d01ng something if there will be
noth1ng 1mposs1ble in its hav1ng the actual1ty of that of which it is said to have the
capacity ••. ; 1f 1t is capable of belng moved
or mov1ng, or of being or coming ~g be, or
of not be1ng or not com1ng to be.
c~pable

FOllOwing these lines of thought, we may read1ly account for
becoming, 1nasmuch as something comes to be from that wh1ch 1s

-60in potency to actual existence; the potential is not simply nothing, nor does it yet enjoy the fulness of being. Hence, it
is neither repugnant to existence, as nothing is, nor y;t does
it entail the difficulties which the supposition that things
come from the actual, as seen in many early s~stems, would
bring on.
On the same grounds we can, without doing. violence to
being, allow for the multiplicity of beings. If he had done nothing else than to force the solution of this question, Parmenides would have won a certain place in the history of philosophy. For, with Aristotle and st Thomas, we may now see that
when something comes from potency to be in act, there is still
a. real potency underlying the act received; the form will be
receiK~g_and limited by the matter so long as it abides there.
"This "ftiH1.erically one form is no longer susceptible of participation, although a form in every re~pect like it can be produced in other matt'er of this kind. "e,( As St Thomas puts it:
Formae, quae sunt receptibiles in materia,
individuantur per materiam, quae non potest esse
in alio, cum sit primum objectum sUbstans: forma
vero, quantum est de se, nisi a quid aliu~mpe
diat, recipi potest a pluribus.
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Now that a metaphysic of sorts had appeared upon the
scene, philosophic attention was henceforward to be directed
to the study of being itself and its first principles. "It is
significant, therefore, that the pioneering Parmenides should
have laid such emphasis on being as that unity which all should
seek, on thought as the means to the same unity, and on the
principle of contradiction. With Heraclitus openly flaunting
that princ1ple, Parmen1des was rendering men a genu1ne service
by his repeated ins1stence on its value and on the need to observe it at all times.
His respect for 1t, true enough, was a little unbalanced, precisely because he had not formulated 1t correctly. Since
the time of Aristotle, the representatives of the perennial
tradition have seen clearly enough that it should read, in full,
as follows: "It is impossible for a thing to be and not to be
at the same time and in the same respect. Coming as early as
he did, Parmenides left out that important latter portion,
and spoke of being and non*being in terms of actually existing
being as opposed to nothing at all. The recognition of potency,
of that which has the capac1ty for existence, as being in some
respect resolved that d1fficulty- Without working injury to the
inviolable sanctity of being, the Peripatetic was able to
bring the principle of contradiction into harmony with our
sense experience of beings. We are as fervently in favor of
the principles of contradiction and identity as was Parmenides
himself, but we are fortunate in having a better understanding
of them, in terms of analogous being.
En vertu du

caract~re

essentiellement et
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d'embl~e analogue de l'obJet suruniversel sur
lequel il porte, l'axiome d'identit~ est en
mbe temfs l' axiome des irr'ductibles diversi- .'
t~s de 1 3tre; si chaque ~tre est ce qu'il est,
il n'est pas ce que sont les autres. C'est ce
que ne voient pas les ph1losophes qui, A la
~~i~~u~er!:~:~i~ei,~m~~~~~.~9ce principe

As Maritain is careful to point out, this principle of identity
acts rather as the guardian of that multiplicity whereof we
are all aware. This it does precisely because it maintains the
identity of each being. If our reason, while explaining things
in the light of the first principles, must turn to the One Being
it does so beoause the nature of the things themselves requires
that suoh be done if thef are to be explained. tlEt s'il (l'axiorne d'identit~) oblige 1 intelligence ~ affirmer l'Un transcendant, c'est que cettemultiplicite l'exige elle-m&me pour
sauver son existenoe. tt70
.
The remainder of our critique of Parmenides may now be
seen with olarity and ease. He presented men with the choioe
between being and non-being, which he declared to be mutually
exolusive and with no middle ground. Sinoe there is no non-being
left to contaminate the One, indivisible and immutable being,
our thought, whioh conceive~he truth of this being, is, thanks
to the all-pervading unity, the same with the being. Even though
our sense-presentations may seem to break down that unity, all
suoh is but illusion and the subjeot of that opinion which we
were taught to eschew from the first.
The truth about what is oan only be reached by thinking, and anything that contradicts
the results of thought must be untrue. The world
as it seems to us in our everyday experience
does contradict the results of thought. It tells
us that what is changes, while thought tells us
that what is cannot ohange. The ordinary world,
then, is unreal: we oannot know anything about
it; for all that oan be known is simply what can
be thought out as to the nature of what 1e. 7l
Our thought must be one w1th the being, for only that
one is~ and all else is not-being. "There is not even opposed
to ita thinking reason to which it . would stand in the relation
of object; for that whioh thinks and that which is thought are tt 7
one, Being is Reason, and thought has being for its attribute.
It is certainly monist in approach.
Truth itself leaves its hearer in no doubt as to the
need there is for abandoning the way of opinion and the senses.
But do thou restrain thy thought from this
way of enquiry, nor let habit by its much experi-

ence force thee to cast upon this way a wandering
eye or sounding ear or tongue; but Judge by ~gu_
meat the much disputed proof uttered by me. There
is only one way left that can be spoken of. 73
Where Heraclitus had objected to the sensible illusion of a permanent being, which should be taken only as the constantly chane
Ing Fire, with its measures kindling and going out in a regular
manner, Parmenides was exercised at the sensible reports of becoming and would allow only the One.74 In spite of their different motives, they were at one in attacking the foundations of
all human knowledge. We may regret the error of Parmenides all
the more because he had caught a glimpse of being, and did not
know what to make of it. Instead of constructing a proper metaphysic, he plunged into a materialist monism which was all the
worse because he did have some of the truth with which to attract men into following hIm against the dictates of nature
Itself.
We should not conclude rashly that Parmenides, when he
denied reality to the world of ordinary experience and when he
declared that the real abides always by itself, unaUainable
for the senses, was actuated by what might now be called idea11st motives. If anything, the case is rather the contrary, for
his expressions, many of which we have seen, would show that
for him the real is the material, conceived in-a more abstract
manner than before, but materIal all the same.·(~
Despi te his high regard for the value of thought, he
never reached a proper knowledge of the intelligence as such.
HOW, indeed, would that have been possible, if everything was
a material unity? The Eleatics did well to speak as they did
of thought, but the full import of their words was, to all appearances, lost upon them, and they remained on a plane of
material monism. They were probably not materialists, in the
later sense of being avowed enemies of the spiritual, but they
were nonetheless caught in the logic of their systems (a point
which was to become very important in the hands of Zeno, this
logIc), which could have no place for the intelligence properly
speaking.
Dans l'objet, i1s sacrifient la mUltiflileur m~taphysique est un monisme de 1 "&tre";
dans le sujet connaissant, ils denient toute.
.
valeur objective au sens, faculte du multiple:
leur ~pist~mologie est un realisme de l'intelligence pure. Ou plut8t ••• les tl~ates ne poss~d
ent foint encore une notion farfaitement d6finie
de 1 intelligence pure; si 1 intelligence est
pour eux la faculte de l' tt~tretl, l' "@tre" represente, k leurs yeux, 1e "ple1n", c' est-'a-dire
une r~a11t' astreinte \ rempllr l!espace. Leur
~tre, unit4 abstra1te des choses ext~rleures,
cit~;

demeure lmmanent ~ celles-ci et prisQnnier des
conditions g6nerales de la quantit~.·(O
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When men are told, even in rather a crude fashion, that all
thinking will produce a thought identical with its being, inasmuch as there ls nothing outside of it, they are bound to
ponder the problems which such a statement creates, and there
is a greater 11kelihood of their coming eaelier to a correct
solution.
Now, Xenophanes had said that the divine world thought
allover; Heraclitus looked upon the reason as a spark of the
ever-living Fire, a spark which could "recognise" its source;
t1parmenides moves on·the same lines as.his prdecessors, but
goes a step beyond them. According to him~ mind and its object
are not merely akin; they are the same.""r, For, if thought,
which is ~ way to truth, discovers that lt is undlfferentlated, then the world and reason must be completely asslm1lated.
In our present explanatlons of knowledge, we of course
maintain that knowledge conslsts in the union of the knower
with the known, of the lntellect wlth the intelllgible object,
thanks to the information of the intellect by the same form
which, in the ontological order, actuates the thlns and ls now
received intentionally, in another mode of being. 7 a There ls,
then, a veln of wonderful truth in this Parmenidean theory as
to the unlon between thought and belng, but he carries it too
far and destroys all possibllity of distinction between the
thinking subject and the known object: all is one.
Au d~t l'esprit s'y porte d'un effort
trop massif. Sous pr~texte qu' entre. l' ~tre et
la pens'e vrai8 il nty a pas dt~cart,il va
affirmer _out unimentune ldentlt~ absolue entre
l'3tre et~la pens~e. C'est oe que dlsalt Parm6nide, l'antique et v4n4rable p~re des m~ta
physiclens: "La penst4e, et ce dont il y a
pens~e, c'est tout un ••• " Saintes et damnables
paroles, pleines de sagesse et de folie. Ce
que je pense quand je dls vrai, clest la chose
mame, ou tout au moins une sorte de d~calque
qui colncide de toutes manl~res avec la chose,
.et toutes les conditl~ns de l'une sont les
conditlons de l'autre"(~
As lt turned out, men were not willing to go all the
way with Parmenides. When man knows, there must be some sort
of unlon between the knower and what he knows, but lt dld not
seem altogether necessary that this should make the soul absolutely and in every respect to be identical wlth what lt
knows: - that a man ln knowing a tree should become a tree
simply and entirely.
On the other hand, it Was seen, lf there were produced
no identity at all between the knower and the object, then man
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through knowledge arrive-merelY at some resemblance of
being, rather than at being itself. This would provoke further
questions as to the reality of a resemblance effected i~ this
way, and so on.
Thus, it would not do simply to reject the theory of
Farm~nides, for such a course would in the long run entail difficulties as embarassing as those which were caus~ by the failure of the E1eatic to grasp his principles aright. What had to
be done was for philosophers to take his principles and to refine them with care, to retain the identity of thought and being
in the act of knowledge, while allowing a distinction of some
sort to obtain between them, "de faqon h. discerner certaines
conditions propres h l'une et certaines conditions propres ~
l'autre, et A distinguer dans ma pensee ce qui eat des choses
memes et ce qui est de rna manllitre de Donna~tre. tteso
In fine, the distinction to be made is between things
themselves and their modes of existence. It has accordingly
been found that a thing has an ontological mode of existence,
in itself as a physical object, and an "intentiona1" mode of
existence, in the knower. The form of the object is received
in the senses and as a result of its existence in this intentional manner there is formed the phantasm, from which the acting
intellect abstracts the form, and renders it immaterial and, as
such, intel1igi\le; precisely insofar as it is intelligible it
exists as the form of the possible intellect.
Similitudo rei visibilis est, secundum quam
visus videt; et similitudo rei intellectae, quae
est species inte11igibi1is, est forma secUndum
quam intellectus inte1Iigit ••• Secundum doctrinam
Aristote1is (lib. 3 de Anima tex. 38.) qui dicit,
quod lapis non est in anima, sequetur, quod anima
per species intelligibiles cognoscat res quae
sunt extra animam. 81

For, as st Thomas is fond of pointing out when he treats of the
intellect, IIproprium ejus est cognos~ere formam, in materia
quidew corporali exsistentem, non tamen prout est in tali materia". ts2 The form of the being is released from material condit'ons by the acting intellect and can thus be the form of an
intellect. It is the form which makes a thing to be what it is;
accordingly, the thing itself comes to be identical with the
intellect which has its form also, enjoying through abstraction
this other, intentional mode of existence. This is in addition
to its physical mode, which knowledge as such does not affect,
for in knowing we receive the form of another as that other's.
This is an important point. When the form of the object
known comes to have this immaterial existence in the knower,
it does not enter with the knower into the relation which obtains between the form of a composite substance and its subject matter. Rather it is freed from the material precisely
in respect of those conditions which matter imposes on it when
they are joined to constitute a being in the concrete, condi-

-66ditions whioh confine the form while it perfects the matter
and makes with it a tertium quid. If we see this, we oan appreciate and purify the Parmenidean teaching on the unity Qt being
and thought: Knowledge obtains through a real existence of the
form, and
of the being, in the knower, but not a physical
existence. j Once we recognise this disjunotion of thought
and being, a disjunction which is necessary as a concomitant
of truly intellectual knowledge, and once we have rightly defined the identity in question, the difficulties of E1eatic
monism are largely dispelled. We have ~aken the principle of
farmenides himself, namely, that "thea- flhing that can be thought
and that for the sake of which the thought exists are the same",8
and made of it a genuinely metaphysical principle.

gQ

Leur accord ne doit pas non plus ~re imagine sur Ie mod~le beauoouf trQp grossier d'un
d~ca1gue materiel: entre 1 ~tre et la pensde. il
y a i la fois, je ne fais que l'entrevoir au
terme de oette ~tude, identit~ beauooup plus
profonde et diversit~ plus marqu~e. La ohose
prise en tant qu'elle existe dans l'esprit souffre des oonditions qu'elle n'a pas en tant qu'e1le
existe en elle-mlme. Mais au. point pr~cis ob porte
purement Ie connattre, il n'y a nulle diversit~
entre la oonnaissanoe et 1a ohose, entre la
pens~e et l'&tre; si bien ~e Ie connaissant et
et Ie connu, sans que l'~tre propre ge l'un se
mele en rien k l'6tre propre de l'autre,.sont
un et Ie m~me8aous Ie rapport pr~cis de l'acte
de conna1'tre. :>
It may have taken some time to work this line of thought out, ..,Ii/!<
but the Eleatic principle has been made a vital part of all
metaphysics.
From all this, as well as from other pa~s of his doctrine into Which we have no call to enter here,
we may see
that Parmenides was a man of great intellectual powers. Having
laid dOwn his suppositions and followed out their consequents
as he could determine them, he drew his deductions to the unique character of the absolutely immutable being. Whatever we
may lay to his fault, we cannot accuse him of lavking intellectual courags, for unlike some others he was willing to accept
the oonclusions which he saw involved in his system. It was
too bad that his talents carried him so deep into error, bUt at
the least he stood boldly for the supremacy of being and its
identity with thought: men could not soon forget that.
To put it briefly, his system, with all its stimulating
features, amounts to a construction of the universe a priori
from the principle, conoeived in too narrow a sense, that the
being is and not-being is not; too narrow, for it was taken to
mean that everything which actually exists is being, and only
such is being.
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Est mon1smus suo modo mere d1alect1cus,
nobls occurrens h1c statlm 1n1tl0 philosophlae
Graecae. Ex abstracto conceptu ent1s desumuatur~
fere omn1a argumenta. Qu1d philosopho nostro
curae est, quod suae conclus10nes s1nt 1n aperta pugna cum experientia? Cogn1tio sensitiva
externa et conscient1a, nob1s referentes clare
pluralltatem et mutabl1ltatem rerum ceder debent elus ratloclnlls. Non est ratl0 supponendi,
1psum non ~1sse convlctum de verltate proprl1
systematls. 7
Much of hls language would assume a more phl10sophlcally acceptable meanlng if it were applied to God, Who ls inde§§ all Being
par excellence, abldlng, 1mmutable, the very Truth. Parmenldes
at least prepared men for thought on the existence and nature,
as well as the need, of such a belng.
His influence, as our later chapters w111 bring out,
was quite considerable, both for the good and for the bad. We
shall find the Atomists, for example, app1y1ng his concept of
the immutable being to their intrinSically unchangeable atoms,
while Plato wl11 call hlm a great man and Ar1stotle will speak
of him in generous terms:
It is just that we should be grateful,
not only to those with whose views we may agree,
but also to those who have expressed more superficial views; for these also have contributed
something, §~ developing before us the powers
of thought.
The philosophy of Monism was defin1tely set on its way. What
was best in Parmenides was to be corrected and re1ntegrated
by Plato and Ar1stotle; his errors have lived on in various
schools of mater1alism and pantheism.
The philosophy of Parmenides was of great
s1gnificance for posterity. The fandamental
metaphysical oppos1tlon of being and becoming,
as Heraclitus expounded it, led to the compromise systems of the 5th cent., of Empedo~es, Anaxagoras, and the Atom1sts, who with
Parmenides all denied to the1r basic substance
an absolute becom1ng and passing away, but recognised ln agreement with Heraclitus a r~
tive changeableness, a combination and separation of these SUbstances in individual things.
Furthermore, this extreme monist with
this violent division of the human intellect
into two oppos1ng organs one of which is ass1gned a supremacy at the expense of the other,
with his untanable rejectlon of the world of
sense 1n favor of an abstract being only ap-

prehended by thought, paved the way for the
metaphysioal dua11sm whioh found 1ts most oomplete expression in the Platonio theory of ideae.90
Zeno of Elea.
With the ph1losophy of Monism now formulated by Parmenides, there was need for his sc~ool to undertake its propagation and defenoe. The most prominent figure in this work was
Zeno of Elea. by report the adopted son of the master, but at
least "all through a pupil of Parmenides and his bosom friend •••
He was a truly noble oharaoter, both a-a philosopher and as
politioian; at all events, his extant books are brimful of
1ntelleot."9l He appears to have been a most fa1thful disoiple
and to have reoeived the dootrine of the un~ty and unohangeableness of the universe without qyest1on. 9 H1s approa¢h,
however, was somewhat different.
For, where h1s master had tr1ed to offer d1reot proof
of those fundamental truths of un1ty and 1mmutabi11ty by arguing
(rom the prino1ple that the same notion of be1ng shQUld apply
to all things un1vooally, the younger man ~Qught oonfirmation
for these teaohings in an 1nd1reot manner. 9 '
As we oan well imag1ne. the Eleatio mon1sm provoked a
number of objeotions as well as the oharges that it involved
1ts adherents in a ser1es of oontradiotions. Zeno felt that
the proof positive was already on hand, but that it would be
call to the attention of these followers of the way of opinion
the oontrad1otions and antinomies wh10h a teaoh1ng of plura11ty
and ohange in things must enta1l. In the words whioh Plato has
put in his mouth:
In reality, this writing 1s a sort of reinforoement for the argument of Parmenides against
those who try to turn it into rid10ule on the
ground that, if reality is one, the argument beoomes involved in many absurdities and oontradiotions. This wr1t1ng argues aga1nst those who uphold a .any, and g1ves them baok as good and
better than they gave; its aim is to show that
their assumption of multiplioity will be involved in still more absurdities than the assump- 94
t10n of unity, 1f it is suff101ently worked out.
If he was direoting h1s arguments aga1nst those who believed in things as a many, it is likely that he had the Pythagoreans in mind. His book of defenoe is said to have been the
work of his youth,95 whioh would seem to indioate that it was
written in his native Italy, where the Pythagoreans were the
most likely philosophioal group, if not the only one, to have
indulged in oonsiderable oritio1sm of suoh a kind at that
time. 90

Zeller holds, indeed, that it was merely
the popular form of the belief that things are
many that Zeno set himself to confute; but it ~
is surely not true that ordinary people believe
things to be a many in the sense required. Plato
tells us that the premisses of Zeno's arguments
.were the beliefs of adversaries of Parmenldes,
and the postulate from which all his contradictions are derived is the view that space, and
therefore body, is made up of a number of discrete ynits, which is just the Pythagorean doctrine. 97
.
ThiS interpr~tation is borne out also by observations made by
Simplicius. 91
Zeno thus preferred to 1mpart the truth by means of
dialectic rather than in the accustomed manner of direct exposition. Such a course of action, which he followed out rather well
may justify the report that "Aristotle says that Zeno wa,s the
inventor of dialectic, as Empedocles was of rhetoric".99 If we
may agree with Burnet when he says that dialectic "is just the
art of arguing, not from t~e premisses, but from premisses admitted by the other side,"IOO we can readily see his claim to
such a distinction. For it was his procedure to take as basis
of discussion and argument some fundamental principle of the
opponent school, such as plurality, place or motion, and to
draw contradictory conclusions from it.
Leaving the realm of pure science, then, he betook himself to the ground of his adversaries, of the people who in one
way or another followed along the way of opinion, and turned
upon them a negative dialectic, so that he might retort upon
their heads the reproaches of self-contradiction which they
had cast at the Eleatics. It is necessary for us to keep his
purpose clearly before our minds if we are properly to evaluate
his contribution to the development of philosophy, for his
significance is of a different sort than that of his master.
The older man was content to insist upon the Truth; Zeno sought
to show by means of a new technique how other schools were
wrong. The best defense lies in a vigorous offensive.
The proof consists in showing that on the
supposition of the reality of plurality one and
the same thing would be definite, and yet indefinite and rests on the fact that all plurality
is a definite thing, i.e. number, and10it contains an infinity, i.e. of fractions.
We shall here content ourselves with a rather brief reof these arguments and of the answers which one may make to
them on the basis of the metaphysic of the schools.
First of all, there are the proofs which he advanced
against the plurality of bodies, and, indirectly therefore, on
Bum~

,rr.,

uni~er:e.

behalf of the unity of the
It is his contention that
. if there were several bodies, these would have to be at onoe
"infinitely great and infinitely small, but such a concl~sion is
r
SO repugnant to reason that men will be driven to accept the
existence of the One alone. He argues that if the bodies are
once divided into several, each of them oan be divided still
further and will at last be made up of unities. Since what is
extended can still be divided and, according~~ is not the ultimate unity, the proper unity of the extended thing would then
have to be something unextended. Now the unextended is without
magnitude. "Ergo etiam quaelibet multitudo unitatum inextensarum nequit totum oorpus faoere revera extensum et eonsequenter
hoC esset infinite parvum vel potius sine omni vera extensione. 1I
So much for the "inconvenient conclusion" of infinite smallness.
Taking up the other "inoonvenient conolusion", he maintains that several bodies or extended beings clearly ought to
have extension. Eaoh body oan be divided into infinite and extended parts: these parts must be extended, else they could not
make up an extended body when in the whole, but the extension
of infinite parts to eaoh other will oonstitute an infinite
magnitude. Henee, each body would, while neoessartly of an infinite smallness , be possessed also of an infinite greatness.
Having first shown that "if what is had
not magnitude, it would not exist at all", he
proceeds: "But, if it is, then each one must
necessarily have some magnitude and thiekness,
and must be at a eertain distance from another:
for it also will have magnitude and there will
be a successor to it. It is the same to say this
once and to say it always: for no such part will
be the last nor out of relation to another. So,
if there is a plurality, they must be both large
and small. So small as tolbave no magnitude, so
large as to be infinite. ft 03
Furthermore, if there were these several bodies, they would
at onoe have to be finite in number and infinite in their multitude; as Simplicius remarks, there is no need for us to labor
this point, since, in proving that plurality must entail this
contradiotion, Zeno himself states briefly:
tllf things are a plurality, they must be
just as many as they are, and neither more nor
less. But if they are just as many as they are,
they will be finite in number. If things are a
plurality, they will be infinite in number. For
there will always be things between any of them,
and again between these yet othfo•• And so,
things are infinite in number."
His next argument was directed against the Pythagorean
dootrine concerning spaoe, whioh was an endeavor to distinguish
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space from the body which Occupies it. For, "if we insist that
body must be 1n space, then we must go on to ask what space itself is in. This is areinforcement of the Parmenidean dtnial
of the void."lOS We can see where the contention that all must
be in something and accordingly have something beyond it would
militate against the Eleatic One. Simplicius, again, narrates
the positing by Zeno of this argument: "If topos exists, in
what will it be? For every existent is in something; but what
1s in something ~s in a topos. Topos will therefore be in a
~O
topos, and so on ad infinitum: therefore topos does not exist.
-Finally, it is reported that Zeno argued with Protagoras
the Sophist, to this effect: if there are several grains of
millet falling, one of them ought to make a noise and ought not:
Ought not, because if it falls alone, nothing is heard and it
makes no noise; ought, ~87ause many grains together could not
otherwis'e make a noise.
We can without difficulty imagine what the effect of
these arguments would probably be on his contemporaries, most
of whom were unfamiliar with dialectic. Thus handicapped, and
without any sound philosophic basis, they were ill prepared
to analyse the arguments or to frame a suitable reply_ Certain-.
1y, they could not through the use of any existing system find
the means for an answer. Zeno was then of real service in showQ
ing such attempts at philosophy up for their defects.
The answer which we can now essay to make is due largely to the efforts of Aristotle, whose work was evidenrO~ stimulated by the problems which men like Zeno thought up.
As to
the first objections, we should note that the really ultimate
parts out of which a body is compounded are neither extended
nor unextended, forasmuch as ultimate parts of this sort being
no longer divisible do not exist.
Quare partes, in quas de facto dividitur
corpus, semper sunt extensae, ita tamen ut ulterius adhuc dividi possint et ut cUm maiora numero partium earum extensio fiat semper minor.
Sic plura corpora finitae extensionislO~ 1nS!finitum divisibilia, sunt possibilia.
As to his second series of arguments, the number of parts which
can be obtained thanks to the actual division of each of those
several bodies will always be finite, and never infinite, although, as we just saw, the actual division might conceivably
be prolonged indefinitely. There are, then, no grounds for saying that there can be serious talk of an actually infinite
multitude of bodies whic~ could be found in every divisible body
The argument as to space, in turn, confuses real with
possible space. If we accept the Aristotelian definition of it
as "the first and unmoved limit of the enclosing as against the
enclosed", ~O we find that such surfaces will be in the proper
body as in a subject, and not just "in space". This body may in
its turn be likewise fixed, but if we think,:as.Aristotle though,
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of the number of existing bodies as fin!!!, there will be no
need for an indefinite procession here.
The argument about the millet seeds is rather l~ss ingenious than the others, for it is founded on the obvious failure to consider the limits of sense perception, as in the case
of the ear on which any excess or defect of sound will be lost.
Therefore Zeno's argument is not true,
that there is no part of a grain of millet that
does not make a sound: for there is no reason
why any such part should not in any length of
time fail to moveli~e air that the whole bushel
moves in falling.
Sooner or later, every student of philosophy will come
up against his famous objections to motion; these are real
tributes to his dialectical skill and a harsh accusation as
well of the short-comings of the contemporary philosophy.
The first is the so-called dichotomy, wherein he contends that, if a body is to cover a certain distance, it must
first traverse the half thereof, but before it traverses the
half of the whole given distance it must get across half of
the half, and even before half of this half of a half, etc.
"If then these halves are infinite in number, because it is
alwys possible to halve any given length, and if it il thus
impossible to traverse an infinite number of positions in a
finite time -- this Zeno assumed as self-evident --- every
magnitude has an infinite number of subdivisions, and therefore iilis impossible to traverse any magnitude in a finite
time." -, Aristotle, as we might have suspected, does not accept t~is assumption of Zeno's, that the crossing of an infinite number of positions or the making of an infinite number
of contacts one by one in a finite time was impossible.
When he gives his answer, we are able to see another
service of the Eleatic philosophy. Parmenides had enuntiated a
doctrine which was to oblige men to study the analogy of being;
Zeno was now propounding difficulties which were to drive later
thinkers to study the.infinite and the various senses thereof,
and to distinguish what is actually infinite from what is potentially so. This is clear in the reply which Aristotle makes to
the dichotomy:
For there are two senses in which length
and time and, generally, any continuum are called
infinite, namely in respect of divisibility or
of extension. So while it is impossible to make
an infinite number of contacts in a finite time
where the infinite is a quantitative infinite,
yet it is possible where the infinite is an infinite in respect of division; for the tkme itCe1f is also infinite in this respect. 1
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If we understand time as being also inf1nite 1n its potency to
div1sion, we can see that it is possible to traverse an 1nf1nite number of sueh pos1tions in a time like this and al,o to
make an inf1nite number of contacts.
Then, we have the famous argument about Achilles and
the tort01se, wherein he tells us that the hero, speedy as he
is, can never overtake the tortoise whom he 1s pursuing. By the
time he gets to a given spot A, the brute w1ll have reached a
spot B, and by the t1me he does get up to B, his quarry will
have passed ahead to C, and so on.
And so, during every period of time in
which the pursuer is cover1~ the distance
which the pursued moving at 1ts lower relative speed has already advanced, the pursued
advances a yet further d1stance; for even
though this distance decreases with each step,
yet, since the pursued 1s also definitely in
motion, it does advance some positive d1stance. 115
Inasmuch as distances will diminish in a given proportion ad infinitum thanks to the assumed infinite divisibillty of any
magnitude, it follows that Achilles fleet-of-foot is never
going to catch up with the tortoise. In its essence, this argument is the same as the dichotomy, differing in that the successively given lengths are not divided into halves.
For in both, by dividing the distance
in a given way, we conclude that the goal is
not reached; only in the Achilles a dramatic
effect is produced by saying that not even the
sw1ftest will be successful in h1s pursuit of
the slowe J t - and so the solution of it must be
the same. 1l6
Thirdly, Zeno would hold that arrow flying through the
air 1s at rest, if, indeed, all must be e1ther moving or at
rest. Since an object "in flight" will always occupy a space
equal to itself, and since whatever does occupy such a space
cannot be 1n mot10n, the fly1ng arrow 1s at rest. 117 This again
rests on an assumption, namely, that time is composed of 1nstants, but the assumption is unwarranted and the argument is
accordingly false.
For if, he says, everything is either at
rest or in mot10n, but nothing is 1n motion
when it occup1es a space equal to itself, and
~hat 1s 1n flight is always at any given 1nstant occupying a space equal to 1tself, then
the fly1ng arrow 1s mot10nless. But this 1s
false, for the time 1s not composed of 1nd1visible instants any more t~t§ any other magnitude,
1s composed of ind1v1s1ble.
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Finally, he says that is necessary to traverse equal distances at an equal velocity in the same time. Yet a moving body
will pass by a second body moving at the same velocity i~.a contrary direction twice as quickly as when this second body is at
rest. In such a caseA the laws of motion are at variance with
the seeming facts.~~~ Zeno would like to maintain that it is nenecessary for his adversaries to admit that half a given time is
equal to its double, i. e., the whole time. Once again, he has
fallen prey to a fallaacy, in taking for granted "that a body
takes an equal time to pass with equal velocl~ a body of equal
size at rest, an assumption which is f.al.se".
There is little
need to labor the point, for the solution is plain to see: the
conditions which he names are precisely the ones which would
allow the quicker passing.
Until Aristotle proposed the integrated philosophy which
could allow for the resolution of such ~guments, men were confronted with real difficulties through this dialectic of an aggressive monism. It was not, in fact, long before the proofs
which Zeno had earnestly advanced in support of the Truth he
saw, were employed in a sceptical fashion, as a means of assailing the foundations of certitude. The dialectic of the two centuries that followed, on the bad features of which so much has
een said, may well be regarded as owing its method and even
its spirit - for dialectic merely tied up the opponents - to
eno's work. That was his technique, after all, to confute his
adversaries by showing that their opinions contained inherent
absurdities and contradictions. Indeed, he "treated of natural
philosophy in the same manner as.Parmenides did, but had also
erfected himself in an art of his own for refuting and silencing opponents in argument; as Timon of Phlius describes it tAlso the two-edged tongue of mighty Zeno, who,12l
Say what one WOUld, could argue it untrue.'""

~

It was a dangerous art and one not very hard to pervert from the
service of the "Truth" to the advantage of the dialectician. For,
here was no necessary tendency after truth at all: the whole
oint was to show that the position upheld by one's opponent,
hatever it m1~t be, was wrong; after that was done, there need
e no further af"firmative work, but one could just keep on
earing apart whatever had been devised as an explanation of
hings. "The.business of the questioner," as Aristotle observed,
'1s so to develop the argument as to make the answerer utter the
ost extravagant paradoxes that necessarily follow because ~.
is position: while that of the answerer is to make it appear
hat it is not he who is ~~s~onsible for the absurdity or paraox, but only his position. 2
Plato traced the root of eristic and its dangers to the
chool of Elea. He was, as we know, very much alive to the perils
f argument merely for the sake of argument, of a blind partisanhip the only concern of which is to perauade the listener, no
tter what the merits of the question at issue.l23 When Socrates

- 4is faced with death, he takes the time, as Plato pictures him,
to denounce such dialecticians:

.'

When a simple man who has no skill in dialectics believes an argument to be true which he
afterwards imagines to be false, whether really
false or not, and then another and another,_ he
has no longer any faith left, and great disputers, as you know, come to think that at last
they have grown to be the wisest of mankind; for
they alone perceive the utter.uasoundness and instability of all arguments, or indeed, of all
things. 124

It is a strange conclusion to a Monist dialectic. Plato was, mor
over, distrustful of any who followed t~ men of Elea, with
whom, as he brings out in his Sophist, he associates the beginnings of this eristic art. There, "Socrates is afraid that a pupil
of Zeno will prove ~ very devil in logic-chopping' far above
the level of the present company, until Theodorus . reassures him
by the information that the new-comer is more reasonable to deal
with than the enthusiasts for controversy. Plato thus definitely
connects the rise of eristic with the antinomies of Zeno. tf125
The latter may have been well-intentioned, but he displayed a
dangerous weapon for unscrupulous use, and the dangers of the
situation were only augmented by the fact that he employed it
himself on behalf of a philosophy which was at variance with common sense.
Nonetheless, we should acknowledge his remarkable talents
and the clarity with which he was able to perceive and to propose such important problems dealing with the nature of the coninuum - whether is it permanent or successive? -with the manner
in which its parts are found in it, with the multitude of parts ....
hich can be brought about by division, with the character of
he infinite.
By the metijod in which he pursued the end
he gave a lasting impulse, not only to the development of dialectic, but also to the discussion
of the problems inherent in the ideas of space,
time and motion. The fallacies of his proof and
in particular the fundamental error, the confusion
of the infinite divisibility of space and time
with infinite dividedness, he certainly did not
notice himself.126
With Zeno, the opposition between the Eleatic Monism and
he general belief of mankind that there are many bodies subect to change reported by experience was brought jo a head.
or he did not content himself with maintaining the falsity of
he common view, but denounced it as impossible and contradicory. Certainly, in so dOing, he entangled the Pythagoreans and

~
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u~e other imperfect philosophers of
~rom which their own faulty systems

the times in difficulties
could not extricate them.
,e rendered these unacceptable to thinking men. At the s~e ~ime,
~1s own vigorous attacks upon the data of common sense tended to
~epel people from the Monism which he advocated.
For some, the result of this intellectual turmoil was to
be scepticism, but others saw the need for probing more deeply
nto these questions, for penetrating beyond the material level
,n which philosophers had so far remained in their endeavors to
i1scover the truth. No solution arrived at on this plane was able
~O withstand careful studj and criticism. This circumstance sug~ested the unique character and power of the mind, which could
~ot accept the material as sufficient to meet its demands for
~~e reasons of things. Zeno had provoked the clash between the'
~onists and the physicists. Lighting up the defects of each in
uhis way, he ~nifested the need for a true metaphysic: such had
uO be found or men would be lost. The issue, at last, was being
nade clear. 127
Melissus of Samos:

The Monist tradition found another able representative
Ion Melissus of Samos, whose origin would suggest that "it is
?ossible that he was originally a member of the Ionic school,
~nd we shall see that ~ertain features ofh1s doctrine tend to
'ear out this view".120 It is, at any rate, clear that he came
mder Eleatic influences and was in association with some of
~he physicists, for "he was a pupil of Pa;rr~~ides. Moreover
~e came into relations with HeraUli tus ••• "
Where his fellow disciple, Zeno, had sought to support
~he teachings of their master, Parmenides, by the indirect means
~n which we have just co~ented, Melissus seems to have preferred
~ more direct approach when it came to proving their common docrina, from wh1ch he departed in one respect. For, that which is,
nd its complete opposition to that which is not, were equally
mpressive to his mind:
If nothing is, what can be said of it as of
something real? What was was ever, and ever shall
be. For, if it had come into being, it needs must
have been noth1ng before it came into being. Now,
if it were nothing, in
wise could anything have
arisen out of nothing. l

98

his is the by now familiar teaching, with its basis in the Parrestriction of reality to that Which actually exists.
elissus, however, had a new way of expressing his belief in the
ternal character of this being, and in putting his reasons for
uch a belief.
.

~enidean

For, he argues, "if it had come into being, it would have

- 6d a beginning (for it would have begun to come into being at
oIDe time or other) and an end (rgr it would have ceased to come
nto being at some time or other) .131 Thus far, he is f~~lowing
he more or less customary Eleatic paths. His next step, on the
ther hand, was apparently inspired by some of the dialectical
nfluences then abroad, and was later to bring the shap criticism
f Aristotle upon his head.
Having contended that that which begins to be has a be1nning and an end, he went on to to convert this universal aflrmative proposition into a universal negative one: "If it
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ogic, evidence of what the new art might do without the proper
lscipline. It would, of course, be going a little too far to
ay that it was on this turn alone that he founded his belief
n the eternity of the world, iiaamuch as his whole system would
ve tended to that conclusion. 55
Whether he made serious use of such a line of thought
r not, he seems to have differed from his master more seriously
n maintaining the spatial infinity of the being. He would agree,
s we have seen, that it is temporally infinite, but he was unble to Bee why it should be considered as limited with regard
o space, since that could be brought about only through limitaion imposed upon it by empty space. Here, at least, his logic
as proceeding consistently upon the Eleatic premisses: for, if
he being is the finite sphere, there can be nothing outside of
t, yet Parmenides had been most eloquent in his insistence upon
he impossibility of nothing. Now, as Me1issus saw it, a finite
phere is encompassed by infinite emptiness: "Nor 1s anything
1 4
empty. For what is empty is nothing. What is nothing cannot be. If
This denial of the void is orthodox enough, and he was
ndeed loyal to the internal exigencies of the system when he
orked on the basis of this denial to the conclusion thatl"just
s it ever is, so it must ever be infinite in magnitude". 35 If
he Being is in this way infinite, it will be necessary. for men
o reject the assumption of a multiplicity in things and to beieve rather in the Truth of the One 6"If it were not one, it
ould be bounded by something else", 13 . for it cannot be surround
d by the utterly non-existent nothing, and, if this is true,
hen the two which might bind each other are ipso facto finite:
For if it is (infinite), it must be one; for if it were two, it
ou1d not7be infinite; for then they would be bounded by one antherlt.~3

It is clear, therefore, that such a being will be a p1eum, one and homogeneous, a continuum which is everyWhere like
nto itself. It will be free from all change and from all possiility of change. There will be no occasion for it to move, and
.
t will be perfectly fUll at every point:
So then it is eternal and infinite and one
and all alike. And it cannot perish nor become
greater, nor does it suffer pain nor grief. For

if any of these things happened to it, it would
no longer be one. For if it i~ altered, then the
real must needs not be all alike, but what was .'
before must pass away, and what was not must oome
into being •••
Further, it is not possible either that
its order should be ohanged; for the order whioh
it had before does not perish, nor does that
which was not come into being •••
Nor does it move; for it has nowhere to
betake itself to, but is fUll. For if there were
aught empty, it would betake itself to the empty.
But, since there is n~ught empty, it has nowhere
to betake itself to.l'~
s treatment of this subject shows his opposition to the Ionians
, in one way or another, denied the perfectly homogeneous
raoter of that which is real, and admitted the possibility
f some sort of change. All of this is out of the question, if
e aooepts the unity of the Being and its eternity. Change, the
eneration and oorruption of being, is not to be reconoiled with
eternal. In like fashion, he rejeots any ohanges in order,
r these too would entail that beooming and passing away whioh
at be excluded: "Sinoe nothing is either added to it or passes
or is altered, how can any real thing have had its order
~~""......oed?'f139 Hence, he finds also wanting in truth the opinion
f Anaximander, who "did not asoribe the origin of things to any
teration in matter, but said that oppositions i~the substrat
oh was a boundless body, were separated out".
As for his emphatic repudiation of the_possibility that
Being might have feelings of §orrow or of pain - sinoe "a
ng in pain could not all be"141., this may have referenoe to
teaohings of Anaxagoras, to whom, as we shall see shortly,
was antipathetic on other grounds as well. If he went this
, he was certainly obliged to take the next step, of disp,utng the method of Anaximenes for the produotion of things: 'for
t is not possible for w. .t is rare to be as fUll as what is
ense,; but what is rare is at once emptier than what is dense".
Even though Melissus denied change and motion, Baeumker
s declared that he allowed for motion in pleno, basing his
nterpretation on some remarks of Simplioius. Burnet, however,
s of opinion that the passage in question forms "part of Simpli-

~fs~~ :r~~~~:lt§a!~~tn!i:~~~r'z~~e~!:m~O!~~~dt~od~h:ith
ame point of view.
His discussion of the impossibility of a plurality of
ngs brings Melissus to deny the veraoity of our sensible knowedge, which always reports reality as being made up of many
I~A~w~~ing veings. For, he maintains, things very often appear to
e ohanged from their previous manifestation, and this oould not
the case, if they were really made up in the way the sense
rted the first, now changed manifestation.

If things are ••• all that men say they really
are, -- if that is so, and if we see and hear aright, eaoh one of these must be suoh as we firs~
decided, and they oannot be ohanged or altered,
but each must be just as it is. But, as it is, we
say that we see and hear and understand aright,
and yet we believe that what is warm becomes cold;
••• that what is living dies, and that all things
are born from what lives not; and that all these
things are ohanged, and that what they were and
what they are now are in no way alike ••• Now these
things do not agree with one another ••• It is
clear, then, that we did not see aright after
all, nor are we right in believing that all these
things are many.144
Multiplioity, then, is but an illusion of the senses, which deceive us anyhow with the semblance of beoomings, and it oannot
stand up under analysis. This was an inevitable result of the
leatio system, with its various errors mingled with glimpses
of the truth. It was a very dangerous oombination, this oombination of a skillful dialectic that aimed at destroying whatever
the opponent held with a pOSitive philosophy whioh oontradicted
the first date of knowledge. What men had to do was, with
ristotle, to distinguish matter and form, to allow in this way
for a rational explanation of change and the oonservation of
an abiding subjeot of the changing reality as well as of an
abiding object of intellectual knowledge -- the form. In some
espects, to be sure, it remained for the Christian philosophy,
ith its proper grasp of the significance of being and the radioally oontingent charaoters of all things hare together with their
intrinsic dependence on God the Being, to perfect the genuine
etaphysics.
As for Melissus, his line of reasoning about the senses
ay well be direot'd at Anaxagoras, who said that "from the weakess of our senses we are not able to judge the truth"145; he
eant thereby that they disolose only the dominant pDrtions in
things and not the portions of all things in eaoh. Perception
id not support his account, and he accordingly took refuge in
assailing its "imperfection and weakness". Of course, differing
ortions of reality would not fit in with the homogeneous Being.
t any rate, if the senses are no longer to be received as the
riteria of the real, there is no way left for us logically to
eject the Eleatio monism; if things do constitute a plurality:
They would not change if they were real, but
each thing would be just what we believed it to be;
for nothing is stronger than true reality. But if
it has changed, what was has passed away, and what was
not has come into being. So then, if there were
many things, they would have to just of the same
nature of the One.146

J

luralism can be consistent, therefore, only in some kind of an
atomic theory, which looks to a reality made up of physically
indivisible and extended atoms, the common substance of which
signifies that all differences observable in things are to be
e~plained on the basis of atomic dispositions. It may with justice be said of Melissus that "his greatness consisted in this,
that not only was he the real systematiser of Eleaticism, but
be was also able to aee, before the pluralists themselves saw
it, the only way in which the theorY that things are a many
could be worked out consistently. tllZf.7
Although he may have been more thoroughgoing in his aderence to the monist logic, he was in other ways inferior to
bis master. The unity of the older philosopher was i~ some respects an ideal unity, but that of his pupil was quite material:
Parmenides seems to fasten on that which is
one in definition, Melissus on that which is one
in matter, for wh1ch reason the former says that
it is lim1ted, the latter that it is unlimited. l 48
He did not follow his master in this important subject, although
be may not have explicitly contradicted him. At any event, he
did not restrict himself to a consideration of the abstract concept of being or to an application of that concept to the universe itself. Rather, as we have seen, he considered things more
ooncretely and made the non-being of his master's teaching the
same as the void: "Parmeni~1.~ non ens identificans cum vacuo et
vacui exsistentiam negans".~he master was at least nearer to
a metaphysical conception of reality than was his pupil, who
stayed on a more material plane.
du moins, affirme les droits de
mieux encore, ilIa cherche ou elle r~
s1de vraiment, c'est-\-dire, dans l'essence intellig1 ble, Ko..'\o. "Y'O'I ~O'lOV, et non R,as, c0Illr3~ M~lie.sus,
dans l' ind~term1D' mat6riel~ "K~'\~ 'l~y \J ~'V .1!)O
Parm~nide,

l'unit~;

His identification of that which Is not with the vacuum and h1s
further conclusion as to the lim1tless extension of the world
raised the diff1cult questions which have to d,o with the possibIlity of a vacuum and of local motIon there1n, as Iell as with
the extens10n, bounded or unbounded, of this world. !)
What probably interests us the most in these Eleatics as
related to that deyelopment which we are now studying 1s the
way in which their writings lead up to and necessitate the establIshment of a proper metaphysic. The world of merely sens1ble
things is denounced as unreal -- and there is, after all, a good
deal of truth to this, once it is understood correctly. This denUnc1ation and the correspond1ng failure of the Eleatics to get
anywhere with their exaggerated insistence on the Being served
alike to direct men's attention toward the truth of the matter,

to that incomparable primacy which The Being does enjoy, to the
tract notion of being-in-general which we can apply ana10gousto all that is, to the derived and changing reality t~~ senbl e world which is best understood in terms of the Peripatetic
u_w____ tion and which,
too, must be seen in its proper place in
hierarchy of being. Even though the Eleatics may not have
eiated the fact, we may say that with them tlthought frees
sself ••• from the bondage imposed upon it by the aenses, denies
finite world, and affirms its own infinity".l. 52
It was becoming impossible to solve the quest~ons whieh
eatics and others had raised, on the basis of a physic or a
smology alone. Men were asking now about the existence of
tural bodies, their changes and their multiplicity. In those
easer sciences, such are presupposed as facts altogether sure
evident; they are examined in themselves -in the first philoPropterea omnes illae solutiones, quae, ut
pantheismus, idealismus, monismus, phaenomenalisMUS atque scepticismus, illa negant aut de eis
dubitant, non sunt in cosmologia ••• exponendae et
improbandae. Eorum enim negationes vel dubitationes non difficu1tatibus vel argumentls ex proprio hujus quaestionis (de primis principiis corporum) objecto exortis innituntur, sed difficu1tatibus et praejudiciis metaphysicis circa objectivum cognitionis valorem et circa naturam
entis in genere. Radix ergo omnium horum errorum
est tota1iter extra cosmo10giae objectum. 1 53
o call in question such things as these men did was to pass bethe field of natural things. So it is that St Thomas says
f Parm~Qldes and Me1issus: "Non natura1iter de natura locutl
".154 They dragged in metaphysical questill1s and created a
efinite need for men to address themselves thereto in a metaslca1 manner. Aristotle demonstrates, in the first book of
s Physica, that the errors of such men as Parmenides and Melisare not to be confounded by natural science. In the first
ce, those thinkers denied the very formal object of ant cosmogy, and it is only metaphysics, the sclence of being as such,
ch investigates its own formal object in such a way. Further,
science could be required to advance reasons against opinlons
ch are manlfestly false and improbable:
Ridlcu1um est quod a1iquls tentet demonstrare
quod natura sit, cum manifestum slt secundum sensum,
quod mu1ta sunt a natura quae habent principium sul
motus in se ••• Natura autem esse est per se,notum
ln quantum natura1ia sunt manifesta sensui. Sed quld
sit uniuscuiusque rei natura vel quod prlnciplum
motus, hoc non est manifestum.l. 55

-81For, it should be at the base of all our thought that we
existence and multiplicity of things, which are pre:ented to us with such evidence that none can in practic~.deny
them, and which are duly discussed, in so far as they are subject to discussion, in metaphysics. Aristotle pOints out further
that no science should be required to attempt the solution of
sophistries which are clearly deflclent ln thelr very material
or their form.
ccep~he

Non omnes ratlones sunt solvendae ln aliqua
sclentla, sed solum illae quae concludent allquod
falsum ex prlnclplls lllius sclentlae; quaecumque
vero non concludunt ex prlnciplis sclentlae, sed
ex contrar15s prlnciplorum non solvuntur ln llla
sclent1a. 5
It is pla1n that these anc1ent assaults upon the value of our
sensible knowledge, as well as upon all that contradlcte4 the
absolute univocity of being, could not be taken up so long as
the discussion remalned on the plane of natural science. One
had to look higher, to the sclence of being 1tself.
Qula praedicti ph1losophi loquebantur de
rebus natura11bus, licet non inducerent defectus, id estdub1tatlones, naturales, ut1le est
ad propositum disputare de hujusmodi opinlonl_us;
quia etsi non slt sclentiae naturalis disputare
contra hujusmodi op1n1ones pertinet tamen ad
ph1losophiam primam. 157
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59. ST. Thomas, De.Potentla Dei. vii.7. Followlng much
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the same line of thought in the Summa Theologica (I. iv.3.), he
saYs that the effects ot God are to H1s l1keness as their cause
IIsecundum aliqualem analogiam, sicut ens est commune omni'bus."
60. st. Thomas, In I Metahh., lect. ix, 139. Father Schaaf
succinctly points out that Parmenides "non attendit ad varias
slgnificationes entis. Ex eo,quod ens de omnibus praedicamus,
non sequitur, ut iterum suppon1t Parmen1des, ilIa omnia entia
habere eandem naturam, quippe cum ens, uppote conceptus transcendentalis, etiam in difterentiis contineatur,quae etsi sic
slnt ens, tamen in natura possunt esse valda inter se diversa •••
Falso ergo deduci t, omnia debere esse g )a-0\,..Q.. • "( Ope ci t. ,pg. 61. ).
The matter of the concept of being, together w1th the variOUB issues involved,is discussed in McCormick,Scholastic
Metaphysics, Pt. I, ch. 2.
61. Ofr. fro 8.
62. Garrigou-Lagrange, op.cit., II. 549.
63. "Aristotle) criticised both the Eleatics,who looked upon
reality as all actual unchangeable,and Heraclitus,who stressed
change as the only rea11ty. He took the middle course,hold1ng
reality to be not entirely actual, but partly also potential,and
continually passing trom the potential to the actual. He admitted real being and real change, and it was to explain both permanence and change in reality that he formulated his doctrine
of causes. The potential cannot make itself actual; therefore
the influence of the efficient cause is needed to reduce potentiality to act ••• For the efficient cause to act and br1ng about
ohange, there must be in the things of nature potentiality for
such change; and. this potentiality is his material cause, to
which corresponds the formal cause or the actuality which fulfills this potentiality. If "Material SUbstances are ••• composed
of two intrinsic principles; the material principle, which is
the same in all, and which is called Prime Matter; and the determining principle,which is proper to each, and which is called
the Substantial Fon,l." "Material substance is in potency,not
only with regard to further accidental perfections, but also
with regard to other substantial perfections ••• The constituent
of the material substance that corresponds to its potentiality
is called Materia~ Prima. It McCormick,op.cit., I.16506, 178,18).
64. Anicetus Fernandez-Alonso,O.P., "DePrimis Intr1nsecis
Corporum Naturalium Principiis", pg. 293. Apud Acta Secundi
Con res sus Thomistici Internationalis, 1936; pp. 284-96.
5. "Motion is 'the actualisation of that which is potentially, as such· ••• Motion in general is the actualising of the
otential. This it is part of the nature of movement that the
otential has not yet comnlete1y lost its potent1ality and become actual... In each moment of activity,potentiality is comletely cancelled and trans.:·ormed in Actuality; in movement the
ransformation is not comulete until the movement is over •••
ovement cannot be ollssed simpliciter either as potentiality
r as activity_ It is actualisation, but one which implies its
wn incompleteness and the continued presence of potentialitytiThe elements involved in change are - that which produces

~o~ement,

that Which is moved, the time in whiCh it is moved, that

from which and that into which it ls moved." Ross, Aristotle,

pp. 81-2.
66. Metaphysics Ix.4. 1047 a. Here he deals with ~eing in
potency, but a moment later takes up being in ~ and says of
thiS word "quod ponttur ad signlficandum ende1echiam et perfectionem, scilicet formam, et alia hujusmodi, sicut sunt quaecumque operationes,veniunt maxime ex motibus quantum ad originem
yocabull. Cum enim nomina sunt signa intelligibi1ium conceptionuro, illis primo imponimus nomina. quae prlmo intelligimus, licet
sint posteriora secundum ordinem naturae. Inter alios autem
actus, maxime est nobis notus et apparens motus, qui sensibiliter a nobis videntur." st. Thomas, In IX Metaphys., lect.iii,
1805. The soundly philosophic passage is especially interesting
because of its stress on the role of the sensible and of motion
in the foundation of our knowledge~
67. Garrigou-Lagrange, op.cit., II. 551
68. S.Th. I. iil. 2 ad 3.
69. Maritain, Les degrls du savior, pg. 427.
70. Maritain, Ope cit.
71. Taylor, OPe cit., pp. 29-30.
72. Erdmann, History of Philosophy, I. 41.
73. Fr. 1.
74. "Heraclitus and Parmenides both distrusted the evidence
of the senses and sought to correct lt through thought, but in
precisely dpposite ways. For Heraclitus, the SBnses give an
illusion of permanent being and he recognised the ever-changing
substance of fire behind it. Parmeni'des saw however the deception of the senses in the apparent becoming and passing away,and
recognised the unchangeable being behind it ••• However misguided
the attempt to make a pure logician out
the metaphysician
Parmenides,nevertheless the E1eatic seized upon the weak pOints
in the Heraclitus doctrines - t~e want of a basis whiCh explains
why the universal fire changes into other forms ••• Thus he arrived
with Xenophanes at the conclusion of complete immutability of
being and further his logical r~jection of the world of sense
which corresponds to its ethical repudiation in the OrphicPythagorean circles ••• It was not without justification that Plato
and Aristotle called the Eleatics the "interruptors of the course
of the world" ••• and tithe unnatural scientists" (Theaetetus 181
A. Aristotle in Sextus Empiricus, Adv. Math. X. 46.). Zeller,
o • cit., pp. 50-1.
75. M.E.J.Taylor. invites us to essay the following: "Take
the world as we know it: conceive it as a spherical in form:
subtract from it all its variety of quality: the remainder is
reality is conceived by Parmenides, and the few bald statements
that can be made about such a 'reality' are the sum total of
truth." Ope ci t.
76. Marechal, Le~oint de d6part de la m~taphysigue, I. 44.
77. Benn, Early Greek Philosophers, pg. 53.
78. The act of intellection or intellectualising means
that as soon as the senses perceive a reality distinct from the
mind, the higher faculty, the intellect, conceives, or forms a
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of it. This,in turn,means thSL the intellect,penetrating the material data presented to our consciousness by the
senses, apprehends, or understands, on account of its po.er of
abstraction, the essence, or that which in the mat~rial data is
the thing that makes it what it is. NOw, we are not only aware
of some reality distinct from us as the subject thinking, but we
are said to know, to apprehend the nature of the reality presented to us. The reality which, before we had our cognitional
experience, had only an ontological existence as far as we were
concerned, now as an ideal - a representational existence in our
mind, and inthis way we are said to apprehend or to know the
objecr, even to become one with it. 'Cognoscendo,anima quodammodo fit omnia'." McLaughlin, The Problem of Knowled~e, pg. 18.
79. Maritain, &~flexions sur lfintelligenc~ pg. 13.
80. Mari tain, Ope cit. e>g. 17.
81. S. The I. lxxxv. 2.
82. S.Th. t. Ilxxxv.l. "L'image t§tant presente a. la conscience, l'intellect agissant fait appara1tre spontanement I'
aspect intelligible: il d~mat~rialise, i1 abstrait, il fai~ surgir les notes essentielles de Ice q\t est' la chose en ellem~me, non dans son individua1it~ materielle mais dans sa nature
specifique." de Bruyne, S.Thomas d'Aguin,p~.237.
83. "Voila ce que signifie Ie terme d existence immaterielIe et rien d'autre; aussi doit-on prendre garde que ce terme
pr3te a meprise, par exces or par defautj par exces, car l'objet
d'une connaissance sensible conserve, excepte au sens precis
qui vient d'3tre dit, les conditions formelles qui resultent de
la materialite; bien que communicable, la forme sensible existant dans la connaissance demeure la forme d'un objet materiel,
individuel et pou~u d'une position spatiale; par defaut, car
dans Ie monde des esprits il ~a encore lieu de distinguer l'
existence physique de la chose en elle-meme et son existence,
dans la connaissance; aussi doit-on pr~ferer Ie terme d'elistence
intentionne1le, cree par l' aristotelisme latin pour exprimer une
~ensee d'Aristote." Simon,Introduction a l'onto1ogie du
connaitre, pg. 17.
84. Fr. 8. (R.P. 119.).
85. Marita1n, Ope cit., ~p. 23-4. He directs our attention
~o the teachings-of Aristotle: actus objecti sensibilis et actus
facu1tatis sensitivae sunt realiter unus actus et tantummodo conceptus eorum sunt diversl~. De Anima III. 2,426 a 15.
86. efr. Burnet, OPe cit., pp. 177 fr., for a complete
account.
87. Schaar, OPe cit., pg. 63.
88. For in god we have Being and Truth Itself: "Veritas
lnvenitur in Intel1ectu, secondum quod apprehendit rem, ut est,
et in re, secundum quod habet esse conformabile inte1lectui. Hoc
autem maxime invenitur in Deo. Nam esse suum non solum est con~orme suo intel1ectui, s ed etiam est ipsum suum inte1ligere: et
~Uum intel1igere est mensura, et causa omnis alterius esse, et
~mnis alterius intel1ectus: et ipse est suum esse, et intelli~ere.
Unde sequitur, quod non solum in ipso sit veritas, sed
RUod ipse sit ipsa summa, et prima veritas. It S. Th. I xvi 5. The

-88The truth obacU'l!'ely hinted at in Parmenides here finda the
11ght, and it is glorious.
89. Schaaf, Ope cit., pg. 64, takes the statement.of
Ar1stotle as referring to Parmenides in particular.
90. Zeller, Ope cit., pp. 51-2. Burnet is of opinion that
tlail materialism depends on his view of reality" ( Ope cit., pg.
182. ), while Fulton Sheen, declares that "he reduced. the real
to the rational, being to mind, the concrete to the abstract,
and the transcendance of God into the immanence of the spirit.
The modern followers of Pannenides are the Italian idealists"
(God and Intelligence,pg. l5~. (He adduces quotations from
Gsntile's Teoria generale dello spirito.).It~ould be necessary,
of course, to take Dr. Sheen's terms in a special sense.
91. Diogenes LaeDtius, IX. 25-6.
92. H.D.P. Lee, in his Zeno of Eiea, pp. 8-9, comes to thre
conclusions with regard to our philosopher, of which the first
(on p.8) is that "we have every reason to suppose that in his
general views Zeno was an orthodox Eleatic".
93. "But he developed a particulae type of argument whose
object was to show that hypotheses other than the Parmenidean
'what is, is one' lead to self-contradictory 1J.tesults. His object
was to discredit the pluralists. We should not therefore, for
instance, expect to find that he held any particular views about
the nature of motion, but simply that he tried, as an orthodox
Eleatic, to show that the whole idea of motion is self-contradictory and absurd. ft Lee, conclusion 2, Ope cit. ,pp. 8-9. B. A.G.
Fuller gives a very colorful picture of lithe dire need ••• to rearray all the forces of logic for a final onslaught on the
philosophic countenance increasingly given to the things which
are 'but names which mortals have given, believing them to be
true - coming into being and passing away, being and not being,
ohange of place, and alteration', 'f ci ting "the more brilliantly
marked mathematical and scientific characteristics 11 ofa recrudesoent Pythagoreanism with its dangerous dualism and its disruptive space, the elements- of Empedocles, the molecules of Anaxagoras, and the continued teaching of a vacuum as especial signs
of peril (History of Greek Philosophy, pg. 161.).
94. Plato, Parmenides 128 c.
95. Cfr. Plato, Ope cit.
96. f1There is some reason to suppose that the Pythagoreans
in particular were the object of his attacks - as indeed they
had been of Parmenides' before him. tr Lee, conclusion 3, Ope ci t.
pg. 9. Cfb. #91, supra.
~
97. Burnet, E.G.P., pg. 314. In the fourth note,he says:
Empedokles has been suggested. He was about the same age as .
Zeno indeed, and he seems to criticise Parmenides (frs. 2 & 4.),
~t the arguments of Zeno have no special applicability to his
theories. Anaxagoras is still less likely." Yet their opinions
were at least symptomatic of the opposition.
98. "And they say that Zeno said that, if anyone would exlain to him what the one is, he would be able to a~eak about
eXistent things. He raised the difficulty, it seems, because

each particular sensible object is called many both categoricall
and by division, but the point he supposed to be nothing at all.
For ehat does not increase a thing when added to it, nor decreas
1t when substracted from it, he thought has no existenc~~"
"Zeno's argument in this passage seems to be different from
the one in his book to which Plato refers in the Parmenides.
For there, arguing in support of Parmenides' monism from the opposite point of view, he shows there is no plurality: but here,
as Eudemus says, he both does away with the one(for he speaks
of the point as the one), and ~llows the existence of plurality.
However Alexander thinks that here too Eudemus 1s referring to
Zeno as doing away with plurality. He says: "As Eudemus records
Zeno the friend of Parmenides tried to show that it is not possi
ble for there to be plurality because there is no "one." among
existing things,and plurality is a collection of units. " (Simpli.ius, PhysiCS, 97. 13; 99.7. Found in Lee,op.cit.,sections 5 &6.
Remarking that "the polemic of Zeno is clearly directed in
the first instance against a certain view ot the uni tit ,Burnet
finds the commentary of &lexander (given above) quite satisfactory in lhts explanation of this passage on the 'one', for "here
we have a clear reference to the Pythagorean view that everything may be reduced to a sum of units, which is what Zeno
denied." (E.G.P., pg. 315.)
99. Diogenes Laertius, IX. 25.
100. Burnet, Ope cit., pg. 314.
101. Erdmann, History of PhilosopA!, I. 45.
102. Schaaf, Ope cit., pg. 66. As Simplicius puts it,
Physics, 139.5: "In his book, in which many arguments are put
fprward, he shows in eachalb.at a man who says that there is a
plurality is stating something self-contradictory. One of these
arguments is that in which he shows that, if there is a plurality, things are both large and small, so large as to be infinite
in magnitude, so small as to have no magnitude at all. And in
this argument he shows that what has neither magnitude Dor
thickness nor mass does not exist ar all. For, he argues ,-if it
were added to something else, it would not increase its size;
for a null magnitude is incapable, when added, of yielding an
increase in magnitude. And thus it follows that what .as added
'Jas:l'1othing. But if, when it is substracted from another thing,
that thing is no less; and again, if, when it is added to anothe
thing, that thing does not inc~ease, it is evident that both
what was added and what was substracted were nothing." (Lee,
Ope ci t., ,2).
_
103· Simplicius, PhysiCS, 130. 34. (Lee, Ope cit., 10.).
104. Simplicius, Physics I 140.27. (Lee, Ope -cit., 11.).
105. Burnet, OPe cit., pg. 317.
106. Simp11cius,Physics, 562.1, ad 2l0b23.(Lee,op.cit.,12.).
Lee re.ldera the Greek topos by place, Burnet 0 .cit., pg.317.).
takes it as space,as does Zeller {pp.cit., pg. 52••
107. Stated in Simplicius, PhYSics, 1108.18. (Lee,op.cit.,
38.
108. "Ipsi Aristoteli, qui cum subtilitate Zenonis felicisaime univit profunditatem, sobrietatem, bonum sensum communem,

-90quique judicavit, 'imbeci11is esse ingenii, propter difficu1tates
relinquere veritatem cognitam', debemus c1aras et quantum diffioultas rei patitur, sUfficientes solutiones argumentorum.zenonis.
continuum, sic explicat, non est actu divisum et sic aCbU divisum et sic actu multitudinem partium non continet; nam continua
sunt ea, quorum extrema sunt unum et sic aotu limites in internp
non habent. Divisible vero est oontinuum non in partes multitudinis actu infinitae, sed in partes semper adhuc divisibiles."
Schaaf, Ope ci t. , pg. 69. Indeed we may ~ ree that tt argument a
zenonis magnam famam habuerunt, sed etiam aaud parvam utilitatern, ad eluoidandum oonoeptum continui; nec eorum vim potest
quis eludere nisi doctrinae peripateticae adhaereat." Geny,
re is Co
us Historiae Philoso hiae pg. 43.
Schaaf, Ope cit., pg. 70.
110. Physioa IV.4 212a.
•
111. ffParti cular space, II writes Turner (History of PhJloso~, pg.l44.) in expounding the Aristotelian physic, "is,therefore, ooterminous with extended body, and space in general is
ooterminous with the limits of the world. Space is aotually
finite; yet potentially infinite,inasmuoh as extension is oapable
of indefinite inorease."
112. Aristotle, Physioa VII.v 250 a.
113. Simplioius, 1013.4, ad 239blO, (Lee,op.cit., 20.).
114. Aristotle, op.cit., VI.ii. 233 a 21.
115. Simplicius, op.cit., 1013.31 (Lee, op.cit., gr.).
116. Aristotle, OPe cit., VI.ix.239 b 18. "Parsequens non
attinget fugiens,si semper vellet sistere in illis punotis,unde
fugiens anteerat profectum; quodsi motu oontinuo oeleriore,quam
habet fugiens, se movebit, illud obtinebit." Sohaff, ,Ope oit.,
pg.71.
117. "The flying missile oooupies a space equal to itself
at eaoh instant, and so during the whole time of its flight: what
occupies a space equal to itself at an instant is not in motion,
since nothing is in motion at an instant: but what is not in motion is at rest, sinoe everything is either in motion or at rest:
therefore the flying missile, while it is in flight, is at rest
during the whole time of its flight." Simplioius, 1011. 19.
(Lee, oS. cit.~ 21·)·
11. Aristote, Ope oit., VI. ix. 239 b 30.
119. This is set forth at great length by Simplicius,QP.
cit., 1016.9 - 1019.9. (Lee, Ope cit., 2§.). Of Zeno it is observed that "in his proof he assumes as admitted that bodies
moving with an equal velooity and of equal size move an equal
distanoe in equal times, and further that of such bodies, if
one moves halt as far as the other, then the motion of the first
will occupy half the time of that of the ·seoond. 11 On this basis,
he therefore argues that ttif there is motion, of two bodies of
equal size and moving with equal velOCities, one will move twioe
as far as the other, and not the same distamce, in the same time.
This of oourse an absurd oonolusion, but so also is the oonolusion that follows upon this that the time they take whioh is
equal and the same,is at onoe both double and half. llt

120. Aristotle, Ope cit., VI. ix 239 b 33.
121. Plutarch, Pericles, iv. 3.
122. Topica, VIII. iv 159 a.
123. In the face. of death, Socrates declared that·the partisan, to whom in the circumstances he somewhat likens himself,
"when he is engaged in a dispute, cares nothing about the rights
of the question, but is anxious only to convince his hearers of
~g own assertions."
(Phaedo 91 a.}.
124. Phaedo 90 c.
.
125. Taylor, Varia Socratica, pg. 92: as quoted by Lee
(gp.cit., pg. 118.).
126. Zeller, Ope cit., pg. 53. tfNon habemus rationem,dubitandi, ipsum non tuisse convictum de veritate proprii systematis
at hoc sensu sophistis sane non est adnumerandus. Ipsius tamen
subtilitates gratissimam dederunt occasionem sophistis,omnia,
etiam nlstentlam corporum, in dubium vocandi. ff Schaaf ,Ope ci t.
pg. 73.
127. ttZ eno closes the second great line of independent enquiry opened by Anaximander, and continued by Pythagoras,Zenophanes, and Parmenides, which we may characterise as the Mathematical. Its opposition to the Physical or Empirical enquiry
was radical and constant. But up to the coming of Zeno these
two systems had been developed almost in parallel lines, so
little influence did they exert upon each other. The two systems
olashed together on the arrival of Zeno at Athens., The result
f the conflict was the creation of a new method, - Dialectics.
s method influenced the Sophists and the Sceptius. It also
fluenced all succeeding schools, and may be said to have conituted one great peculiarity of Socrates and Plato. If Lewes,
F=~~~~~~~~~~' I. 65.
rn , ,Ope ci t., pg. 321
129. Diogenes Laertius, IX. 24.
130. Frs. la & 1. The fragments may be found in Burnet,
. 131. Fr. 2.'
132. Fr. 2. The criticisms of Aristotle are included in
(143 a.).
133. "His whole conception of reality made it necessary
r him to regard it as eternal. It would eemore serious if
stotle were right in believing as he seems to have done, that
Melissosinferred that what is must be infinite in space, because
it had neither beginning nor end in time. (Cfr. de Sophist.
Elench. l68b39). As,however, we have the fragment which Aristotle interprets in this way (fr.2), we are quite entitled to
understand it for ourselves, and I cannot see anything to justify
Aristotle's assumption that the expression 'without limit'
means without limit in space.
"Melissos did indeed differ from Parmenides in holding
that reality was spatically as well as temporally infinite; but
e gave an excellent reason for this belief, and had no need to
pport tt by such an extraordinary argument. tf Burnet, Ope ci t. ,
• 325.
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134. Fr. 7, n.4. efr. Aristotle, de Generatione et
corruptione, I. vlil 325 a.
135. Fr. 3.
~
136. Fr. 5
137. Fr. 6.
138. Fr. 7, nne 1, 2, 5.
139. Fr. 7, n. 2.
140. Simplicius, Ph~sics,l50. 20. (Burnet, op.cit.,pg.32.).
141. Fr. 7, n. 3.
It ls clear that Anaxagoras made considerable use of pain ('1\6 \lOS), and it is possible that his
d~ctrine, summed up ln the words(U:'i.1lC)vtl"bS~oy'(Arist.Eth.Nic.H.
15, 1154 b 7.) had a wider application than appears from his
remains. n Burnet, Ope cit., pg. 326, note 2.
14~.
Fr. 7, n. 6.
143. op.cit., pg. 327, and notes 1 & 2.
144. Fr. 8. "II insiste avec beaucoup de force sur l'
insuffisance d'e la connaissance sensible; si, en effet, noua
afflrmons avec v~r1t~ qu' une chose est chaude, il faudra taxer
d' erreur la sensation qui nous montre une chose chaude devenant
froide, c' est-A-dire les observations sur lesquel1e~ se fondait
l'image du changement dans la physique ionienne. tr~8hier,
op.cit., pg. 67.
145. Anaxagoras ,fr. 21.
146. Melissus, fr. 8.
147,. Burnet, OPe cl t., pp. 328-9.
148. Aristotle, MetaPhYsics, I.v. 986 b. It is said in fr.
9 that lIlf it is one, it cannot have body; for, if it had body,
it would have partsm and would no longer be one." Burnet argues
t.hat the.Qlli! spoken of here is not the E1eatic whole of reality,
but the point as a spatial unit. "To maintain it in the flrst
sense, the Eleatlcs were obliged to dlsprove it in the second;
and so it sometimes seemed as if they were speaking of their own
'one t when they really meant the other. tI (op. cit., pg. 328.).
We have already treated of much this same point in connection
with Zeno.
149. Schaaf, op.cit., pg. 80. "Sed Melissus considerabat
ens ex parte materlae. Argumentabatur enim,unltatementls,ex
eo quod ens non generatur ex a11quo prlorl, quod proprie pertinet
ad materiam quae est ingenlta. Arguebat enlm sic: Quod est
generatum habet principium;ens non est generatum, ergo non
habet principium. Quod autem caret princlpio, et fine caret;
ergo est infinitum. Et sl est infinitum, est immobile: quia
infinitum non habet extra se quo moveatur. - Quod autem c.
ens non generatur, probat sic.
Quia si generatur, aut generatur
ex ente, aut ex non ente; atqul nec ex non ente, quia non ens
est nihil, et ex nihi10 nihil flt. Nec ente; quia sic a1iquid
esset antequam fieret; erg,o nullo modo generatur. - In qua qu1dem
ratione patet quod tetigit ens ex paete materiae; quia non
generari ex al~quo prius existent materiae est. Et quia finitum
pertinet ad forman, infinitum vero ad materiam. Me1issus qui
considerabat ens ex parte materlae, dixit esse unum ens infinitum tr
St. Thomas, In I Metaph., lect. 9, 140.

ISO.

Marechal, Ope Cit., pp. 58-9. '
"Quid, quod plures ~ost ipsum etiam ppssibili tatem
"acui negarunt:;' uti Cartesius (etsi propter aliam rationem,
identificando nempe extensionem, competentem etiam vacuo:' .cum
corpore et quod recentius Balmes ex. gr. repetit, duo corpora,
inter quae esset vacuum, debere sese tangere, cum vacuum nihil
s1t. Attamen vacuum exsistere non posse,spphistice probatur a
Farmenide, ut rationem afferente, ipsi, utpote nihilo repugnare
ex1stentiam. Sane uti ens positivum existere nequit; quid ,autem
prohibet, quominus exaistat uti entis extensi negatio, cum possob1litate, quod inter duo corpora, inter quae est vacuum, ponatur corpus determinatae extensionis? QU4re iure communius adgdttitur possibilitas vacui extra mundum nec non inter corpora,
quamvis alia sit quaestio de absoluta possibilitate, alia de exs1stentia vacui. Problema vero de extensione illim1tata universi
sive ,quoad meram possibilitatem sive quoad exs~stentiam, ex te~
pore Melissi philosophos vexavit et adhuc vexat." SchaCt,~.
c1 t., pp. 81-2.
lSQ. Mitchell, A Studt of Greek Philosophy, pg. 19. This
is all right, provided that we take the denial of the finite
world in the right sense, that is, by comparison with the
reality. In summary we may note: ttIn the development of the
Eleatic philosophy Xenophanes, with his critical tendency of
mind and theological interests, appears as the predecessor of
Farmenides. The latter formulated the profound but rigid central
dogma of the school. Zeno .nd Melissus were protagonists, who
with the new art of their dialectic defended the conquests of
the school against the attacks of adversaries, but not without
danger of falling into the snare of mere polemics and thereby
paving the way, much against their will, for the scepticism of
the sophists which was eventually superseded by the PlatonicAristotelian logic. tt Zeller, Ope cit., pg. 54.
153. Fernandez-Alonzo, Ope cit •• , pg. 286
154 •• In I Physic., lect. 3,1.
155. In I Physic, lect. 1, 8.
156. In I Physic., lect. 1,7.
157. In I Physic., lect. 1, 8.
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Chapter V: The Younger Physicists.
The early Ionian physicists were more or less content to
regard reality as some kind of a unity, without entering into
all the implications of such a doctrine. The criticisms offered
bY the Eleatics, however, showed the Hellenic world t~at, if
the One, as usually conceived, really is, it cannot assume different forms, inasmuch as change would involve the admission of
that which is not. Hence, the sense presentarions of a changing
manifold of things were held to be delusory, and no thinker
before the time of Aristotle was able to vindicate the data of
oommon sense. Men sought instead to mediate between the Being
and experience, to modify the pure monism in favor ~f a more
adaptable reality, which would still be all it should be.
And so we find that from this time onwards
all the thinkers in whose hands philosophy made
progress abandoned the monis.tic hypothesis. Those
who still held by it adopted a critical attitude,
and confined themselves to a defence of the theory of Parmenides against the new views. Others
taught the doctrine of Herakleitos in an exaggerajed form; some cont1nued to expound the systems
of the early K11esians; but the leading men are
all pluralists. The corporealist hypothesis had
proved unable to bear the weight of a monistic
structure. 2
Among the newer pluralists we early find the outstanding
figure of Empedocles of Agrigentum, a man of an illustrious
family, who, by one account, was the disciple of the Pythagoreans
and, by another, the pupil of Parmenides.3 He was by a common
tradition a man of notable parts, possessed of great erudition
and gifted with a noble eloquence. Aristotle speaks of him as
being the inventor of rhetoric, a man "Of Homer's school and
powerful in diction, being grea! 1n metaphors and in the use
of all other poetical devices", while Satyrus megt10ns him as
being "also a physician and an exoellent orator", who numbered
Gorgias among his students.
Indeed, Satyrus tells us that Gorgias was present when
his master traffioked in magic, and Empedooles h mself laid
claim to great powers over the forces of nature •. He partioipated in politics and travelled widely, setting fprth his teachlngs and reoiting his verses throughout the western portion of
the Hellenio world. By his own acoount, he was received with
divine honors wherever he fared: such, for example, was the
burden of his message to those rather astound1ngly virtuous
folk who dwelt in the great town that looks down upon the
yellow rook of Agrigentum:

5

I go about among you as an immortal god, no
mortal now, honored among all as is meet, crowned
with fillets and flowery gariands. Straightway,.'
whenever I enter with these in my train, both men
and women into the flourishing towns, is reverence
done me; they go after me in countless~hrongs,
asking of me what is the way to gain; some desiring oracles, while some, who for many a weary day,
have been pierced by the grievous pangs of all
manner of sickness, beg to hear from me the word
of healing.7
As Burnet has pointed out, he was something more than a mere
scientist or even a statesman; there was much that would remind
one even of the Itmedicine man" about him. He was an exponent
of the new impulses in Greek religious life which the mysteries
stood for, and was interested in means of deliverance from the
wheel of birth -- means which he came to see in purity of life
and abstinence. Thus it was his advice to "abstain wholly
from laurel leaves",e while, echoing Pythagoras, he vehemently
warned the "wretches, utter wretches" to "keep your hands from
beans".9 Speaking more generally, and perhaps less to the initiates, he counselled men that they should "fast from wickedness tt ; 0
there is a note of lamentation over some fault of his in this
regard, for he says nAh, woe is that the pitiless day of death
did not destro!lme ere ever I wrought evil deeds of devouring
with my lips".
For, he was one of those daemons banished for
having followed after strife, "( who) must wander thrice ten
thousand seas~ns from the abodes of the blessed, being born
throughout the time in all manners of mortal forms, changing
one toilsome path of life for another••• One of these I now
am, an exile, a wanderer from the gods, for that I put my trust
in insensate strife."12
After all this, we may well feel like asking with him:
"Why do I harp on these things, as if it were LmY great matter
that I should surpass mortal, perishable men?"J.-', but the fact
remains that his quasi-mystical outlook and his blending of
rational enquiry with a faith in a somehow higher message both
served to make his teaching different in tone and to lend it an
appeal which brought philosophy closer to the lives of his
hearers. Indeed, it has been remarked!:
The personality of Empedocles resembles
that of Faust, and is only to be understood if
we recognise in his character the combination
of a passion for scientific enquiry with a
nonetheless passionat~ striving to raise himself above nature. With him it was not merely
a question of knowledge of nature, but of mastery over nature. His purpose was to discover
what forces govern the natural world and to
subject them to the service of his fellow men. 14

With Empedocles, the element of faith makes a definite
entrance upon the scene of Greek thought. The term is not to be
taken in too strict a sense, but it does serve to illust~ate
the condition of mind which he required of his followers. For
his doctrine, like so many others of the time (in claims, at
least), is above the mass of opinions wherewith the ordinary
man may be satisfied. Yet, this doctrine is presented on high
authority and, however beyond the common view, must be carerully attended to. Indeed, nit is all too much the way of low
~nds to disbelieve their betters. Do thou learn as the sure
testimonies of mY Muse bid thee, when my words have been divided
in thy heart. "15 He conceives ~mself as the bearer of a higher
message, one which men ought to receive on such great authority,
since it means so much to them. There is perhaps a faint adumbration of the later scholastic teaching as to the influence
of the will on the intellect in matters of faith. St Thomas
puts it clearly and with precision:
Et sic etiam movemur ad credendum dictis,
inquantum nobis repromittitur praemium aeternae
vitae: et hoc praemlo movetur voluntas ad assentiendum his quae dicuntur, quamvis intelectus
non moveatur per aliquid intellectum. 16
Even Empedocles re-enforced his teaching at the promptings of
his Muse by happy promises1
Blessed is the man who has gained the
riches of divine wisdom; wretched he who has
a dim opinion of the gods in his heart. 17
Moreover, if he is to preach his doctrine, he must do
his work subject to guidance and only after he has been purified
by the higher powers:
But, 0 ye gods, turn aside from my tongue
the madness of those men. Hallow my lips and
make a pure stream flow from them! And thee,
much-wooed, white-armed Virgin Muse, do I beseech that I may hear what is lawful for,the
d,kildren ofa day!
When the doctrine is presented in the proper way after the reqUisite purifications, the disciple who would receive it and
make it indeed his own must be sure that his own mind is pure
and good. If he has thus taken it to himself and made it his
own, he m~y well expect great benefit therefrom, especially as
regards the enrichment of his inner life, of that which really
counts in him. The theme of a reward held out to those who
believe now becomes very clear. The Empedoclean teaching is a
faith, which must be received as such and which, interestingly,
entails results not only in the order of knowledge, but in the

order of man's moral life as well:
For if, supported on thy steadfast mind, .'
thou wilt contemplate these things with good
intent and faultless care, then shalt thou have
all these things in abundance throughout thy
life, and thou shalt gain many others from them.
For these things grow of themselves into thy
heart, where is each man's true nature. But if
thou strivest after things of another kind, as
it is the way with men that ten thousand sorry
matters blunt their careful thoughts, soon will
these things desert thee when the time comes
round; for they long to return once more to
their own kind; for know that all things have
wisdom and a share of thought. 19
That rather anti-climactic last clause gives us the key to the
whole story of Eapedocles. A great man, he had rather a sound
but imperfect view of the value of faith, imperfect the more
so in that he was, unable to propose the right things in Which
men should believe. After his inspiring build~p, that touch
of animism, though perhaps to be expected, shows that philosophy ~s not quite matured as yet.
'
The content of his teaChing, even if our hopes must be
disappointed, is by no means without interest or value. We
have some of it from a poem which he wrote Concerning Nature
and from another one on Purifications, Which respectively emPhasised physics and psychology.
He appears at the outset to indulge in some criticism
of Parmenides and of his exaggerated claims as to the great
Truth of his Monism, saying that "each is convinced of that
alone which he had chanced upo~ as he i~hurried every way,
and idly boasts he has found the whole".
This attitude leaves
him very cold, and he reproaches the Eleatics for their rejection of sense knowledge. As he sees it, men should not set up
theories which will from their start contradict the experience
of reality, but should rather try to understand things as they
show themselves: "Go topow, con!!lider with all thy powers in
what way each thing is clear".2~ He will not take a stand,
however, which is altogether opposed to that of Parmenides,
preferring to try for an explanation of all things that will at
once escape the destructive criticism of the Eleatics ahd be
in accord with common sense.
It is often said that this system was an
attempt to mediate between Parmenides and Herakleitos. 22 It is not eas~ however, to find any
trace of Herakleitean doctrine in it, and it
would be truer to say that it aimed at mediating between Eleaticism and the senses. 23

Empedocles did not leave himself open to the then damaglng charge that he admitted change as ordinarily understood,
that is, as the coming into being of something which wa~ not
actually there before. He was willing to interpret ordinary experience in the light of a monist rejection of true change.
Accordingly, he declares that they are "fools -- for they have
not far-reaching thoughts -- who deem that what before was not,
comes int~ being, or that aught can perish and be utterly destroyed". 4 It is out of the question for anything to come from
that which in no way is, and out of the question also for that
which is to pass out of existence. That which is is eternal,
"wherever one may keep putting it".25 The divine reality is
"bound up in the close covering of lfarmony, spherical and round,
rejoicing in his ci~gular solitude ••• equal on every side and
quite without end".
Like the Eleatics, he can not recognise
any void in the Being: "In the All there is n~ught empty,
Whence then could aught come to increase it?ttZ(
Now his thought takes a new turn, for if he is to reconcile this with experience he must find some sort of motion.
Any such motion could not be on the part of the spherical Being
1tself, but it might be within that spherical Being. This would
not be possible, if the part which 1s dt:splaced were replaced
at once (as would be necessary) and by something of the very
same kind. Motion like that would be no better than rest. But
he could not see the need for admitting a perfectly homogeneous
character of the spherical Being. It might be just to insist
upon the reality of that which is, but one ought not to take
that which is in too narrow a sense. Rather, one should investigate the nature of this abiding reality with a greater care.
Even if it is 111 advised to contradict the senses outright, it is still impossible for us to regard the immumerable
forms of being~ which they manifest, as the ultimate reality.
We must remember:
There is no substance of any of all the
things that perish, nor any cessation of them
for baneful death. They are only a mingling
and interchange of what has been mingled. Substanc~ is but a name given to these things by
men. 25
The man of faith in the higher teaching should see that there is
a small number of such ultimate forms of the being, and that to
each of these there may be applied the truth concerning that
Which is. Further, these will by their mingling and interchange,
as already suggested, constitute the reality which we know.
In fine, what he advanced was a theory of elements, that
are indestructible and unchangeable, yet that go to make up the
bhanging' things of our experience. Thus, he hopes to save both
the abiding character in the spherical being of these elements
together and the presentations of our senses as to what goes on
Within the Being.
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Corpora omn1a v1vent1a et non v1vent1a
sunt compos1ta ex qu1busdam corpor1bus elementar1bus, quae sunt plane 1mmutab111a secundum
qua11tatem~ 10ca11ter tamen se movent et resoluta 1n partes minores se un1unt ad 1nv1cem
vel sese solvunt. F1er1 novarum rerum stat 1n
eo quod 11la elementa 1n se 1mmubab111a a110
modo coeant ad unum fa01endum (hom1nem, brutum eto.), 1nterire vero 1n eo, guod eadem
elementa sese 1terum d1ss01vant (1n morte
hom1n1s, brut1); mutat10 autem tuno aoc1d1t,
quando quaedam solum elementa aooedunt ad
unum 1am praex1stens vel ab eo recedunt. S10
looum habet solum eorundem elementorum 1mmutab1l1um a11a un10 vel segregat10; nomen vero
generat10n1s et oorrupt10n1s ret1neri pot est
oum oommun1 modo 10quend1, dummodo non 1ntell1gatur ortus vel 1nter1tus novae rea11tat1s. 29

.'

The elements are fam111ar to everyone: f1re, a1r~t ~~rth, and
water, "the four roots of all th1ngs ••• unoreated ,jO whioh he
first proposes under the fan01ful names, respectively, of Zeus,
Hera, A1doneus, and Nest1s. As these were the ult1mate oonst1tuents of the real, all that he had asoribed to the eternal, ohangeless be1ng now app11ed properly to them. "For these, he says,
always rema1n and do not oome to be, except that they oome to
be more
fewer, be1ng aggregated 1nto one and segregated out
of one tl . )
From these elements all things have oome, whether they
have been 1n the past, or presently enjoy the ex1stence iroduoed ~ the m1nglings, or are yet to be brought forth. For
these," he reminds us, "are these alone; but, runn1ng through
one another, they take different shapes - so muoh does m1xture
It 1s just as with works of art, wh10h the
change them.""
painters produoe by taking the p1gments and mix1ng them 1n the
r1ght measures, more here and less there, so as to be able w1th
the1r help to oonstruot shapes that w1ll be 11ke to all things.
It 1s most neoessary that men should reoe1ve this teaohing as
to the foundations of rea11ty and that they should not y1eld
to temptat10ns to look beyond, for other souroes of what is:
th1s 1n deed 1s the tale whioh the gods endorse.
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So let not the error preva11 over thy mind,
there 1s any other source of all the per1shoreatures that appear 1n oountless numbers.
this for sure, for thou has heard the tale
a goddess.))

Now, as to the souroe of mot10n, wh10h Herao11tus had
onoe pos1t~d 1n h1s ever-11v1ng f1re, Empedocles had reoourse
to two mlv1ng foroes whioh by the1r 1nfluenoe effect the mingling and the disgregat10n of these four elements. His rea11ty

.as a spherio mlx1rure rather than a completely homogeneous mass,
but there was, as he insisted, nothing outside it to start it
~oving. Hence, he was obliged to look to the existence oJ a
force which he called Strife or Hate, which appears to have
been a familiar part of the Orphio cosmogony.
But he could not very well stop with this, for the effect of suoh a motive force would be to separate all the elements out entirely, after which nothing could happen. There had,
then, to be another force, wh1ch would tend to unite the elements once more; this he called Love or Harmony. In this way,
the story of reality is a two-fold ODe:
At one time it grew to be one only out of
many; at another, it divided up to be many instead of one. There is a double beooming of perishable things and a double passing away. The
eem1ng together of all things brings one generation into being and destroys it; the other grows
up and is soattered as things become divided.
And these things never cease continually changing places, at one time all uniting in one
through Love, at another eaoh borne 1n d1fferent directions by the repulsion of Strife. Thus,
as far as it is the1r nature to grow into one
out of many, and to become many once more when
the one is parted asunder, so far they come
into being and their 11fe abides not. But, inasmuch as they never oease changing the1r
places oontinually,so far they are ever immovable as they go around the circle of existence.34
This Love should be studied with the mind, for it is the same
as that whioh is to be found in the bodies of men, and it is
important in that "it is she that makes them have thoughts of
love and work the works of peaoe".35
Despite the high-sounding names of these all-moving
foroes, it is olear from his desoription that they are not incorporeal. The philosophio mind had not yet reaohed the stage
where it would insist that the ohangeless source of ohange
must be altogether free of the potential and, a fortiori, of
the material. These forces may be aotive, and it may be a good
sign that he looks to something Dot quite like the ordinary
things of direct sense experience for the source of motion, but
they are still material. For, is it not true that tlthis (contes
between love and str1fe) is manifest in the mass of mortal 1
This way of considering the sources of motion was sure
to provoke Aristotle, to whom it seemed rather contrad1ctory
to identify, even by implioation, the efficient and material
causes, the agent and that whioh is acted upon.
Empedocles has a paradoxical view; for he

1dent1f1es the good w1th love, but th1s 1s a
princ1ple both as mover (for 1t br1ngs th1ngs
together) and as matter (for 1t 1s part of the
m1xture). Now even 1f 1 t happens that the same .'
th1ng 1s a princ1ple both as matter and as mover,
still the be1ng, at least, of the two 1s not the
same. In wh1ch respect, then, 1s love a pr~nc1pIe? It 1s paradox1cal also that strife should
be 1mper1shable: the nature of h1s 'ev11' 1s
just str1fe.37
It 1s certainly s1gn1f1cant that Empedocles should afford the grounds for such a cr1t1c1sm. L1ke many men of sound
1nst1ncts, he was anx10us to solve the d1ff1culties created by
the extreme views of his predecessors. Although he tried h1s
best, h1s system Was from the start thus 1nvolved in contradict1ons, because of h1s 1nability to rise above the merely phys1cal level, to atta1n the plane on which alone the metaphys1cal
problems now at 1ssue could be discussed.
The details of h1s rather 1nterest1ng descr1pt10n of
the manner 1n which all th1ngs come to be from the orig1nal
mixture as operated on by those two forces does not d1rectly
concern us here. We may note, however, that 1n h1s v1ew of the
matter, plants and an1mals ar1se from the earth by a gradual
process. Ar1stotle takes 1ssue w1th h1s theory as to the growth
of plants upwards and downwards because of the OPPos1te3~atural
movements of the earth and the f1re which they conta1n. The1r
growth 1s a moment 1n the separat10n of the ele.ents under
the 1nfluence of str1fe, when some of the f1res that are still
beneath the earth meet, as they tend upwards, w1th some earth
that 1s st1ll m01st, and, under the 1nfluence now of love, they
form a plant.
As for the animals, their farts first of all r1se up
separately, at a t1me when "on it the earth) many heads sprung
up without necks and arms and wandered bereft of shoulders.
Eyes strayed up and down 1n want of foreheads. 't 39 This would
take place 1n the f1rst stage of history, when love was on thno
increasejand, later, it put these scattered members together.
As a result of these un10ns, there came about all possible combinations, many of which were monstrous:
As div1nity was m1ngled still further
with d1v1n1ty, these things joined together
as each m1ght chance, and many other things
bes1des them cont1nually arose4lShambling
creatures w1th counless hands.
SUch 'act1v1ty seems to be dev01d of purpose and, at least, d1fficult to reconcile with an 1ntel11g1ble or1g1n of the universe.
It does not become any clearer when we gather that those forms
Which were somehow fitted to surv1ve kept on be1ng, wh1le the
others per1shed. In terms of what would they be fitted?

In the third stage, when strife is gaining the upper
~snd, we have "whole-natured forms ••• , having a portion both of
water and fire. These did the fire, desiroUs of reaching its
like, send up, showing neither the oharming form of ~~e rlmbs,
nor yet the voice and parts that are proper to men. ff
In the
fourth, or present stage, we have the sexes and the species determined and production by generation. It has all worked out
just as if it were planned.
We may suppose that all things have
fallen out accidentally just as they would
have done if they had been produ¢ed for some
end. Certain things have been preserved because they had spontaneously acquired a fitting structure, while those which were not
so put together have perished, as Em~edocles
speaks of the oxen with human faces. )
It is unquestionably an interesting description, and
all the more such because of this early appearance of the very
"modern" notion of the survival of the fittest. still, it entails a number of difficulties, in addition to the ones which
have already been pointed out. For the question of knowledge
could not receive any satisfactory answer from such a scheme.
It was well, of course, that Empedocles did not explicitly regard all bodies as living and organic, but he failed clearly
to discriminate between those which lived and those which did
not, for both of them came from the elements by natural motions.
Further, there was no distinction properly made between the
several orders of the living.
Claram tamen distinctionem mundi anorganici ab organico et regnorum viventium inter
se nondum facit. Sic plantis etiam cognitionem
et dolorem attribuit ••• Insuper putans ••• etiam
cognitionem intel1ectualem esse actionem mere
materialem elementorum speciali modo unitorum,
censet intellectionem inveniri, u~!cumqu. kpta
mixtio e1ementorum locum habeat.
Now, of motion in general, Empedocles had said that the
elements, which alone have the being, "running through one another, ••• become now this, now that, and like things evermore".4
There obtains a symmetry of pores, Which is the true explanation of the attraction which each exercises upon its like. Small
parts of each body, or effluvia (effluxes), are separated off,
and these may enter into the pores of other bodies. The more
the pores of a given body are conformanle to such effluvia, the
more easily can the effluvia enter into it and begin the work
of modification. This is the point, for instance, of the discussion which Socrates ~as with Meno:

.§.2£l Do not he (Gorg4las) and Empedoc1es
say that there are certain effluences of existence?
M!n.t Certainly.
Soc: And passages into which and through
which these effluences pass?
Men: Exactly.
Soc: And some of the effluences fit into
the passages, and some of them are too small
or too large?
46
Men: True.

.'

The particles and pores of the same element are nicely adapted
one to another; as a result, fir~ can be penetrated only by
fire, water by water, and so on.~7
This conception of the manner in which things may act
upon each other was to be of great help to him in the formulation of his theory of knowledge. If he failed to make sufficient distinotion between the various orders of life, we might
well expect that his account would be imperfect and somewhat
materialistic. It is valuable all the same in that it represents an effort to work the fact of knowledge into a more nearly complete system of philosophy.
Before this time, Xenophanes, as we saw, pro~ed that
there is a god who sees and thinks allover. In a vein not altogether diSSimilar, Empedoo1es avowed that man had to attend
to the important matters whereof he spoke, for any distraotion
would allow suoh things to desert them, "for they look to re-
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mingled together which produce, or rather, undergo the cognit10nal experienoe: "for out of these are all things formed
and fitted together, and by these do men think and feel pleasure
and pain tI • 49
The mixture which is most apt for the production of
knowledge is to be found in the blood and especially in the
heart, wherefore we may say that the seat of knowledge is in
the blood about the heart, "dwelling in the sea o~ blood that
runs in opposite direotions, where chiefly is what men oal1
50
thought; for the blood round the heart is the thought of men".
He had reasons for his choioe of this well-mingled blood, for
it is a most important faotor in life, f'and for this reason
we think chiefly in our blood, for in it of all parts of the
body all the elements of the body are the most completely mi
The Empedoc1ean psychology has probably received most
attenjion because of the theory of perception which it includes.
Just as everything is attraoted by its like, so is it the prinoiple of knowledge that like is known by like. '" For by earth, t
he says,
we see earth, by water water,
By ether godlike ether, by fire wasting fire'52
Love by love, and strife by gloomy strife. t.,

rhe several ementary bodies, then, are known to us through the
corresponding elements whioh are mingled in our bodies and our
blood. So too, we oome to those two foroes of love and hate,
that rule the universe, through the presenoe of kindred forces
in our selves. This sensitivity, if we may use the term, of the
elements or forces within us to the oorresponding elements or
forces outside obtains because of the similarity of their pores.
rhUS, whereas particles of the earth would fit in nicely with
each other, bits of earth which intruded into the spaces between drops of water would be in the probable position of the
familiar round peg in a square hole.
As he has had occasion to point out befor~, "effluences
flow from all things that have come into being",5), and these
will, of course, come into oontact with human bodies. Striking
upon the body, they will enter the organ of sense whioh has the
pores adapted to acoomodate them, whereafter they will be picked up by the similar element within. In some instanoes it seems
that they may unite thmselves with oertain effluxes that prooeed from the organs themselves.
Empedokles speaks in the same way of all
the senses, and says that perception is due to
the "effluences" fitting into the passages of
each sense. And that is why one cannot judge
the objects of another; for the passages of
some of them are too wide and those of others
too narrow for the sensible object, so that
the latter oan either hold their course right
through without touching or cannot enter at
all. 54
Turning to the several senses themselves, we find that smell is
due to respiration, for the breath will draw in the partioles
that will fit into the pores. In this process, the mouth, the
lungs and the pores of the skin are to operate alternately, for
smelling is incidental to that portion of the process in which
the mouth and lungs serve as agents:
Empedocles holds that the sense of odour
is introduced with and by the respiration actuated from the lungs; that accordingly, when the
respiratory process is labored, at suoh times,
owing to its roughness, we do not perceive
smells when we inhale, a a haPpens with persons
suffering from catarrhs.~ 5
Objectively, then, the odors are effluences which emanate from
the odoriferous bodies; this we may see in the case of the
scents which a hound will track, "with its nostrils tracking
out the fragments of the beast's limbs, and th~6breath from
their feet that they leave in the soft grass".~

-10

As for hearing, it seems that it is produced by sound
.1thout, when the air moved as by the voice comes to sound within the ear, for the air-wave will strike the cartilage found ins1de the ear, and this will then oscillate like a gong that has
been struck. "For the sense of hearing is a sort ot bell sound1ng inside the ear, which he calls a ~leshy sprout'. When the
air is set in mg~ion it strikes upon the solid parts and produces a sound. t1
Here, the effluences seem to be air, or particles of air. The explanation is interesting enough, but its
materialistic coloring opens the way to grave difficulties. Even
though hearing is said to be due to sounds within the ear, such
a theory of a sound like a gong inside does not make it evident
hOW we come to hear.
For suppose that we hear the outer sounds
by means of this B2n8; by what do we hear the
gong itself, when it rings? For this -- the
very pOint Ofathe whole enquiry -- is neglected by him. 5
The theory of vision, which was later on to please
Plato and to find a place in the Timaeus, supposed that the eye
is made up of the four elements, with fire at its heart, a
layer of water next, and both of these enclosed by air and
earth. He likens the eye to a lantern, for just as the flame of
the lantern is protected from gusts of wind by a sheet of horn,
so too the central fire of the eye is shielded from the surrounding wate. by a delicate membrane, the pores of which are,
exceeding fine.59 The water cannot penetrate this, but the fire
can find its way out, or, for that matter, its way in. The emanations from the objects can thus make their way into the
eye and, according as they proceed from bright objects or from
dark ones, they may enter in and pass through the corresponding
pores of fire {for the bright) or water (for the d3rk). Since
like is known by like, we will know the effluences of the fire,
or the white, by the internal fire, of the water, or the black,
by the internal water, and so on. The predominance of anyone
element'wou1d naturally affect the disposition of our sight,
so that it is better to have the elements balanced: "the best
tempered and the most excellent vision is one composed of both
in equal proportions".oO
As it appears from the statements of Empedocles himself and from certain remarks of Aristotle and Theophrastus,
there was involved in his theory of vision a two-fold emanation.
First, the inner fire contributed much to sight, which it b
about by visual rays flowing outwards from it; secondly, the e
fluences from the object had their part to play. Although Emped
cles .quite possibly did not fully harmonise these two fac~ors,
they may be regarded as complementary portions of the same theo •
It has been suggested that if we think of the inner rays as going only so far as to meet the effluences from the object, we
Will find the views better understandable and have an indication
of the similarity here between Plato and Empedoc1es. o1

He does not appear to have pa1d much attent10n to touch
or taste, and, in the case of these senses, we can only recur
to his general doctrine that sensation is brought about .through
adaptation to the pores. The effluences, as Theophrastus pOints
out, may be helpful where the other senses are concerned, but
theY6~reate special difficicu1t1es when we come to these last
two.
How ••• are we to conceive sens1b1e disj1nctions of taste or touch as made by means
of emanation •• ? How are we to discrim1nate
ttthe rough" or t'the "smooth" bjj 1ts fitting
into "the pores"? •• The primary condit10n of
the proper exerc1se of each and every senseorgan is found to cons1st 1n a fact of touch
-- the due contact between the l1emanation"
and the 1nner surface of the pore; yet of the
sense of touch1ng he has propounded no spec1a1 theory. No idea of the sensory function of
the nerves existed till long after Empedoc1es;
and the seeming ttimmediacyV of touch was, perhaps, what debarred it in his opinion from
being easily explained in detail by the theory of 6.,"'\\()P\H)o..( , which operate at a distance
and through a medium. The difficulty felt in
applying his general theory to touching was
of course felt also in reference to the kindred sense of tast1ng. 6 3
His various theories are, thus, interesting and provocative, but so involved with materialism that from the start we
cannot hope to find them organised in a sound psychology. The
principle that like is known by like is an extremely valuable
one, but Empedocles put it on no very h1gh plane; for him, sense
perception was someth1ng that took place when the sense-organ
is supplied with its r.roper object and its pores are symmetric
with the effluences. tBut neverthe1ess ••• there is in th1s nothing pecul1arly characteristic of sensation. Such agreement
between~~OfPoo..( and the pores of objects is the universal cobdi tion of the interaction of material bodies. "64 There is not
in such an account which could serve to distinguish the animate
properly from the in. .animate • All bodies work on one another;
if the theory as proposed is taken, there is no reason for denying perception to any substances which blend together.
As for the element of l1keness, we are said to perce1ve
things thanks to the fact that our body and even our soul are
made up of the same elements. So long as one continues to think
in terms of a material likeness, th1s explanation 1s scarcely
better than a physics.
He showed, indeed, or tr1ed to show in
what the various kinds of sense perception agree 1
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but not that which at the same time distinguishes them from physical processes. Rather
he implicitly denied that there is any such
fundamental distinction. Perception is for
him only interpenetration -- a material conception. 64a
He had been of real service in obliging men to think over the
character of sensation, for after this time it was difficult
for anyone who wished to propose_ rounded scheme of philosophy
to overlook this problem. Thinkers will herafter fall roughly
into two camps, the one of those who deny, explicitly or otherwise, the existence of any real difference between physical
interaction and sense-perception, and the other of those who
would maintain that there is some difference.
Empedocles, as we have seen, was greatly interested in
reconciling that which is with the testimony of the senses,
both of which he though should be taken rather broadly by the
man of faith. Yet, the failures of his predecessors and his own
not altogether satisfactory explanation may well have prompted
him to indulge at times some measure of doubt as to the real
worth of our means to knowledge. For, man's powers, being diffused through his corporeal parts, are straitened and numerous
troubles break in upon them, and dull the edge of their diligent
thoughts. The individual, then, is mistakenly convinced that
he has tound the truth, but he is lost soon enough.
They behold but a brief span of life
that is no lite, and, doomed to swift death,
are borne up and fly off like smoke. Each is
convinced of that alone which he had chanced
upon as he is hurried every way, and idly
boasts he has found the whole. So hardly can
these things be seen by the eyes or heard by
the ears of men, so hardly grasped by their
mind! Howbeit, thou, since thou hast found
thy way hither, shalt 19arn no more than
mortal mind hath power. ~
It is a well directed reproach of the Parmenideans, who would
claim to have discovered an all which flagrantly contradicted
experience, but, on the while, his remarks do not see; to offer
much hope of man's arriving at the truth. Of course, he does
seem at other times to be strongly persuaded that he can give
the answers, decla~ing:
Friends, I know indeed that truth is
in the words I shall utter, but it is hard
for men, and jealous are they of the assault
of belief on their souls. 66
He is, further, persuaded that "blessed is the man who has
I
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the riohes of divine wisdom".67 This beatitude is to be obtained
through believing in the dootrine wh10h he proposes, professedly
on the authority of the Muse. Apart from the obviou diffioulty
entailed in the aooeptanoe of h1s person at h1s own eval~ation,
the teaching wh10h he expounds as the divine wisdom has distress
lng inadequaoies.
He advises us, also, to oonsider as oarefully as we oan
_- for, being men, we shall learn no more than our mortal power
may avail -- the manner in wh10h things are olear. This is to be
done by the faoulty wh10h has been given (or has happened) to
man for this operation: "Do not withhold thy oonfidenoe in any
of thy other bodily parts by whioh there is an opening for6unde~
stan~ing, but oonsider everything in the way it is olear." l;As
Father Sohaaf has justly pointed out:
Quantum ad cognitionem objective spectatam, nempe eJus objectivum valorem, clarum est,
Empedoclem debuisse coarct are veracitatem sensuum, quippe oum ipsi referant ortum et interitum rerum, qmi tamen locum non habent. "sensuum fidem declina, reputa vero, quale
quodque
clare (i.e., per rationem) apparet. tf Ing~ insistit, rationi prae sensibus fidendum. ~
After all he has said about the disadvantages of a naive trust
in the senses, the Empedoolean view is one that we might expect,
and rather commendable in that he tries to interpret Being in
such a way as to save part of the data of experience.
But what is this "reason" in his eyes? So far as we may
give an answer to this question, it does not appear very different from sense perception and, accordingly, not very differeat from activity of a purely material sort. Indeed, we are
told that his account of perception is in the final analysis
the same as h1s explanation of thought and ignorance. "Thought
arises from what is like and ignorance from what is unlike, thus
implying that thought is the same, or nearly the same, as perception. "70 -After all, the blood in the neighborhood of the
heart is the very thought of mai' since the elements are most
complebe1y intermingled in it."f
His dootrine on knowledge of like by like comes down
to this, that we know a thing by means of itself in its physioal
existence,wh1ch the arrangement of the elements oonfers upon it:
"For out of these are all things formed and fitte<L~ogether, and
by these do men think and feel pleasure and pain".·{ It was a
good idea, this saying that knowledge obtains thanks to the presence of the known object in the knowing subject, but Empedocles
came a little too early to see how th1s should be taken.
He still explained everything in terms of matter, even
though so metaphysioal were many of the problems discussed that
the need beoame more pressing than ever for some man explicitly
to transcend physios and to interpret being in the light of its
proper science. Thus, Empedoo1es divined that knowledge must

-109-

consist in a union of some sort between the knower and the kno ,
but, as he had treated of everything else on material terms, so
too he was here obliged to speak of a physical union, v.~ like
that which takes place between any material substances, "for
thuS have all things thought by fortune's will ••• And inasmuch
as the rarest things came together in their fall."73
To rectify this teaching required an altogether new study and appreciation of the nature of knowledge, as well as of
the constitution of that material reality which we in deed know.
It demanded the explicit recognition of the fact that our properly intellectual knowledge is of the universal, and that it
can never be explained merely on the basis of a material penetration of the individual object. It demanded, in other words,
some such reconstruction of philosophy as Aristotle, following
after Plato, was to accomplish in large part: a hylomorphic
theory as to the make-up of things, whi ch means that the form,
which makes the thing to be what it is, is an imprisoned idea,
one that our intellect, as experience will bear witness, withdraws from the individuating conditions of the matter; with
this the form now of the intellect, there obtains the reqUisite
union of subject and object.
To hold, on the other hand, that the object known is in
the soul accprding to its phYSical mode is either to identify
that soul in a pantheistic fashion with all things or else to
conceive that there are just modifications of the soul itself.
E1ther course offers ruin.
Elles (choses, chez le connaissant) n'y
sont pas avec leur fropre 8tre de nature, cs
qui mettrait dans 1 !me, comme Ie voulait Empedoole et les vieux Ioniens, la mati~re des
pierres et des arbres, et de tout Ie spectaole
qu'elle voit: elles n'y sont pas aveo l'etre
de,nature de l'Ame elle-m@me, oe qui supposerait, ou bien que l'ame est d6jA toutes ohoses
par son essenoe -- et o'est confondre l'!me
avec Dieu -- ou bien que les ohoses ne sont
pas dans l'Ame par leur sim11itude, mais qu'il
n'y a dans l'&me que des modifications ~~lle
mime, et o'est d6truire la connaissanoe. 7
Thus, we oan see that Empedooles was a man of notable
talents, proposing as he did an ingenious theory of reoonoiliation between the dialeotically impregnable of the Eleatio Being
of those days and the apparent plurality of things. Not quite
free of hyloz01sm, he desoried in part the need for an effioient
cause. Other thinkers made but little use of their oauses, and
even ftEmpedooles, though he uses the causes to a greater extent •• ,
neither does so sufficiently, nor attains consistenoy in their
use, "7~ sinoe his Love is at onoe material and efficient cause.
His doctrine of ohange, though better developed, is still at
Variance with common sense.
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Regard1ng the cause of movement and the
quest10n whether we must pos1t one or two, he
must be thought to have spoken ne1ther correctly nor altggether plaus1bly. And 1n general, change of quality is necessaril~6done
away w1th for those who speak thus.'

.'

What he had said could, however, and in fact d1d stir
men to deeper invest1gation. Material things were moved somehow
by forces that were descr1bed in terms that would suggest some
difference; even th1s made his theory more consistent, and it
could be seen that according as one withdrew the more from a
merely phys1cal plane the better could one explain reality. Despite all the imperfect10ns of his teachings, Love could not be
divested of every spiritual aSfect; even looking toward it implied that what holds w1th man s rational and voluntary nature
is, as a matter of fact, the h1ghest rea11ty to be found in
this order. Another step would mean that men that men should
bring in the mind, 1mperfectly at first, but preparing the way
for a truly intellectual conception of rea11ty.
When the universe had been thus humanised and the very affections of the human nature attributed to its attractive and repulsive forces, it is evident that philosophy
had but one step further to take 1n order to
reach the completion of the analogy. The world
was not merely to be endowed with organisat1on
and with active principles of desire, but still
more with the regulating energy of an intellect.
That by sGme such progress1ve course·as this
Anaxagoras'was led to his concept1on of the
Supreme Intelligence, I cannot think but highly probable. 77
.

\,

Notes to the F1rth Chapter:
1. tiThe Eleat1cs, as R1tter remarks, be11eved that they
recognised and could demonstrate that the truth of all th1ngs
1s one and unchangeable; perce1ving, however, that human thought
1s constra1ned to follow the appearance of th1ngs, and to apprehend the changeable and the many, they were forced to confess
that we are unable fully to comprehend the d1v1ne truth 1n 1ts
reality, although we may rightly apprehend a few general pr1nciples. Neve~heless, to suppose, 1n conform1ty w1th human
thought, that there 1s actually both a plura11ty and a change,
would be but a delus10n of the senses. fI Such 1s the summary Lewe~
makes of the Eleat1c teach1ng on these top1cs; H1story of Ph1lo.!ophy, I. 51- 2.
2. Burnet, Early Greek Phl1oBopgy, pg. 197.
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5. Op. cit., 58.
6. op.cit., 59: "And thou shalt learn all the drugs
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slone shall I accomplish all this. Thou shalt arrest the violence of the unwearied winds that arise and sweep the earth,laying waste the cornfields with their blasts;and again, if thou so
111, thou shalt call back winds in requital. Thou shalt make
fter the dark rain a seasonable drought for men,and again after
he summer drought thou shalt cause tree-nourishing streams to
our from the sky. Thou shalt bring back from Hades a dead mants
strength."
7. Fr. 112. The fragments are found in Burnet, Ope cit
p. 204. ff.
8. Fr. 140.
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21. Fr. 4.
22. Thus: Empedoc1es' explanation of nature represents
n:,attempt to find a compromise beteen Heraclitus and Farmenides,
etween eternal change and eternal invariability." Zeller,
• cit., pg. 55.
23. Burnet, op.cit., pg. 227.
24. Frs. 11-12.
25. ibid.
26. Frs. 27-8. This is very like the account of the
leatic Being, given by Farmenides,according to Simp1icius,~.
145, 23 D. (R.F. 118.).
27. F~".
28. Fr. 8.
29. Schaaf, Ope cit., pp. 88-9.
30. Frs. 6-7.
31. MetaPhvsica, I. 3. 984 a.
32. Fr. 21, n. 3•.
33. Fr. 23.
34. Fr. 17, n. 1. "For all of these -sim, earth, sky
nd sea - are at one with all their parts that are cast far and
from them in mortal things. And even so all these that are
ore adapted for mixture are like to one another and united in
ove b A hrodite. T ose thin
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-112origin, mixture and the forms imprinted on each, are most hostile, being altogether unaccustomed to unite and very sor~ by
the b1dd1ng of Str1fe, s1nce it hath wrought the1r b1rth. Fr. 2 •
35. Fr. 17, n. 2.
.'
36. Fr. 20.
37. Metaphysica XII. x. 1075 b. As st. Thomas remarks,
"licet autem contingat esse principium idem sicut materia et
slcut movens, non tamen secundum eandem rationem. Potest enim
19nisesse movens secundum formam et materia1e principium secundum materiam: non autem secundum idem: 2uia movens, inquantum
hujUsmodi, est in actu,materia autem,inquantum hujusmodi,est in
potentia ••• A11iud autem inconveniens ••• est quod posuit litem
esse primum principium incorrupt1bi1e. Quae quidem secundum ipsum videntu~ esse ipsa natura mail: malum autem secundum recte
op1nantes non ponitur principium esse, sed solum bonum. tt In XII
Metaph., 1ect. 12, 2646-7.
38. "Quare Empedoc1es omino errav1 t, dum asserui t inorementum in p1antis ideo accidere, quia ex una quidem parte
earum radices aguntur deorsum - dorsum enim fertur ex natura sua
terra! - ex a1tera autem parte, quia mittuntur ram1 sursum ~
sursum enim fertur ignis. - Nec enim #lpsas voces "sursum" et
Ifdeorsum" bene inte11igit; ••• non eandem habent significationem
pro omnibus si~gu1is rebus, quam habent pro universo;contra,
quod in anima1ibus est caput, hoc in p1antis sunt radices saltem si organorum diversitas ex operationibus judicanda est.
Praeterea quidnam est,quod simu1 teneat 19nem et terram,quae in
contrar1a. feruntur partes? Sane dispergentur, nisi exist at,
quod eorum motus contrarios impediat; quodii tale re vera existi ,
certe hoc 1rsum animam atque causam incrementi et nutritionis
constituet.
de Anima II. iv. 415b - 416a.
.
39. Fr. 57. Indeed, "solitary limbs wandered seeking
for union. If Fr. 58.
40. "Empedoc1es dixit: 'En quomodo capita mi1torum anima1ium cervice carentia pu11u1arunt", quae deinde Amicitia cum .
re1iquis corporis partibus coniunx1t." de Anima III.vi.430a.
41. Frs. 59 and 60. In a particularly famous passage,
he speaks as follows: "Many creatures with faces and breasts
looking in different directions were born; some, offspring of
oxen with faces of men, while othere, again arose as offspring
of men with the heads of oxen, and creatures in whom the nature
of women and men were m1ng1ed, furnished with sterile parts. tI
Fr. 61.
42. Fr. 62.
43. Phjsica II. viii 198b.
44. Schaaf, Op.clt., pp. 100-1
45. Fr. 17 n. 3.
46. Meno 76 C-D. Ofr. de Generat.et Corrupt. I.viii.
47. "There is an exapt adaptation between the particles
and the pores of the same element, so that fire, for examp1e,is
only penetrable by fire, and water by water. By this theory,
much more than by his ambitious cosmology, Empedoc1es showed
~lmse1f an original and_progressive t~nker, in harmony,like
L

-11':3analytical tendencies of his age,and conZeno to the subsequent development of
(freek philosophy. tf A. W. Benn, Early !reek Philosophy,pg.63.
,48. Fr. 100.
.'
49. Fr. 107. "Even knowledge is explained by Empedocles as the result of mixture ••• Thought also depends,for its
character, on the character of the mixture of elements.Quickness
and acuteness of perception and thought result from mixtures
different from those from which t~eir oppOSites result." B. C.
surt,A Brief History of Greek Philosophy, pp. 25-6.
SO. Fr. 105. As to the Empedoclean teaching on the
soul, there is of course the testiinony of Aristotle: "Ita EmPedocles,qui hinc quidem animam ex omnibus componit elementis,
lllinc autem asseri t unumquodque eorum esse antmam." De Anima
I. ii. 404b. Various commentators tend to accept this viewi
for example, we find John Marshall stating that "the soul, or
life-principle in Man Empedocles regarded as an ordered composite
of all the elements or principles of the life in nature, and in
this kinship of the elements in man and the elements in nature
he found a rationale of our powers of perception ••• He ••• ,as
Aristotle observes, drew no radical distinction between senseapprehension and thought." (Short History of Greek Philosophy,
pg. 71.). In a similar vein, Stoeckl wrote that The human soul,
like other things, is a mixture of the four elements, with Love
and Hate as moving forces. For as like alone knows like, it
follows that the soul, which knows all the elements, must contain its own being the "raducal principles" of all things - the
four elements - otherwise, not resembling them in nature,lt
could possess no knowledge of them". (Handbook of the History
Philosophy, pg. 40.).
From this much it is clear that,the spiritual soul,as
we understand it" could have no place in the scheme of Empedocles
what we regard as the operatIons of the soul, as sensing,understanding, and willing, were for the ancient Greek merely material
actions of elementary bodies linked in a special way. "Inde
anima," notes Father Schaaf (OPe cit. ,pg.lOl.) ~ "ut substantia
diversa a corpore ab eo nondum agnoscitur lf ; there is added a
note, remarking the opinions of Aristotle, but adducing also the
authority of Zeller to the effect that Empedocles did not knQr'
of the soul as something di stInc't trom the body. and in a way opposed to it,and moreover spoke solely of vital actions - actions
of the elements mutually united in a special way. Then follows
a citation of Zeller (Pre*80cratl ~., II. 802. 2.)," 'Empedocles non compsuit animam ex elementis, sed ipse id, quod.nos
appellamus activitatem animae, declaravit ex compositione elementari corporis; animam distinctam a copere eius pbfsica nondum
cognoscit.' Attamen cum anima cocipiatur communiter ut subjectum et principium operationum vitalium et cum istae operatlones secondum Empedoclem insint in elementis ut subjecto,sane
11la elemta habentia in se istas operationes possunt etiam appellari anima." {lac. cit.).on the whole,as Adamson pOints out
(Development of Greek Philosophy,pp. 58 ff.), this theory of
Empedocles with regard to the foundations of life,so far as we
~no, with the minutely
t~buting far more than
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scover
, oes no
of which he speaks could take place. Where,it m~ be asked,is
there room for an individual soul?
51. Theophrastus,De Sensu X. (Passages from t~s au'
thor bearins on Empedocles are to be found in Burnet,op.cit.
pp. 246 ,f.) In view,no doubt,of this, Cicero said:"Empedocles
ani mum esse censet cordi suffusum sanguinem". Tusculanae
Disputationes I. ix. 19.
52. Metaphysica III. iv. 1000b.
53. Fr. 89.
54. Theophrastus, OPe cit., VII. Thus, "we Ban only
perceive an object if there is a proper symmetry between the
pores of the receptive organ - such as eye or ear - and the particles of the object". M.E.J.Taylor,Greek Philosophy, pg. 38.
55. Aetius,Synagoge, IV. 17.2. To be found in Beare,
Greek Theories of Elementary Cognition, pg. 133.
S~.
Fr. 101.
57. Theophrastus, Ope cit., IX.
58. _Theophrastus, op.cit., XXI. (ApudBeare, op.cit.,
pg. 97.). Commenting on this, Beare sa~s: "The gong to the outer sounds: but to us the sounds of the gong' itself are a fresh
incognitum: how do we hear them? With another gong?" (op. cit. ,
pp. 97-8.).
59. Fr. 84.
60. Theophrastus, Ope cit., VII. "As will be seen below, it is not easy to ascertain how far the rays of fire passed
outwards: whether (a) merely through the water to the outer surface of the eye,or (b) all the way to the object,however distant.
The third possibility,that the inner fire formed a junction
with the emanations from the object at some point intermediate
between this and t~e eye,cannot,on any posit1ve author1ty, be
ascribed to Empedocles, but would seem to constitute the distinguishing feature of Plato's visual theory." Beare, Ope cit., pg.15
61. "Empedocles,explaining the nature of the eye as
organ of vision,states that its inner part consists of fire and
water, while the environment of this consists of earth and air,
through the sides. The pores of the fire and water alternate
in position with one another. By those of fire we cognise
white objects, by those of water, black objects;for these two
sorts of objects fit into these two sets of p,ores respectively.
Colours are carried to the eye by emanation.' Theophrastus,
op.c1t., VII-VIII. (Apud Beare, op.cit., pp. 19-20.) •.
62. OPe cit., xx.
63. Beare, Ope c1t., pp. 180-1.
64. Beare, Ope cit. ,pg. 204. "Thus,we are tm1d (fr.
102) ,all things have their share of breath and smell."
64a. Beare, Ope cit., pg.205. As Bren1er observes,
"une theor1t. import ante , dont on voi t mal Ie lien avec le reste,
celle de la perception eX\ertieure". (Histo~:re de 1:& philosophle.
1. pg. 69).
65. Fr. 2. "Empedocles' utterances on the t rustworth1ness of percept10n and the relation of sense to reason
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-11 (Fr.2, Burnet,E.G.P., 3rd ed., pg. 204.) are not developed and
are not altogether clear. According as they are punctuated
they may voice either a mild distrust or perception and.an insistence on checking and correcting the reports of the senses
by the opposed activity of reason, (Zeller, Pre-Socratic Philosophy, II, 169-70) or a plea not to withhold confidence fr.om any
of the sensory channels by which understanding is no wise opposed to perception may enter in. (Burnet, E.G.P".~, 3rd ed., p.
227. Cfr. 2nd ed., pp. 219-68.). But whichever interpretation
be true, Empedocles did not lean far enough in either direction
to fall into the problem of error and knowledge, and the question of Appearances vs. Reality. The senses introduced him to
the Fire, Air, Water, Earth, Love, and Strife, which constituted
his Universe. It was equally obvious that their presentations
did "not altogether acquaint him with the 'home life," the relations, and the movements of these elements; and even suggested
false ideas about them, such as their apparent coming into and
passing out of being. Hence, in addition to perception some
checking up by the exercise of common sense and thought was
necessary, if he was to get a true view of things as they really
are. Beyond this point, except for a thetorical lamentation
over the brevity of human life, the inadequacy of man'$ powers,
the propenSity of others to jump to hasty conclusions, and the
difficulties of working out a philosophic system (difficulties
however, with which he feels himself able to cope), Empedocles r
theory of knowledge does not go.n So feels B.A.G. Fuller
(History of Greek Philosophy, pp. 197-8.).
66. Fr. 114.
67. Fr. 132.
68. Fr. 4. "The mixture of elements," writes J.
Erdmann (History of Philosophy, I.56.), "is nowhere more thorough than in the blood. Hence he regards it as the vO,\~o.. i. e. ,
of the sum of all peroeptions. Cognition by the senses is deceptive beoause it depends on a single objeot, and ~ element,
and can only grasp the elements in their separation,and not in
the (S"t1f>.\.~o~. Thlhs is not the case with the Vo"'~" ,Which,
itself the combination of all perceptions,has cognition also of
that which is united by love."
69. OPe cit., pp. 103-4.
70. Theophrastus, de Sensu x. ttlntelleotio et prudentia habentur a multis pro quadam forma speciali sensationis
(in his enim utrisque anima discernit atque aliquid de rebus
cognoscit); eti~ Veveres quidem prudentiam (cognitationem)
cum sensatione identificant - sicut et Empedocles, qui dixit:
"Intelligentia, enim hominum crescit in eadem proportione atque
obJecta praesentia', et alibi: 'Unde ipsis etiam alia avque
alia cogitatio continuo in mentem venit'. de Anima III. iii
427a. Cfr. the discussion in Theaetetus 152.
71. Cfr. fr. 105.
72. Fr. 107. Indeed, he tells us that "the wisdom of
men grows accordin~ to what is before them" (fr. 106.), and we
are informed that 'pleasure is produced by what is like in its
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elements and their mixture; pain, by what is opposite" (Theo;hrastus, de Sensu IX).
73. Frs •. 103-4.
74. Maritain, Reflexions sur Itintelligence, ~p_59-6075. Metaphysica I. iv. 985a.-· . .
76. op.cit., I.viii 989a.
77. W. A. Butler,·' Lectures on the. History of Ancient
Philosophy, I. 319-

Chapter VI: The Younger Physicists (ii.).
Then, I ween, there is Anaxagoras, a
doughty champion, whom they call Mind, because forsooth his was the mind which suddenly woke up and fitted closely together
all that had formerly been in a medley of
confusion. l
This interesting an4 in many ways important figure in
the history of philosophy was a native of Clazomenae distinguished for his lineage and his means. He was a noble in more
senses than one, however, and gave his inheritance over to his
relatives, for he "also seems to have conceived of the Happy
man not as either rich or powerful, saying that he should not
wonder if he were accounted a strange man in the judgment of
the multitude. "2 Having devoted himself to study, in the interests of his true fatherland, he studied - so report has it - un
der Anaximenes;' actually, their times were a little too divergent for this to be probable. It seems more likely that the
old School of Miletus continued after the death of Anaximenes
and taught in his vein. But, even if "the old Ionic school
was still capable of training great men, it4was now powerless
to keep them. Anaxagoras went his own way", as Melissus and
Leucippus also did. Each ot these was, however, really influenced by this oldest of the philosophical traditions.
In the year of Salamis, Anaxagoras came to Athens,
quite possibly with the Persian arM1. Remaining after the Greek
victory, he set himself up at Athens as something of a Sophist
and imparted a knowledge of rhetoric and some philosophy to his
disciples. Pericles was one of these, seeking to perfect an excellent talent under the best available teaching: Socrates is
made to bear witness to the reasons for the disciplined attainments of the statesman:
All the great arts require discussion
and high speculation about the truths of nature; hence come loftiness of thought and
completeness of execution. And this, as I
conceive, was the quality which, in addition
to his natural gifts, Pericles acquired from
his intercourse with Anaxagoras whom he happened to know. He was thus imbued with the
higher philosophy, and attained the knowledge of Mind and the negative of Kind, which
were favourite themes of Anaxagoras, and applied what suited his purpose to the art of
speaking. 5
It was a great period, that Periclean Age, crowded with men of

genius and their splendid works. The people of Hellas were, as
we know from Herodotus and Aeschylus, profoundly impressed by
the victory which they had, with the help of the gods and in the
spirit of the fatherland, achieved over the Aryan might.-The
nigher things of life were looked upon as those which counted
most. Men had the leisure and were inspired by a zeitgeist which
allowed and prompted them to seek for answers to the problems
of life better than those which the materialists of the oast had
proposed: answers which had for the most part been dispeiled by
the Eleatic logic, which was in its own turn repugnant to common
sense. Anaxagoras felt the movement of the age and responded in
some degree at least.
But he also met with troubles, and was charged with Medlsm and impiety, as he had taught that the sun was hot stone and
the moon just earth. 6 Pericles, it would appear, was able to effect his release from prison and to get him out of the country.
He spent his later years at Lampsacus and dying there requested
that the school-children should every year be granted a holiday
in his memory.
His more developed teacjings he included in a single
book, which ancient critics regarded as exemplifying a lofty
and agreeable style. Preserved though it is in fragments, we can
still see that:Its charm comes principally from the use
of the Ionic dialect; while its grandeur lies
in the thought itself. The author's personality
seems as fully absent from his works as from a
treatise on geometry. There is neither passion
nor imagination, if one cons1ders the details
of its language. He never discusses, but simply, like an oracl~announces truths as certainties. So his contemporaries justly called
him Intelligence. The epigram is just, and indicates well the 70fty, clear, formal character of ,his style.
In fine, his tone was definitely "philosophical", being marked
in some measure, at least, by those characteristics which were
henceforward to be associated with the perennial tradition and
to find their fullest development in St Thomas.
With reference to the doctrine which he expounded in this
manner, he was interested, like Empedocles, in effecting some
reconciliation between that unchangeable Eleatic being and the
testimony of the common sense as to the existence of a reality
which manifests change, corruption, and generation to us. He
looked upon the teachings of Parmenides as having been established, wherefore "we must know that all of them are neither more
nor less; for it is not iossible for them to be more than all,
and all are always equal .8 Despite the common manner of speaking of things, men should not let themselves think that any real
change takes place. What men really mean is that there 1s a ming

1ng and dissociation of that which is.
The Hellenes follow a wrong usage in
.'
speaking of coming into being and passing away;
for nothing comes into being or passes away,
but there is a mingling and separation of
things that are. So that they would be right
to call coming into being mixture, and passing away separation. 9
In other words, one ought not to take the Eleatic Being in too
narrow a sense, nor should one place too great a credence in
the apparent data of the senses. Thus, his way of reconciliation bears a resemblance to that of Empedocles, from whom it is
conceivable that he dtriVed the general notion and certain of
its salient features. 0
Like Empedocles, he had pulverised Reality into many particles which, though indestructible and unalterable in nature, possessed different characteristics and could shift
their positions in space. And like him he had
seen that creation and destruction and transformation need not l~ply absolute coming into
or passing out of 'being, but could be explained as a mere mixture and separation of uncreated, indestructible,
and unchangeable elements. ll
<
Now, in the system of Empedocles, the four OPPOSites
hot, cold, moist, dry, were things, and all of them were real in
the Eleatic sense. This did not appeal to Anaxagoras, who considered that four elements were rather inadequate and thought it
better to change the sum of fundamental differences and elements
to an undefined number, which would afford a greater scope for
the extensive variety of being. "The things that are in one
world are not divided nor cut off from_one another with a hat- 1
chet, neither the cold from the warm nor the warm from the cold.
Thus, for Empedocles the four elements were qualitativel
diverse and the other bodies, such as the bones and the flesh,
could be derived from these elements and their properties could
be explained from those of the elements. This seemed to be il~
logical, as Anaxagoras saw it; he could not grasp "how hair can
come from what is not hair, or tles~ from what is not flesh".13
The Eleatic rejection of the non-being appeared to be jeopardised by such a doctrine.
To explain these and other questions which the reconcilia
t10n brought up, he iecided that "in everyth1ng there is a port10n of everything". 4 Now, this does not mean that there was
at first just a commingling of things, before the worlds were
contrived, although he does, true enough, speak of some such a
t1me, describing everything as being found together, infinite
in numver and smallness alike: "And when all things were together
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none of them could be distinguished for their smallness".15 As
a matter of fact, this state of affairs has not altered even in
respect of the commingling. The portions, he goes on to lay, of
the large and the small are equal in their amount: "For ~his
reason, too, all things will be in everything; nor is it possible for them to be apart, but all things have a portion of everything".16 It might be a little clearer.
At any rate, everything will thus have an eq~al number
of the portions, and a smaller particle would only be able to
have a less number of portions, should one of them cease to exist. But, if we take the Eleatic Being in its sense of necessity
(though not of its narrower unity), it will be clear that no di~ision will ever bring about the nonQexistence of anything, for
whatever is, is. The less number need not, then, concern the
philosopher.
Nor is there a least of what is small,
but there is always a smaller; for it cannot
be that what is should cease to be by being
cut. But there is also always something greater than what is great, and it is equal to the
small in amount, and, compared with tself,
each thing is both great and small. 11
At least! Zeno had taught people the art of tying things up.
At any rate, if we accept Anaxagoras' line of reasoning,
it will be impossible for us to carry our analysis back to something that is free from mixture; the smallest of particles will
have as many portions as the largest. Thus, we can never expect
to reach a particle of simple nature.
In studying the character of the things found in everything, we may be guided by the objection which he made to the
thought of hatcheting out the opposites, as hot and cold, and
by other references which he makes to the traditional OPPositest8
The mixture of all things -- of the moist
and the dry, and the warm and the cold, and the
light and the dark, and of much earth that was
in it, and of a multitude of innumerable seeds
in no way like each other. For none of the other
things either is like any other. And these things
being so, we must hold that all things are in
the whole. 19
Aristotle has remarked, in his PhysicafOthat, if the first principles of the real are considered to be infinite, as those of
Anaxagoras clearly are, they may in that case be either, like
those of Democritus, one in their kind, or they may be opposites.
Porphyry, Themistius, and Simplicius ascribe the suggestion of
the "opposites" to Anaxagoras, while Aristotle further indicates
that his opposites may be called first principles as well as
homoeomeries. 2l
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It is of those opposites, then, and not
of the different forms of matter, that everything contains a portion. Every particle, however large or however small, contains every
one of those opposite qualities. That which
is hot is also to a certain extent cold. Even
show, Anaxagoras affirme~ was black; that is,
even the white contains a certain portion of
the opposite quality.22

~

If, in other words, one is successful in carrying out the analysis of Empedoclean being, he will arrive at lengt~ at the four
elementary bodies, of earth, air, fire and water, which are
said to constitute the ultimate reality. In the system of Anaxagoras, on the other hand, things are di~sible ad infinitum;
hence, no amount of reduction, however great i~ may be, will
bring one to a body so small that it does not oontain some' portions, at least, of all the opposites. The denial of this would
1mply that real change is possible, whioh would contradiot that
Being, whioh simply is. 23
We find him pushing on some distanoe beyond Empedooles towards the atomistio and meohanical view of reality finally attained by
Leucippus and Demooritus. The four passave
oonstituent elementsof the Empedoclean worldstuff are expanded by him into a~.definite
number of partioles, each one of whioh shimmers with all the basio qualities, but is predominantly and distinctl~4colored with that
whioh gives it its name.
Everything may be in everything, but a thing will appear
to be just that of whioh it happens to have the most present in
itself. For example, air would be that which had the most oold,
although some heat would go along with it, whereas fire would
be that whioh had the most heat, and there would be some Of the
cold in it too. What Empedooles regarded as elementary is now
taken as a oonglomeration of all sorts of seeds, inasmuoh as
"Each single thing is and was most manifestly those things of
Which it has most in it".2,
There was a time when everything was somehow found together; that more or less universal mingling would have presented
the sem~ce of air and the aether, which constituted the most
part of all, "being both of them infinite; for amongst all things
these are the greatest both in quantity and size tt • 26 His manner
Rf oonoeiving the original state of things is not unlike that of
Anaximenes, who did exeroise some influenoe over him; but, the
Beeming air is a mixture whioh is determined to its appearance
by its greatest part and not by itself the primitive substance.
The universal commingling would, of oourse, be infinite and
without any void: two dootrines oombining Pythagorean and Eleatio
vi w • T
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The seeds are, obviously, found no longer in thi~ prim1tive condition; somehow, they have been brought into the1r present ordering, and the quest10n naturally arises as to how th1s
has happened. The seeds are subjected to a m1xture and to a separation 1nto the those 1nnumerable conglomerat10ns of various
make-ups wh1ch go to const1tute the world. "These th1ngs revolve
and are separated off by the force and sw1ftness. And the sw1ftness makes the force. The1r swiftness 1s not l1ke the sw1ftness
of any of these th1n~s that are now among men, but 1n every way
many t1mes as swift. 27 S1nce everyth1ng 1s 1n everyth1ng and
since there cannot be aqy least thing -- as all things are div1sible ad inf1nitum, "they cannot be separated nor come to be by
themselves; but they must be now, just as they were in the beg1nning, all together. And 1n all thlngs many th1ngs are conta1ned,
and an equal number both 1n the gre~ger and 1n the smaller of
the th1ngs that are separated off."
The seeds, as these and
others of h1s comments show, do not separate themselves out, nor
do they 1mpart the needed force and sw1ftness to themselves. He
was see1ng, after some fash10n, that noth1ng can well be posited
as cause and effect 1n the same respect.
L1ke Empedoc1es, then, he is ob11ged to discover some
source of the activity of separat10n. Parmenides, even before
these men, had argued that a body could never move 1tself: the
mover for wh1ch he sought had therefore to be somehow distinct
from the bod1es moved.
The cause of th1s s epa rat 1 on , and of the
various subsequent comb1nat10ns of pr1m1t1ve
particles, was not in the pr1mary matter 1tself, for mater1al part1cles do not, of the1r
own accord, separate or enter 1nto union. We
are therefore forced to admit a cause h1gher
than matter, but exert1ng an 1nfluence on 1t,
and by this 1nfluence effect1~g the separation
of the pr1mary part1cles and the1r subsequent
comb1nat1ons. 29
The d1ff1culties wh1ch constantly arose 1n precisely th1s regard
were due to the mater1a11stic influences wh1ch operate upon all
these early th1nkers. They were com1ng slowly to rea11se that
matter cannot explain 1tself, but they were not able as yet to
hit exp11citly upon a metaphys1cal solution of the problems of
rea11ty. Thus, Empedocles had said that the forces which governed h1s tour elements were Love and Str1fe, but he comb1ned 1n
them the 1ncompat1ble attr1butes of eff1cient and mater1al causal1ty. Anaxagoras was 10ok1ng tor some one force, and therein
served the cause of philosophy well, by return1ng to the quest
after unity - and a un1ty this t1me not altogether the same as
the mater1al One of the Eleat1c Being.
And when he sought to ident1fy th1s stutf
(1.e., the d nam1c substance wh1ch moves all else)
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with some one of the qualities or elements with
which we are acquainted ge found its alter-ego
or "twin-soul" not in a plWsiological instinct .'
or mwstical emotion, but in the thinking and
reasoning activity of life and consciousness.
The stuff which possessed the power of moving
other things was perhaps most naturally that
which possessed the power of knowing them. At
any rate, Anaxagoras located his active element
in lUnd.
It was a suggestion that has made history. Perhaps it is
not clear to us today what exactly were the various motives that
together prompted him to his choice, but that a man should say
the present universe is dependent upon mind, upon something analogous to the human reason, was a challange -- imperfectly appreciated even by its maker -- to any attempt to account for
ultimate reality in physical terms alone.
There could hardly be question but what men were using
the Nous to seek out the meaning of things. Such implies that
they do have a meaning, potential in the concrete things and
made actual when freed by our mental activity; but that potential
idea of things can have been put in the concrete realities only .
by something which would have it actually, that is to say, a Nous
If this other Nous has not been at such work, how could ours ever
discover anything concerning a reality which would thus be so
alien to it? nThe same Reason which can explore the world must
have been exerted to arrange it; and man gfD see in the work the
image of the intelligence of the Artist." j
Other thinkers had insisted, and often with considerable
force, that men should trust to their reason rather than to their
senses. Heraclitus had , interestingly, made man's reason akin
to the everWliving fire, and Parmenides had inaugurated a science
of Being, but it remained for Anaxagoras to make a definite attempt to posit the mind on a different plane than the common
material, and to interpret reality in terms of intelligence.
He saw that matter cannot move itself, any more than the wood
fashions itself into a bed or the bronze molds itself into a
statue: some agent must intervene to produce these latter works,
and it seemed but reasonable to suppose that matter in general
required an agent to organise it. It would not do to hit merely
upon some form of matter for the agent, as the difficulty would
then be pushed back a stage and not obviated, nor will &n*y material cause ever be able to account for the presence of goodness in things (a goodness which Empedocles endeavored to explain
with his ambiguous Love).
When these men and the principles of this
kind had had their day, as the latter were found
inadequate to generate the nature of things, men
again forced by the truth itself,as we said, to
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inquire into the next kind of cause. For it is
not likely that either fire or earth or any
such element should be the reason why th1ngs
manifest goodness and beauty both in their being and in their coming to be, or that those
thinkers should have supposed that it was; nor
again could it be right to entrust so great
a matter to spontaneity and chance. When one
man said, then, that reason was present -- as
in animals, so throughout nature --as the cause
of order and of all arrangement, he seemed
like a sober man in contrast with the random
talk of his predecessors. We know that Anaxagoras certainly adopted these views, but
.Hermotimus of Clazomena~ is credited with expressing them earlier.)

Philosophers had at last descried a source of reality,
that would be at once the cause of the goodness and beauty of
things and the principle of their movement. Th1s discovery, published abroad by Anaxagoras, won him deservedly great renown and
he title of Nous; he might have had some claims to such ~stinc
ion by reason of h1s attainments in the study of nature, but it
as secured to him because he assigned some intelligent cause
f the universe, a cause whose character was much enhanced by
subsequent reports. Plutarch has recorded that he was held in
he h1ghest esteem "because he was the first of the philosophers
ho did not refer the first ordering of the world to fortune or
chance, nor to necessity or compulsion, but to a pure, unadulterated intelligence, which in all other existing mixed and comound things acts as a pr1nci~le of discrimination, and of co~
ination of like with like".3' If one qualifies the encom1um by
derstand1ng that all this was opened to philosophers by Anaxgoras, it is well put.
It is well at the same time to reflect that the patient
ffort of many later men was necessary in order that his suggesion might be made truly metaphysical and, in the long run, contructive. In point of fact, as Etienne Gilson has brought out,
revelation was needed for men to see that all this universe
s radically contlngent and must so depend in esse upon a trancendant being; this could have been worked out by reason alone,
ut as a matter of historical fact, men had to be shown the right
ay by Christ.
With regard to the contribution of Anaxagoras, Plato reorda that Socrates was in h1s early years much interested in
he investigation of nature, but, becoming dussatisfied with
he several schools of thought then orevailing, looked carefully
road for the true answer as to the ordination of things. The
nquiry was going on, when he heard somebody reading from a book
y the Clazomenaean (pr. 1 drachma at the stalls).-The theory
hat Mind has caused and disposed all things, wh1ch was set forth
n that book, strikes him as admirable and he says to h1mself:
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If mind is the disposer, mind will dispose all for the best~ and put each particular
in the best place; and I argued that if any
4'
one desired to find out the cause of the generation or destruction or existence of anything,
he must find out what state of being or doin,
or suffering was best for that thing, and .
therefore a man had only to consider the best
for himself and others, and then he would also
know the worse, since the same science comprehended both.34
These were indeed high hopes, though still, even for Socrates,
on a plane higher than before, but not as high as pure metaphysics. He was right, nonetheless, in thinking that, if a man knew
what he meant in saying that mind is the cause, he would give
the answers to the questions that he proposed. The source and
the good of things are objects ot rat&onal enquiry, and no enquiry is complete unless it essays their delineation.
Socrates was gravely disappointed in the developmeDt of
this proposal as made by Anaxagoras himself. "As I proceeded,"
he tells us rather sadly, "I found my philosopher altogether forsaking mind or any other principle of order, but havin~ reEourse
to air and ether, and water, and other eccentricities. He likens
Anaxagoras to a man who would say that it would, generally speak1ng, be the mind ot the man which accounted for the actions of
Socrates, and would then go ahead to account for his presence,
now, as a prisoner of the Eleven by discussing his bones, his
muscles, and the like, with no further reference to the actual
cause -- his reasoned submission to the verdict of the court.36
It might be that he could not carry out his intentions without
these bones and muscles, but any such a doctrine would be a
weird medley of causes and conditions, which the maDy are forever contusing. T~is, incidentally, implies that Socrates thought
of matter as a condition of the first causal operations, and
did not see that it too must be created.
Aristotle, willing as he is to render Anaxagoras his full
due, finds much the same fault with him. Like the others in the
long run, Anaxago~as but vaguely apprehended the true nature of
efficient causality. Like an untrained though spirited tighter,
he could occasionally land a fine blow, but he was not consistently effective aDd was even unaware of the power of his actions.
His type made only a partial use of their frequently good ideas:
Parmenides had muffed the idea of the being, and Anaxagoras misapplied his notion of cause:
For Anaxagoras uses reason as a deus ~
machina for the making of the world, and when
he is at a loss to tell from what cause something necessarily 1s, then he drags reason in,
but in all other cases ascribes events to anything rather than to reason.38

once we carefully study the account whioh Anaxagoras has given
of the Nous, we shall readily see that, saving its unity, it is
~ot much better than the forces whioh Empedocles had em~oyed.
Thus, we learn that tt all other things partake in a portion of everything, while Nous is infinite and self-rulod, and
is mixed with nothing, but is alone, itself by itself."j9 No
~tter how much we may wish to take his teachings in their bette
sense, the faot remains that·this is ~t how men speak of an
immaterial inextended consoiousness."
Our idea of the immateri
al may be negative, but no one with a proper notion of what it
~eans would find it neoessary to say that it is not mixed with
other things, that it does not have the opposites, hot and cold,
within it. At any rate, thanks to the fact that it is not mingl
it enjoys a universal sway:
For in everything there is aportion of everything, as has been said by men in what goes before,
and the things mixed with it would hinder it, so
that it would have power over nothing in t~ same
way that it now has being alone by itself.
This universal power of the Nous oonsists in nothing more than
the fa.t that it causes things to move, and this, after all,
Heraclitus had attributed to his ever-living fire and Emped~Qles
to his relentless strife, neither of which was immaterial. 2
His description of the formation of the world under the
influence of this Mind is a further, very olear indication of
Its material charaoter, despite the oomparative superiority
which its freedom from mixture may give to it. All things, as
we saw, were at first somehow together; then, mind began to
rotate a part of them, whereat "separating off took plaoe from
all that was moved, and 80 muoh as Nous set in motion was all
separated. And as things were set in motion and se~~rated, the
revolution oaused them to be separated muoh ~re."
This gradually widening rotatory motion is very swift,
and bring it to
pass that "the dense and the moist and the cold and the dark
came together where the earth is now, while the rare and the
warm and the dry (and the bright) went out towards the further
part of the aether".45 This division according to the hot, light,
rare, and dry qualities of the Ae_her and the opposite qualities
of the Air is in keeping with his earlier teaohing that these
two were predominant in the primary mass. With the process begun
in this way, he goes on to desoribe the remaining steps in a
manner whioh puts the reader in mind on Anaximenes. For, the two
masses are being separated off acoording to the dominant parts,
and It from these as they are aellarated otf earth is solidified;
for from mists water is separated off, and from water earth.
From the earth stones are eQlidified by the oold, and these rush
outwards more than water. "46
Inasmuoh as he was familiar with meteorites -- to the
extent that he was credited with predioting the tall of one (~)-
his theory of the heavenly bodies is an interesting product of

some soientifio observation and presents some more original feat
ures. "We read, II says Burnet, "at the end of fr. 16 that 'stones
rush outwards more than water', and we learn from the dozographers that the heavenly bodies were explained as stones torn
from the earth by the rapidity of 41s rotation and made red-hot
by the speed of their own motion.'·
All this, taken with the terminology of Anaxagoras, fails
to bespeak the immaterial oharacter of the Mind. Certain other
passages do attribute to It some rather contradictory attributes,
at least from the viewpoint of immateriality. Thus, having spoken of it as unmixed, he goes on to say that "it is the thinnest
of all things and the purest, and it has knowledge about everything and the greatest strength; and Nous has power_over all
things, both greater and smaller, that have life.ff~
To our way of thinking, this knowledge about everything
would bespeak an eminentilplateriali ty, but we cannot very well
take it in our sense, after he has also referred to the Nous as
the thinnest of all things and the purest. It was doubtless an
excellent thing for him to insist as he did on the supremacy and
the distinctive character of the Nous, but he has not envisioned
it free of all material conditions; for his own part, he has
but made it the least gross of whatever is material. After all,
tne quite material, ever-living fire has something of the universal knowledge, for "wisdom is one thing. It is to know the
thought by which all things a~§ steered through all things,"
while "the wise is one only". 9 We can agree with Zeller in so
far as he would insist that "Anaxagoras' leading_idea ••• is the
conception of mind in distinction from matter", 5U because he
finds this in the simplicity of the Nous as contrasted with the
infinitely composite nature of everything else, but he ought
not to push the distinction between mind and matter as conceived
by Anaxagoras too far. Indeed, Zeller himself points out that
"these expressions do not explicitly assert its incorporeality •••
Its essential function (he adds, significantly) consists in the
separating of the mixed mass~lso that its knowledge is nothing
more than a distinguishing.":J
Even though Anaxagoras may declare that~all the things
that are mi~gled together and separated off and distinguished
are all known by NOus", Which "set in order all things that were
to be, and all things that were and are not now and that are, an
this revolution in which now revolve the stars and the sun and
the moon, and the air and the aether that are separated Off", 52
it is clear from his own remarks and especially from the criticlsms of the ancients that he failed to apply this in the proper
way. The Mind is needed to start the movement of separatdon at
one point in the mass, from which the rotatory motion spread
with gathering swiftness. "We have no evidence," Zeller admits,
"that Anaxagoras supposed mind to take a part in other stages
or the process of the world creation. "5-, Evidence there is, however, and to the cpntrary. We have the disapPOintment of those
hopes whioh Socrates would not have sold at a great price, and
We have the several times repeated critioisms made by Aristotle,
who certainly respected the positive contributions of Anaxagoras.

The Masters appear to be in agreement that Anaxagoras
d not avail himself of the opportunity, offered by the Nous,
giving a teleological explanation of things -- an explanation
oh as would be required by the theory that there is a ~nd
it all -- like the h~ reason -- which has implanted
purpose that we can discover.
Both Plato and Aristotle, who believed
that purpose was the main factor in the formation and ordering of the world, were severe
with him for using Kind as a mere mechanical
cause which did no more than wind the world
up and then left it run by its own mechanism.
And Plato doubtless was thinking of him as
well as ~of Empedocles when he spoke of those
philoso~hers who taught that the universe was
formed not by the action of mind ••• or of any
God, or from art, but ••• by chance and nature
onlytl (Laws 889). We have then no more ri~ht
to attribute to him a ttteleological" or design" theory of the activity of Mind than we
had to ascribe_to him an immaterial view of
its character. 54
Even as Empedocles had failed to use his efficient cause p
as such, so Anaxagoras, after a brief, and no doubt significant
gesture, returned to those "eccentricities" which so distressed
Socrates and spoke once more in terms of a material causality,
11ke the rest. Aristotle has well said of these early thinkers,
who at times said more than they knew, that "that for whose sake
actions and changes and movements take place, they assert to
be a cause in a way, but not in this way, i. e., DOt in the way
1n which it is in its natu,re to be a cause". 5:>
Now, whereas nothing else is quite like to any other
th1ng, inasmuch as all that is other than mind goes by that whi
is predominant in it, "all Nous is alike, both the greater and
the smaller". 5 6If there are greater and smaller parts of the _ .......'""1,
w1th all its different qualities, Burnet may be right when he
finds that "Nous is certainly imagined as occupying space".57
We could draw much the same conclusion from further remarks of
Anaxagoras, as when he tells us that "Nous, which ever is, is
certainly there, where everything else is, in the surrounding
mass,_and in what has been united with it and separated off from
1t." ::>0
One very commendable aspect of his theory of the Nous
Was that it a~forded him the opportunity to make some distincti
between animate and inanimate beings. As he saw it, "in everything there is aportion of everything exc~t Nous, and there are
Bome things in which there is Nous also", ~~ that is to say, in
all that has life, whether in plants, brute animals or men. This
Nous, being found always alike, "has 'Dower over all things, both
greater and smaller, that have life".oO Since, in other words,
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Mind was responsible for the movement imparted to the entire
world, it was but logical to suppose that in those corporeal beings which can in some way move themselves there should be something of that motive Mind, able to move and to know, for!'smuch
as it is all like to itsel'f.
It was a definite step ahead for men to recognise a distinction between mere bodies and those which enjoy some form of
life, and for them to acknowledge the somehow superior character
of the principle of life. It was evidence that man, led on, as
Aristotle would have it, by the very truth of things, was at
last awakening to the fact that it is.o9t of the question for
the merely corporeal to stand as the highest of realities or as
the only one.
Impossibile est autem aliquod corpus
esse nobilissimum in entibus, qqia corpus
aut est vivum, aut non vivum. C~rpus autem
vivum, manifestum est, quod est nob11ius corpore non vivo: corpus autem vivum non vivit,
inguantum corpus, quia sic omne corpus viveret: oportet igitur, quod vivit per aliquid
aliud, sicut corpus nostrum vivit per animam.
Illud autem, per qg~d vivit corpus, est nobilius, quam corpus.
Even if Anaxagoras was not fully aware of all this, he was at
least conscious of the need for explaining life -- which is not
a phenomenon common to all the bodies of our experience -- on
some basis other than that of a crude hylozoism.
Of course, his 'absolute likeness of the Nous', which
would not permit of degrees, militated against his discerning
between the principles of life to be found respectively in men,
brutes and plants as principles essentially diverse from one
~
another. The appallingly self-same Nous would enjoy better, or
at least more, opportunities in some bodies than in others. Hence
we should not be surprised to learn that, in his view, plants
were not alive merely, but also experienced p~~asure and pain in
their growth and in the loss of their leaves.
Animals grew out
of the moist element, and among them man was best equipped for
what we would regard as rational activities; he was "the wisest
of animals, not because he had a better sort of Nous, but because he had hands".o3
In the case of man no distinction was made between the
Mind and the Soul -- as is hardly surprising. Having laid it ,
down as a principle that everything is moved by mind, he would
naturally regard the "soul n just as that which imparts motion,
that is, Noua. The later Atomists were quite explicitlr, to affirm the identity of mind and soul, but, as it seems, 'Anaxagoras a utem minus clare de hoc puncto mentem suam aperuit; multis
quidem in locis intellectum vocat causam pulohri et veri, sed
alibi docet eum ease animam, cum omnibus insit viventibus aeQ~e
magnis atque parvis, aeque superioribus atque inferioribus".o4
The position of Anaxagoras is hardly sound, for not only is
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"mind", insofar as it may stand tor wisdom, not present equally
in all things, but it is not to be found equally or in ~e same
faY in all men. Perhaps, when Anaxagoras says "Nous (noos)ha.s
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twO; such a theory does not, however, bear close scrutiny, for
he, after all, assigns the origin of motion and the knowledge of
things to precisely the same principle, whether he styles it
the .!l.Q.Q.! or the psyche.
Utroque hoc termino indifferenter utitur
ac si unam eandemque designarent naturam; nis1
quod praecipuum princ1p1um omn1um rerum statu1t
1ntellectum; certe aff1rmat eum solum esse 1nter
res, quae exs1stunt, s1mplicem, 1mm1xtum, purum;
nihilom1nus uni eidemque pr1ncipio utramque functionem, cognitionem v1delicet atque movendi facultatem tribuit, dum ~sser1t intellectum esse qui
universum moverit. 66
His teaching as to the knowledge which man, the wisest,
because hand-equipped, animal comes to possess is interesting,
both in itself and by reason of the contrast it offers to that
of Empedocles. The latter held that knowledge 1s of like by
like, while Anaxagoras declared that it obtained through contraries, somewhat after the fashion of Heraclitus. Such a theory
would be in harmony with his fundamental tenet of the unmingled
lindand with certain facts of exper1ence. For it does seem that
a number of perceptions, such as that of the temperature of
something, depend on the existence of some difference between
the state of the object and of the organ wh1ch perceives it. If
water, for example, is at the same temperature as our hand, we
will not, upon plunging our rum,9-S into the water:;: perceive it
'as either hot' or cold. Moreover'~~he contrariety required by
the doctrine of Anaxagoras as one of the conditions of perception exists for all poss1ble cases; since, according to the
Anaxagorean doctrine "1\~Y ~V1\o.IITG we have wi thin us the contraries
of all possible external objects." 67
Inasmuch as the Nous is in some things and not in others,
the activity of sensation, it is implied at least, is in some
way different from other interactions. The implication which
his distinction between the animate and inanimate, the Nous-bear1ng and the Nous-less, makes hard to escape, is not explained
to any satisfaction by the various remarks which are attributed
to him. I1He does not define the general features which character1se all sensory activity, and at the same time distinguish it
frompther kinds of activity." 6~ We can gather that sensible perception is brought about by the relation which obtains between
contraries, and that the act of sensing will entail the production of some change in the organism. tfAnaxagorassays that perception is produced by opposites; for,1I Theophrastus points out,

t11ike things cannot be affected by like". 69 Thus, we have sight
thanks to the presence of the image in the pupil, but this will
be cast only upon somet"hing that is of a different color. F;9r
most creatures, night is more of the same color as their pupils
than the day is, and they will accordingly see better in the
daylight. An image will be cast upon their pupils at such time
"because light is a concomitant cause of the image, and because
the prev'dling
color casts an image more readily upon its opposite tl •
The same is true of the senses of taste and of touch,
for that which is at the same temperatur~ as we are will neither
warm nor cool us, nor again do we know ~he sweet or the bitter
by themselves: "We know cold by warm, fresh by salt, and sweet
by sour, by virtue of our deficiency in each; for all these
are in us to begin withtl. 7 I The case is no different with our
smelling or our hearing, for the former is associated with our
processes of respiration and with the lat~r sound is produced
when air in motlon bumps against some fixed and solid air, and
in its recoil ls carried to the organ of hearin~, where it hits
upon the hollow bone that surrounds the braln.· r
All along the line, therefore, we perceive all the quall
ties of an object according as there is a defect or an excess
of them ln ourselves. Since everything ls in everything, and so
ln us too, those contrarieties whlch perception requires are
always possible. This may be all very interesting, but it does
not tell us the distinctive characteristics of sensation as opposed to change in general; not only that, but it does not set
the study of the vital phenomena apart from the physlual science.
The contraries here referred to as required
for perception are physical on both sides. Whence
they derive their contrariety, or how'the heterogeneity of the \&) U)(')(, which is active in perception, takes effiJct.we are not informed. The soul
presides over the interacting contrary qualities
of the perceiving sense and its object; that is
all we know. 73
The theory has all the same a considerable value, and it
is not without its modern parallels. The influence of opposites
and the accompan~ment of sensations by pain are facts which
ought to be explained, and Anaxagoras deserves credit for having
discussed them. 7 '+However, the knowledge which these senses give is to his
notion weak and uncertain. As a resuJ:t, It from the weakness ot" "
the senses we are not able to' judge the truth".75 We must be
careful to understand his position aright, in the light of the
causes which he assigns for this weakness. After all, he says,
the organs of sense perception have elements as well which are
like to those elements that are present in the things perceived,
and this would interfere with 'our clearness of knowledge by unlikes. Hence, we do not perceive the portions of everything that
are in everything, as, for instance, the portions of whlte in
something that is predominantly, therefore apparently, black.

~ quam
"In8uper organa hulua
organa a1ter.1us,

!

homlnla aunt aaepe alio modo composlta,
id gqod facit cognitionem sensitivam
adhuc magis subjecti vam. "76
.'
This does not necessarily imply a complete distrust of the
senses or a thorough-going subjectivism, for we must admit the
role of the subject in conditioning sensation. He is reported
to have told his friends "that things would be for them such as
they supposed them to be,"77 but this may refer to questions
of moral responsibility. Even though we may not make of him a
skJ!tptic, it is easy for us to see that his doctrine, if not rectified, might give the lead to incipient skepticism, for it had
not vindicated the true character of knowledge.
He makes the intere~ting remark that "what appears is a
vision of the unseen", 75 and seems thereby to indicate the
presence in· us at least of a power of knowledge somewhat different from that of the senses, which it supplements. The
senses can go just so far in the analysis of vhenomena, and then
they must stop. On the other hand, "the mind s eye can still
see all the colors in the rainbow-like nature of particles too
small even for their dominant tint to strike the physical vision
But reason, in his view, does not descry a new world of immaterial or' super-sensible realities'. It is merely a sort of
miacropoope held to the naked eye of perception, which discovers
nothing that the senses might not detect if only they were
sharpened. "79 This interpretation may be a little extreme, but
it is not without a basis. As there is no corporeal organ assigned for this higher portion or aspect of the ~ in men,
it would apparently differ from the senses in that it would not
be impeded in its operation by an organ where that which in the
organ is like to the object would get in the way; hence, it
should know somewhat better. This may be the reason why Saztu8
Empiri~us speaks of the logos here as the criterion of the
truth. 50
Even though without such hinderance, it still suffers from
serious limitations: tlMu1titudinem e1ementorum quae sese
separan~l nos scire non possumus per rationem neque per rea1itatem".8
Apart from this, it is not made platn how our mind,
a participation in the unmixed Mind, is determined to a knowledge of things. It may be that the Mind always knows, but it
is a fact of experience that we .Q.Qm! to know, and grow in knowledge. This indicates a prior condition of potency succeeded
by one of act thanks to the operation of s}~m~thing agBB'f"and
even if there is no room for the potential in Eleatic being,
this fact should nonetheless be given some explanation. "Anaxagoras solus affirmat intel1ectum esse passionis expertem euque
nihil communis cum ul1a alia re habere. At si ta1is est eius
natura, quomodo cognitionem exercebit et quaenam causa eum ad
cognoscendum determinabit? Haec nee ipse diserte solvit nec
ex eis, quae ab eo dicta sunt, perspici possunt."82. His opinion, already noted, as to the fact that man is the most prudent
of animals thanks to his possession of hands is quite probably
a tribute to that ability to construct things and adapt them to
his 'use, which is executed chiefly by means of those organs.

life. devoted as it was w~th :reat enthusiasm to the study
r~a1B
lof science, would,-!tuUbate 8a possible opinion that in such mental activity lay man's end. 3 Whether he professed
immo~ality

or not is uncertain; it could fit as well into his system as

into that of Empedoc1es.
Anaxagoras is no place explicitly concerned with the problem of a God. The accounts of his trial would not suggest his
acceptance of the traditional mythology; the attitude of his
disciple Euripides points the same way. It may be that he regarded the motig~-producing Nous as God, as a number of writers
have believed.
This much is clear: his Nous does not play
something of the role in reality which the Aristotelian tradition
will assign to God; indeed, it is not altogether unlike Aristotle s
rather unconcerned first mover. But there are notable differences. The Nous is not conceived of in the eminently different
manner familiar to us in thinking of God; it is not, on the
face of available evidence, an immaterial reality, and hence,
a fortiori, not a spiritual reality; it does not clearly govern
everything toward ends (and herein, of course, again differs
from the first mover of \ristotle which moves by being loved);
since it organises and does not produce the primitive commingling
of all things, it could never be intelpret.ed in terms of a
Christian God, "factor cae1i et terrae, visibilium et invisibilium."
On the other hand, it was certainly a fine thing for Anaxagoras to insist upon an explanation of ~aa1ity in terms of Mind
which initiated movement. Unaware of the fact, he was talking
soberly in snatches among that drunken company. He at least
directed men's attention to the more satisfactory nature of explanations which looked beyond the material, to prin~ip1es which
simply could not be of the very same stuff as corporeal reality,
to a cause which imparted movement while remaining itself
unmoved.~5 Me saw and told people that the first principle was
especially a living and a cognitive being, and acted by virtue
of its knowledge; it was not for him to make proper sense of all
this, but he had at least suggested possibilities which others,
stimulated in his high ideas and his failures at their reading
alike, were to investigate, with results that we have tOday.
Thus, in the teachings of Anaxagoras, we have the first
definite cha11ange issued in the name of dualism to all that
would take reality as merely material and so reduce man from
his proper dignity. It has often and well been observed that
there can be no true humanism which does not found itself in
the teachings that there are forces superior to those of matter
and that man derives his being, purpose and fulfillment from
the Source of all reality. It is a sentiment which many a
Greek felt and sought to express; the peculiar merit of Anaxagoras is that he first sketched in broad outline the philosophic
p.easons for this. ln his doctrines as in his life,he emphasised
the role of knowledge and the importance it must have for man,
constituted as he is by his possession of reason. To put it
briefly, Anaxagoras showed that philosophy is a life. As he is
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--;aid to have taught, "life is worth living because it enables
us to contemplate the}:heavens and the order of the universe. 86

Notes to the Sixth Chapters
1. Timon,Silloi, quoted by Diogenes Laertius II.6.
2. Nicomachaen Ethics X.viii l179a. "When they (i.e.,
his relatives)accused him of neglecting it(i. e. ,his property),
he replied, 'Why then do you not look after it, and at last he
went into retirement and engaged in physical investigation without troubling himself about public affairs. When some one enquired, 'Have you no concern in your native land?' 'Gently, t he
replied, 'I am greatly concerned with my fatherland,'and pointed
to the sky. Diogenes Laertius II.7. The last remark,while we
should read too much into it, is nonetheless a very appropriate
one for a philosopher to make.
3."Anaxagoras qui accepit ab Anaxamenes disciplinam."
Cicero,DeNatura Deorum, I.xxvi. Cfr. Diogenes Laertius II.6.
4. Burnet, Early Greek Ebilo~ophy, pg. 253.
5. Phaedrus 270.
.
6. Having been charged with atheism an~eing now aSSUI~
eded by Veletus that he is completely guilty,Socrates asks,in
the course of his trial:
Do you mean that I do not believe in the
god-head of the aun or moon ihi'ke other men?
I assure you, judges, that he does not:
for he says that the sun is stone and the moon
earth.
Friend Meletus,you think you are accusing
Anaxagoras: and you have but a bad opinion of
the judges, if you fancy them illiterate to such
a degree as not to know that these doctrines are
found in the books of Anaxa~oras and Claxomenian,
whi ch are full of them. -- (APOIO~ 26.)
Diogenes Laertius (II. 12 et seq~ gives rather a full
account of such matters. As to the attitude of the people with
reference to thinkers of this sort, Plutarch notes: "He who the
first, and the most plainly of any, and with the greatest assurance committed to writing how the moon is enlightened and ove~
shadowed, was Anaxagorasi and he was (at the time the Athenians
were engaged in besieging Syracusel as yet but recent,nor was
his argument much known, but was rather kept secret, passing only
among a few,under some kind of caution and confidence. People
Would not then tolerate natural philosophers,and theorists,as
they called them about things above;as lessening the divine
power by explaining away its agency into the operation of irrational causes and senseless forces acting by necessity,without
anything of Providence or free agent. Hence it was that
Protagoras was banished, and Anaxagoras cast into prison,so that
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pericles had much difficulty to procure his liberty ••• " (Life
of Nicias 26.). He goes on to note that when philosophy explicitly developed a metaphysic, with Plato, ~hilosophers acqu~ed
standing and could live safely at their work.
7. Scriset, Greek Literature, pg. 156. efr. Plutarch,
Life of Pericles 4.
8. Fr. 5. The fragments are to be found in Burnet,
OPe cit., pp. 258. ff.
9. Fr. 17.
10. "It is in every ~ay probable that Anaxagoras derived his theory of mixture from his younger contemporary,whose poem
may have been published before his own treatise. In any case, ••••
the opinmons of the latter were known at Athens before the middle
of the fifth century." Burnet, op.cit., pg. 261. On this point,
cf~. Zeller, Outlines of the History of Greek Philosophy, pg. 61.
11.B.A.G.Fuller, History of Greek Philosophy, pg. 217.
12. Fr. 8.
13. Fr. 10.
14. Fr. 11.
15. Fr. 1.
16. Fr. 6.
17. Fr. 3. While Anaxagoras, as we have had occasion to
remark, may have possessed many of the virtues of a philosophic
writer, the condition of his subject apparently did not allow
for an always noteworthy clarity.
18. We find much of this same thought in his 15th fragment, describing the evolution of the world.
19. Fr. 4. cfr. matter ad not. 45.
20. Physi ca I. ii. 184b.
.
21. Si,plicius, Physica XLIV.i; Aristotle,Physica I.iv.
l87a. (Apud Burnet, op.cit., pg.263.).
22. Burnet, op.cit., pp. 263-4. In view of the teaching
here we can understand the attitude of Aristotle with reference
to Anaxagoras and others, for whom "if all contradictory statements are true of the same subject at the same time, evidently
all things w~ll be one ••• And we thus get the doctrine of Anaxagoras, that all things are mixed together; so that nothing
really exists. They seem, then, to be speaking of the indeterminate, and, while ~ancying themselves to be speaking of being,
they are speaking about non-being; for it is that which exists
:potentially and not in complete reality that is indeterminate."
(Metaphysica IV. iv. 1007 b.). There is something to this way
of interpreting the reality, that which is,. among thinkers of
thissort. As we shall later have occasion to suggest, it is in
this very co-positing of contraries with its sceptical influence
that Anaxagoras,however well intentioned, made one of his gravest
errors. For, "si praedicatur affirmatio, praedi cabi tur negatio
cum simul verifieentur: ergo neeesse est quod homo sit triremis
et eadem ratione quodlibet aliud. Et sic omnia erunt unum. Hoc
igitur co~bingit dieentibus bane positionem,seilieet quod contradictio verifieetur de eodem." st. Thomas, In IV Metaph., lect.
Viii, 639.
.
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2!. nOn the other hand, everything can pass into eveI'Jthing else just because the 'seeds', as he called them,of each
form of matter contain a port10n of everything, that is, 01 all
the opposites, though in different proportions. If we ar8 to
use the word 'element' at all, it is these seeds that are the
elements in the system of Allaxagoras. n Burnet, Ope ci t. ,pg. 264.
AS Zeller puts it, being for Anaiagoras consists "of a m1xture
of innumerable uncreated, imperishable and unchangeable but not
indivis1ble particles of pecu11ar composition ••• Anaxagoras calls
his primary substances C'\\tt(~"Ta.. or 'ICp~p.-a."6-- • They are called by
later writers 'homoeomeries', the Aristotelian term. If ( Ope cit. ,
pg.62.).
24. Fuller, op.cit., pg. 224.
25. Fr. 12.
26. Fr. 1.
27. Fr. 9.
28. Fr. 6.
29. A. Stoeckl, Handbook of the History of Philosophy,
pg. 44.
30. Fuller, Ope cit., pg. 218.
31. W. A. Butler, Lectures on the History of Ancient
Philosophy, I. 322. There was very probably some inkling of
this in the mind of Anaxagoras, some recognition of the fact
that "since everything in the world is formed and arranged in
accordance with a definite plan, and plan and order suppose Reason, it follows that the efficient cause which presides over
matter must be mind (
)" (Stoeckl,. Ope cit.), although he was
not yet in a position rightly to interpret the hints of nature.
32. Metasphysica I. iii 984b. "Apparuit aliquis dicens intellectum esse in tota natura, sicut est in animalibus,
et ipsum esse causam mundi, et ordinis totius ••• , in quo ordine
consistit bonum totius,et uniuscujusque. Et hic purificavit
priores philosophos, ad puram veritatem eos reducens,qui inconvenientia dixerunt, hujusmod1 causam non tangentes." St. Thomas,
In I Metaph., lect. v. 100.
33. Life of Pericles, iVa ftThis mass void of ,.form and
motion, in which we may recognise the ctile.\~Ov'
of Anaxtmander,
the ..pa.lpo.s of Empedocles, and the union of the smallest particles of the Atomists, is now approached, not indeed by a separating and combining necessity, which is just what Anaxagoras
denies, but by the vo\is. ,a conscious power,the introduction of
which at once provokes the teleological mode of regarding things:.
In direct opposition to the principle of the previous period, as
formulated by Aristotle, Anaxago-.,as ascribes to the know1ng,'Vt.ul
predicates contrary to those belonging to the known object (the
mass)." J.Erdmann, History of Philosophy, pg. 67. It likely
provoked the teleology, as in the case of Socrates, but that
"as about all.
34. Phaedo 97.
35. Phaedo 98.
36. This matter is handled very well by Socrates himself, when, in resisting the well-meant offers of escape made by
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n is friends, he displays his freely chosen course of submitting
to the sovereign authority, in the Crito.
37. "Anaxagoras, them, at least on this side
his
teaching, must be considered rather as an author of a phrase
than as the father of a philosophy. The phrase remained, and
na.d a profound influence on subsequent. philosophies, but in his
own hands it was little more than a dead letter. His immediate
interest Was rather in the variety of unitYihe is theoretically
perhaps, 'on the side of the angels', in practice he is a materialist. tf J. Marshall, A Short Histo
of Greek Philosophy,pg.55.
38. Metaphysica I. iv. 9 5 a.
39 Fr. 12.
40. A.W.Benn, The Greek Philosonhers, I. 40. J.Adam
gives a brief summary of the leading interpretations of the
NOus, and not es hi s own agreement with Heinze and Arleth tt in
holding that Anaxagoras intended us to understand by Nous an
incorporeal essence, although in the absence of an accepted
philosophical terminology he failed to make the new idea absolutely clear" ("illie Divine Origin of the Soul", :pp. 35 to 76 of
his Vitality of Platonism, this from pg. 43.). As our remarks
suggest, we would agree with Socrates, Aristotle and other commentators that, while the incorporeal may render his theory more
intelligible, the evidence indicates that he at least did not
conSistently recognise this, and, in fact, is generally in some
contradiction to it.
41. Fr. 12.
42. Cfr. Phtsica VIII. v 256b.
43. Fr. 13. "Anaxagore, so us l'impression des changements produits par les revolutions celestes, admet que la premiere cause qui separe les choses les unes des autres est un
mouvement circulaire ou tourbilloni il imagine donc Ie Nous
anima d'abord lui-m~me d'un mouvement circulaire, puis produisant dans une espace limitee un petit tourbillon, qui s'etend
peu a peu autour de son centre, se propageant a travers l'espace
1nfini.ft E. Brehier, Histoire de la Philosophie,l. 73.
44. Cfr. fro 9.
45. Fr. 15.
46. Fr. 16.
47. Burnet, op.cit., pg.269. As to the doxographers,
cfr. A~tius, Placita, ii.13, 3 (R.P. 157 c.)
48. Fr. 12.
49. Heraclitus, frs. 19 and 65. Cfr.Burnet,op.cit.,
pg. 268.
50. Zeller, op.cit., pg.6l. "Zeller holds, indeed,that
Anaxagoras meant to speak of something incorporeal; but he admits
that he did not succeed in doing so (Die Philosophie der
~riechen, Erster Theil, FUnfter Auflage; Leipsig, l892,pg.993).
and that is hi storically the important pOint. 11 Burnet, Ope ci t. ,
pg. 268.
.
51. Zeller, Outlines, pg. 61. "In some respects,"
Writes A. W.Benn (Early Greek Bhl10Ef!phI, pg. 78.), fthe clearly
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, conceived it as like human reason, but with far greater powers •••
On the other hand, it is an extended substance, the thinnest
and purest of all things, and enabled by this absoll'iUi.(C!s~ara
teness (!), of which it is an unique example, to act on them.
Its action,however, is of a purely mechanical kind and has no
other effect than to set up a ••• movement by which the component
elements of the original mixture are segragated. ff
52. Fr. 12.
53. Ope cit., pg. 62. The language of Anaxagoras may
~ times suggest "to us the Bebraic idea of the Spirit of God
moving on the face of the waters, and of a divine intelligence
creating and controlling the world. We should be careful,however, not to read any such idea into Anaxagoras'thought. The
action of Mind in setting the other stuffs in motion seemed to
him as unpremeditated an& mechanical as the commotion caused in
a tumbler by the ingredients of a Seidli tz powder seems to us.
And the formation of the world due to the spread of the initial
commotion Was not in any way planned or directed by the cosmic
brain-matter. It was a wholly purposeless and blind process,
liked the series of changes started and sustained among chemical
elements by the mere pres ence of a catalyser." Fuller, Ope ci t. ,
pg. 219.
54. As M. McDonald pOints out (The Progress of Philoso£hI, pg. 20.), the logic of Anaxagoras is not sound "and Aristotle criticises him severely for a manifestation of words conveying the thought that mind is both the creator of changes
brought about by mixtures and separations and also but a necessary part resident in primal elements. Anaxagoras, in other
words, has illogical cause and automatic result in Nous."
55. Metaphysi ca I. viii 988 b. "Isti ergo philosophl
non dixerunt praedictas causas esse bonas,quasi horum causa aliquod entium sit aut fiat, quod pertlnett ad rationem causae finalis; sed quia a praedictis, scilicet intellectu et amore,procedebat motus quidam ad esse et fieri rerum, quod pertinet ad
rationem causae effecientis. tt St. Thomas, In I Metaph., lect.
xi, 177.
56. Fr. 12.
57. Ope cit., pg. 268.
58. Fr. 14.
59. Fr. 11.
60. Fr. 12.
61. Summa Theologica I. iii. 1. (Italics ours.).
62. So PSQudo-Aristotle has it, De Plant. I.i.815 a
(R.P. 160.). "All derivative minds are essentially the same with
it (the NouS) , and with one another, differing from it and from
one another only in degree. tI B. C. Burt, Brief History I>f Greek
Philosophy, pg. 29.
63. Burnet, OPe cit., pg. 272. "the more perfectly a
bOdy is organised, the more powerful is the vo~~ within it, and
the more powerfully does it promote knowledge and animation.
~ence even the plants are not devoid of soul; but the experience
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n'est pas. Or Ie non~~tre ne peut s'elever a l'etre. Rien ne
devient donc qui ne soit preexistant a son propre devenir. En
d'autres termes, Ie devenir ne fait que manifester l'~tre. Jais
1e devenir, Ie changement, aboutit aux termes les plus opposes,
et cela dans Ie m~me objet. Cet objet precontenait donc a la
rois ces elements opposes. Ne faut-il pas, m~me, etendre davantage Qs¥aBtage cette proposition et dire, avec 8naxagore, que
tout est dans tout? Et voila la coexistence des contradictoires
et des contraires qui se trouve imoosee logiquement a notre
'
,
assentiment. " J. Marechal,
LePoint~ de De£~rt de la Metaphysigue,
I. 18-19.
~ •
78. Fr. 21 a.
79. Fuller, Ope cit., pg. 224.
80. Adversus. Math. VII. xci. As sense-perception
obtains through the reciprocal action of opposites, "perceptual
knowledge acquired in this way is only rel~ive. In contrast
to it, the truth is found solely through the ),6yos ,through the
participation of the individual in the world reason. W.Windelband
Historv of Ancient Philosophy, pg. 86.
81. Fr. 7 secundum Schaaf, Ope cit., pg. 162. As
usual, Burnet renders it "word and deGd".
82. De Anima I. ii 405b.
83. While Erdm:?nn comments on the rather strange lack
of ethical data (op. cit., pg. 68.), Stoeckl declares that in the
view of Anaxagoras "the highest contentment is to be found in the
knowledge of the universe obtained by thought" (Handbook, pg.45),
and Burt (Brief History, pg. 29.) finds that "man's highest·
satisfaction l.ies in the pursuit of wisdom."
84. So Schaaf, Ope cit., 163.f. We could cite other
authorities who are likewise much taken by the Anaaxagorean Nous,
~ut it will suffice for our present purposes tO'note that, if
our interpretation and its foundations have ~o far been fairly
just, we cannot very well regard the Anaxagorean thinnest of all
luhings, etc., as a God in a proper sense, though it may be more
~early one than most previous efforts.
"Although this Nous
possesses many of the attributes and discharges many of the funci~ions which later philosophy assigned to the Deity,Anaxagoras
in his extant fragments nowhere called it God." Adam, op.cit.,
pg. 44. In sum, we may well find much to agree. with in the remarks of H. O. Taylor, when he says that "nous is thus a moving,
ordering and knowing substance. With but a mechanical mentality
1t is not yet sheer immaterial mind. Yet it is groping thither -Jreaming on things to come ••• And as far as the man's effect,
one perhaps may say that he started the mind on its career as ~
Demiurge and made way for the conception of the Divine Will as
Creator of the Universe. II Prophets, poets, and Philosophers of
~he ancient World, pg. 158.
85. HAll preceding thinkers had represented their supreme
being under material conditions, either as one element singly ·or
~s a sum total where elemental differences were merged. Anax~goras differed from them chiefly by the very sharp distinctions
~rawn between his informing principle and the rest of nature."
~enn, Greek Philosophers, I. 4O.As we have indicated in our own
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-140and reason of the soul of man is greater, because he is endowed
with hands." Erdmann, Ope c1 t., pg. 68. Cfr. Aristotle, de. Part.
Animal. IV. x 687a. (R. P. 160b.).
.'
64. de Anima. I.ii 404b.
; ' ,
65. Ko.'t SS4. 'It "'UX~" ot( 't(~\, ~iSw '<.o.~ tX~(1\ LU. Tia.llrc.o., VOtlS ~?~:rcL
Found in Simplicius (Physic., 156.13. R.P. 155.). "Intellectus
tribuit rebus motum non ope impulsus ab extra eis impressi sed
ope lmpulsus ab intra eis communicati, tI observes P. Si'iEek
(note 44 to de Anima Ij pg. 73.).
66. de Anima I.il 405 a.
~'57.
J. Beare, Greek Theories of Elementary Perception,
pg. 37.
68. Ope cit., pg. 208
69. Theophrastus de Sensu, 27 ff. FoUnd in Burnet,
Ope cit. ,273 f. "Ill enseignait que la senaation se fait par les
contrairesj c'est dans la pupille, parfaitement obscure que peut
appara1tre une image lumineus8; c'est q~l est plus chaud ou
plus ~rold qui nous rechauffe ou nous refroiditj et c'est pou~
quoi toute sensation implique peine, parce que la peine est Ie
contact du dissemblable." Brehier, Ope cit., I. 73.
70. Theophrastus, Ope cit. Cfr. Beare. op.cit.,pp.
38 ff.
71. Theophrastus, 2£. cit.
72. Theophrastus, Ope cit. Beare, Ope cit.,pp.l03 ~.
cites Theophrastus discussion of Anaxagoras's vagueness on the
relation of sensequality to the size of the anlmal.
73. Beare, Ope cit., pg. 209.
74. "And all sensation impltes pain, a view which
would seem to be a consequence of the first assumption, for all
unlike things produce paln by their contact. And this pain is
made perceptlble by the long continuance or by the excess of a
sensation." Theophrastus, op.cit.(Burnet,ps. 273-4.)
75. Fr. 21. "The sense-faculties of man are too weak
to attain to truth; they are unable -to distinguish between the
constituent elements of things. It is Mind that attains knowledge of things. " Stoeckl, Ope cit., pg. 45. "Taken by themselves
our sensations are' false,inasmuch as they give us only combined
impressions ,yet, ttMarshall opines (op. ci t., pg. 56.) ~ "they are
a necessary stage towards the truth,as providing the materials
which reason must separate into their real elements."
76. I. Schaaf, Institutiones Historlae Philosophiae
Jraecae, pg. 162. Ufr. Erdmann, Ope cit. , pg. 68.
77. Metaphysica IV. v l009b. As we have seen (cfr.
~ote 21.), his doctrlne as to the mixture of all things involved
serious consequences as to knowledge,inasmuch as it in effect
~id away with the principle of contradiction, whence naught but
sceptlcism could flow in the long run: "Pour un bon nombre des
speptiques, arnis, au fond, de la verite, la pierre d'achoppement
rut la notion du mouvement, du changement, ou si l'on veut du
'devenir'. Ce qui devient - ainsi raisonnent-ils avec Anaxagore,
Democrlte et d'autres, ~ ce dev.lent, en tant qu'il devient,
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. treatment of the mat~er, the distinctions could be drawn a little
~ore sharply still, if we are to have a satisfactory evaluation
of the several orders of reality.
86. This is a fragment quoted by Aristotle, or, ~t
least, an Aristotelian in the Eudemian Ethics 1216 a·

_,4':l_

Chapter VII: The Atomists.
Amid these many and often ingenious efforts to effect a
solution of those increasingly complex problems which the conflicting answers of succeeding thinkers had brought forward,
there came upon the scene, perhaps from the acros of the ancient
philosophy at Miletus, one Leucippus, who is said to have been
."
the pupil of Zeno the eleate. l
In later times, Epicurus was·rather coolly to dismtss
Leucippus from his considerations, and to do so in such a way
that he seems to deny the earlier man's existence; various commentators have taken his remarks in this way and taken them seriously. In the light of available evideqce, however, this view appears to be rather unlikely, for tfAris~otle and Theophrastus
certainly made him the originator of the atomic theory, and they
can hardly have been mistaken on such a point". 2
Whether Leucippus -- granting his existence -- was a
student under Zeno, or not, he evidently made some contacts with
the Eleatic teachings, and, in company with many of his contemporaries, must have been impressed, by the stimulant notion of the
One Being, by the excellence of monist dialectic, and by the
difficulty of bringing either the stimulus or the excellence into
harmony with common sense. It seemed on the one hand to be impossible to admit an absolute beCOming and destruction and absurd
on the other hand to rule out all coming and passing of beings.
Now if we assert that matter is uncreated
and indestructible, and yet that things arise
and pass away, there is only one way of explaining this. We must suppose that objects, as wholes,
begin and cease to be, but that the material particles of which they are composed are uncreated and
indestructible. This thought now forms the first
principle of Empedocles, and of his successors,
Anaxagora~ and the Atomists. 3

~

The world, in fine, is to be conceived as made up of what we
would probably call elements, which are the real and to which
the attributes of the as yet dialectically unimpeachable Being
are to be ascribed.
,
The theories which had been proposed up to this time
had their different merits and their serious defects. It may be,
however, that a study of these, in connection, very probably,
with the teachings of Zeno and Melissus induced Leucippus to
find his method of reconciliation in the positing of a primitive
reality made up of two elements, the Atoms and the Void. As he
came to see it, "the sum of all things is unlimited, and they
all change into one another. The All includes the empty as well
as the full. The worlds are formed when atoms fall into the void
and are entangled with one another. n4 This suggestion his discip-

pIes, among »hom Democritus of Abdera was especially prominent,
took upon themselves to develop into a complete weltanschauung,
wherein they faced the problem vexingly created by mental life
and gave a consistently materialist explanation of knowled~e.
Anaxagoras had done this much for philosophy, that he compelled
all succeeding thinkers to do something about Mind (or mind).
A history of which we expect a thoroughgoing and painstaking record of the precise opinions of each philosopher who
occurs within its range could quite possibly, and no doubt with
profit, distinguish between the teachings of Leucippus and Democritus. By and large, however, they hav~·.oespecially been men
whose inflUence was exercised jointly, and there is considerable
truth to Zeller~ s contention that "no differences can be established in the main doctrines or these two men, so that as early
as Aristotle they are quoted together. For the whole of later
times Democritus was the representative 01 atomistic doctrines. If
The younger man was, at any rate,possessed of considerable attainments in the field of the natural sciences, and has
been compared in this respect even to the universal genius precellent in Aristotle. He was widely travelled and his acquaintances included Anaxagoras, for whom he had no very high regard,
as well as the Pythagoreans, for whom he is said to have entertained a great esteem. In view of the later history of Atomism
and its connection with hedonistic teachings, it is not without
interest to remark that Dgmocritus was quite interested in problems of an ethical kind.
Theophrastus has written that Leucippus was for a time
associated with the venerable Parmenides, but that, instead of
accepting the pure Eleat\.C doctri;le, he chose to pursue a line
of thought which mjJIht seem (cbS' do't(et) to be .something very different.7 In spite of this superficial difference, there was, as
Theophrastus, in deed, appears to suggest, a close relationship
between the two theories. The observations of Aristotle on the
origin of the Atomic theory go to bear out this suggestion.
For, Aristotle points out, the Atomists took their start
from that which is conceived as coming first in the order of
nature. Now, earlier thinkers had maintained, forcibly and -- as
we have seen -- with considerable effect, that the real can be
only One and that immobile; such was the explicit teaching of
the master:
One path only is left for us to speak
of, namely, that It is. In this path there
are very many tokens that what iSl~ncreated
and indestructible; for it is complete, immovable and without end. Nor was it ever,
nor will it be; for now it is, all at once,
a continuous one.~

••

In such a scheme of things as Parmenides envisioned empty space
could not enjoy any reality, and motion, which would require an

~

empty space free from matter, would therefore be out of the question. Once empty space was thus excluded~l there was nothing left
to keep things separate and part; as a result, any plurallty of
being would likewise be impossible. Such phases of the the Eleatic doctrines were given a special emphasis in the work of Melissus of Samos:
Nor is anything empty. For what is empty
is nothing. What is nothing cannot be. Nor does
it move; for it has nOWhere to betake itself to,
but is full. For if there were 9 Aght empty, it
would beaake itself to the empty. But since
there is naught empty, it has nowhere to betake
itself to.9
If what is real is dividedt it moves; but
if it moves, it cannot be. lO
Without making any specific references, Aristotle notes
the arguments which Zeno, as we know, directed against such men
as the Pythagoreans, who upheld a pluralist system, but could
not discover any suitable reply to his ingenious objections,
founded on an infinite divisibility. Having alluded also to Parmenides, Aristotle remarks that one thinker, who was probably
Melissus, argued that the Eleatic Being (which is all} must be
infinite, else it would be bounded by that empty space which
cannot be in any way. The dialectical attainments of these men
naturally impressed him, and he could not but admit the consistency of their arguments. He realised full well, however, that
consistency is not by itself a necessary guarantee of the truth,
and he reminded his students that Itif we appeal to facts, to
hold such a view seems like madness. No one who is mad is so far~
out of his senses that fire and ice appear to him to be one."ll
Now, the later monists were engaged largely in the defence of the teachings of Parmenides and in polemic against
either the older pluralists or the newer schools of reconciliation. In the latter class, of course, there was Anaxagoras, who
taught a way of allowing for something of a many while preserving ~
the sacred cParacter of the Being; his views had their good pOints,
but they did not appeal to Melissus, who in retort declared that
Itlf there were a many, these would have to be of the same kind
as I say that' the one is".12
It was fine debating strategy, but Leucippus also ~~w
that trick of making your opponent's case your own and, with
an equal skill, answered -- in effect -- ttWhy not?". Having observed the line taken by the Eleatic apologists, he thought that
it was possible to hit upon a way of recon~iling the data of
common sense with the purity of the Being, provided that one
did not concede too much to the Monists.
As the Atomists saw the case, then, the Eleatics had been
at fault in denying the void. They were right in holding that
without a void there could not be ~ motion, but, in view of

the presence of some motion in the world, such a denial did not
appear to be well founded. In the light of these considerations,
"he inferred that it was wrong to identify the void wit'h. the
non-existent. What is not (T,o~~tv) in the Parmenidean aenae is
just as much as what is (TO ov) ••• The Pythagorean P61~ohad been
more or less identified
with 'air', but the void of LeUkippos
1t 3
was really a vacuum. 1 That which the early thinkers had insisted upon as not-being he takes to be as good as the being.
Heraclitus had said t¥'f, the "non-existent
is: all is and is not at once. Parmenides had
asserted the absolute fulness of one Being, which
is all in all. The Atomists declared reality to
consist of Being and not-Being in combination
of fulness and emptiness togetfer. This conception in a s14entific sense was the most fruitful of all.
Further, since Parmenides had regarded his Being as the
space-filling, or the full, and the not-being as the empty, the
Atomist made corresponding adjustments in his own account and
"accordingly declared(that)the full and the empty (are) the
basic constituents of all things. But in order to explain phenomena from these postulates, he thought of the full as divided
into innumerable particles, whic~ on account of their smallness
cannot.be perceived separately.ttJ.5 The empty will separate these
particles one from another and the fact that each fills his (for
the personal and impersonal are difficultly distinguishable here)
own space -- as the Being must do -plus the fact that they have
nothing of the empty in themsel~es, renders them indivisible.
In his own summary of the matter, Leucippus puts it this way:

...

For that which is, strictly speaking, real
is an absolute plenum; but the plenum is not one.
On the contrary, there are an infinite number of
them, and they are indivisible owing to the smallness of their bulk. They move in the void (for
there is a void); and by their coming together
they effect coming igto being; by their separation, passing away.
That the void, which was so necessary to their explanation, did in some way enjoy existence, the Atomists seem to have
argued on the basis of four reasons, drawn from experience:
Prima est necessitas admittendi pluralitatem et motum corporum; secunda est factum
compressibilitatis corporum; tertia est nutritio, qua nutrimenta intrant in interstitia
viventium; quarta demum est speciale factum,
nempe vasplenum cineribus recipere in se tan-

-146tum aquae, ut appareat, aquam debere 1ntrare
part1m ln poros vaCU08 olnerum. 11

.'

Thls spa.oe waS extremely helpful, for, by interven1ng between
the var10us reals, 1t allowed for thelr plura11ty and their
motlon as well, whlle they in t}1rtt, had none of th18 empty 1n
them and were aceordlng 1nd1v181~le, phrsioally speak1ng. B1
1ntroducing th1s element of p~s1oal indiv1s1bility, the Atomist
no doubt hoped that he would esoape the cr1t1c1sms of Zano, that
drew suoh inoonven1ent conolusions trom the supposition of an
infinitely divisible plurall'tty of being.. As for the reals of
the new system, tlthey are separated from one another by the
empty, and are themselves ind1vis1ble because they oom~letely
fll1 thelr own S~O. and have no empty in them. Hence, 88 Zelle
goes gn t o S8.Y, they are oalled atoms (~~O~L) or dense bodies
t

( VOI.nll). "1

a

The four elements ot Zap.doolea and the indef'ln1 te numbe
of elements ot .lnaxagoras were 1n some way d1fferent_ each element from the other, but this could no longer hOld. For, in the
Atom1st endeavor at reconcillat1on. the pr1m1tIve particles are
not only all extended (and hence. 1t one 111te., matb!la"lcallx
dlvlS1ble)19but they are all preoisely the same as re?;arda their
substance.
In suoh a soheme, evan the elements or Empedooles
will b~eomposlte8, "even these aro conglomeratIons Of given atoms" •
.~Unoe the atoms are thua socomplete1, allke J their
want or qualit1es wlll, as we shall see shortly, have serious 1'8
percuss10ns In the order ot knowledge.

Stl1l things do not appear the same, and the Atomiets
sought to explain d1fferenoes therein by referr.1ng to certain
variations in the element •• "These 41fferenees (we would prefer the term variatIOns), tMY say. are thztee -- shape and order
and positIon. For they say the real 1s differentiated only b,y
• rhythm' and 'inter-contaot' and tturn1ngt; and of theae rhythm
lsi.hape, 1nter-contact 1. order, and turnlntt, 18 pos1t1on, for
A dlfters freml.in shape, AN from NA 1n order, and
from H
1n poa1tlon."2
'the atoms, moreover, are represented as be1ng ever in
motlon, but Ar1stotle professed that he was d1ssatisfied w1th
the acoount whioh was gIven as to the origln and kind ot that
motion. Indeed, he deolared that the Ato:nlsta had fa.lled through
sloth to acoord any adequate treatment to the quest1on, in whioh
they were not very much difterent from the1r predecessors. "Allu
vero," et Thomas comments, "1n quo conven1ebant 1st1 ph11osop1!J4
cum ant1qu1s eat, quod s10ut antiqui neglexerunt panaro causam
ex qua motue Ineat rebus, ita et lstl, l1cet 11la 1nd1v1sIbIl1a
oorpora dloerent eaoe per se mobil1a. tt22
As 1t 1s well known, the Ep10ureans werti later on to
teaoh that the or1g1nal movement ot t~le atoms 1s a result ot
the1r weIght, wh1ch makes them \0 fall down, alwAYS down, throug
1nfinite spaoe. 23 This doe8 tlOt make 1t very easy to expla1n 1n
just what way the atoms would ever come to meet, qu1te apart fro

-the question as

·, n.7.

to what "down" could mean in such a scheme. On
the basis of the evidence, however, we need not ascribe these
views to the earlier Atomists, although our Diogenes La.rtius
appears to have done so.
In the first place they did not ••• regard
weight as a primary property of the atoms; and,
in the second place, we have evidence tnat Demokritos said there was neither up or down, middle
or end in the hnfinite void ••• We may therefore
regard the original motion of the atoms as taking place in all directions, and we shall see
that this alone will account for the formation
. of the worlds. 24

Aristotle, indeed, mentions that Demokritos likened the motions
of the soul-atoms to the movements of those specks of dust tha~
one may see in a sunbeam -- gOing in every sort of direction,
even when there is no win4.25 It is, in Burnet's opinion, a fair
interpretation of this teaching that the original movement of
all the atoms was so explained, for all atoms are alike, soulatoms move in this fashion, and all should mave so.26
Burnet would further take issue with certain interpreters
of Aristotle, for the latter remarked that motion was for the
Atomists "spontaneous",27 aM whis was taken to mean that it
was ascribed to mfre chance. While Aristotle was f,ar from being
enthusiastic where the Atomists were concerned, it does not seem
altogether likely that he intended to direct such a charge against
them in this precise connection, but, rather, that he took exception to their failure to seek, as he did seek, for natural
or imposed motion,Certainly, the passage from Leucippus which
Aetius cites would indicate that chance, on the contrary, was
denied: "Nothing happens f§r nothing, but everything from a
ground and of necessity". 2
Now, Empedocl~s had in some measure recognised the need
for a somehow higher and different force in order to explain
how things were started along, and Anaxagoras, for reasons much
the same, had introduced the all-moving Nous. The Atomists, however, did not see any occasion for looking tp such a force, to
Love (or Strife) or to Mind. This may be due to the fact that
the Atomists made a cleaner break with the Being conceived, Eleatically, as just One: the earlier reconciliators had supposed
some sort of a primary commingling of their elementary bodies,
which had to be dispersed by some more external agency, whereas
the Atomists began with an infinity of reals, to which the Eleatic properties were at onceppplied. Hence, the Atomists could
not see any reason for looking to an external agency that would
bring about the disgrwgation of atoms already ~eparated by empty
space. Rather, it was the problem of the Atomist that ffhe had
to account for their coming together, and there was nothing so
far to prevent his return to the old idea that motion does not
require any explanation at, all".29 If we see the matter in this

light, we can appreciate the reasons for which the Atomists
declined to search after a cause of motion, but any such appreciation leaves us nonetheless aware of the fact that they ,had
failed to recognise the true meaning of motion, a transit· from
potency to act which the moved body can never explain by itself,
and had, by leaving out the notion of efficient causality, destroyed any hopes for their system as a genuine science of cause •
Indeed, by failing to carry on the work initiated by
Anaxagoras, they marked a retrogression in philosophic development. The Nous had its shortcomings, but'~t was most significant,
all the same, and it did vontain the much-sought germ of truth.
Yet, "Democritus expressly opposes to this the doctrine of necessity. There is no reason or intelligence in the world. On
the contrary, all phenomena and all becoming are completely determined by blind mechanical causes."30 i,he early gains were in
this way lost and the incipient dualism, which we have remarked,
was in effect repudiated: "Sic dualismus inter corpus et spiritum, mundum et Deum ab Anaxagora feliciter hntroductus statim
impugnatur et3reiicitur et iterum materialismus et atheismus
propugnatur. "
The "weight" of the atoms has been the subject of not a
little discussion, in the course of which several commentators
have ascribed the motion of the atomic reals to their weight. If
we could more or less identify the Epicurean phySics with the
teaching of the earlier Atomists, then the hypowhesis of a motion
springing from weight would fit in very nicely with a movement
always downward. Such an identification does not, however, seem
to be justified. On the whole, it is probably best to say with
Burnet for the present "that it is only in the vortex that the
atoms acquire weight and lightness, which are, after a11 only
popular names for facts which can be further analysed. "3 2
That vortex presents many features of interest. Since
there is an infinity of atoms differing as to their shape, order
and position, and of necessity wandering every which way, there
is bound to be a meeting of some of them. The impact which they
produce upon such meetings will then set up the movement of the
vortex. All this is the fruit of no plan, yet, in view of the
Atomist's feelings on the subject, it cannot be said to be the
result of chance alone: "All things happen by virtue of necessity
the vortex be!ng the cause If the creation (Gk. genesis) of all
things, and this he (i.e., Democritus) calls necesslty".33 L~ull:- "
ippos is said to have given a full account of the procession of
things from these Atomic movements, and his opinions are sUbstantially those historically associated with the earlier Atomic
school:

i'

He declares the All to be unlimited ••• ;
but of the All part
full and part empty,
and these he calls elements. Out of them arlse

the worlds unlimited in number and into them
they are dissolved. This is how the worlds are
formed. In a given section many atoms of a l l . '
manner of shapes are carried from the unlimited into the vast empty space. These collect
together and form a single vortex, in which
they jostle against each dther and, circling
round in every possible way, separate off,
by like atoms joining like. And, the atoms
being so numerous that they can no longer revolve in equilibrium, the light ones pass off
into the empty s~ace outside, as if they were
being winnowed; 54 the remainder keep together
and, becoming entangled, go on their e~r8Uit
together, and form a primary spherical system. This parts off like a shell, enclosing
within it atoms of all kinds; and as these
are whirled around by virtue of the resistance of the center, the enclosing shell becomes thinner, the adjacent atoms continually
combining when they touch the vortex.35
In terms of this set-up, the Atomist endeavors to explain the
generation of "all composite things -- fire, water, air, earth;'
for even these are conglomerations of given atoms fl ,3b and the
formation of the various bodies that there are, The earth is
produced by the coming together of masses at the center; the
outer shell dries off, fires, and so goes to make up the stars.
On these details the masters of atomism are not in perfect
agreement, so far as the fragments go to show.37 By and large,
however, their systems are at one in holding that things have
come about from the vortex of atoms by a rigorous necessity.
"As the world is bOM:," Diogenes Laertius.points out, "so, too,

~~eg~~~~~ed~~a~~ic~~eP(r~:~:sLe~~i;~~)ed~;Ss~~~ ~;~~~~;:r.38

The Atomist thinkers, as we can now see, found in the
idea of multiplicity, joined with the idea of complete homogeneity, what seemed to be a firm basis on which to build their
accounts of things. As thinking men, they were interested in
discovering some unity behind the multiplicity of things; it
was their misfortune to confuse unity with homogeneity. In living
up to this mistake, they were obliged to reduce qualitative differences to mere local congregations of atoms, atoms that are
always the same in their substance; for them, change too became
only the displacements which these atoms might undergo.
Aa simplification ainsi introduite dans
les choses n'a dtunit~ que l'apparence: c'est
l'unit€ de la quantite et du mouvement passif,
aut.ement dit, la multiplicite pure, l'homo-
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geneit4 materielle, l'inertie. Et chez eux, la
quantite mat~rielle envahit ~ la fois les objets et la pens~e.39

.'

Their primary intentions may have been very commendable, they
may have tried their best to reconcile Being with experience.
In point of fact, they were at variance with the data of common
sense.
For, when it comes to the problem of knowledge, the
Atomist is as materialist and mechanical in his attitude as he
is elsewhere. ttThe sun and moon have been composed of such
smooth ana spherical masses (i. e., atoms), and so also the
soul, which is identical with reason. ft40 More especially, the
soul is constructed of those atoms which in their concourse during movements have come to make up fire. As Aristotle reminds
us, the soul must be characterised by th. fact that it imparts
motion and by its connection with knowledge; and both of these
appear to belong to fire.
Quidam enim dicunt animam esse maxime
et primario, quod movet; ratique non posse
quidquam movere aliud, nisi et ipsum sit in
motu, censuerunt esse aliquid de genere aliquid de genere eorum, quae moventur. Unde
Democritus affirmat eam esse aliquem ignem
atque calorem; figurae etenim et atomi -ita rem explicat -- sunt multitudine infinita; illae, quae formam habent sphaericam,
vocantur ab eo ignis atque anima; similes
sunt dictis ramentis, quae in aere inveniunt~ atque in radiis per fenestras immissis apparent, et quorum f~rraginem vocat
elementa totius naturae. 41
These slight, rounded atoms can move easily and, so, they get
around to impart their motion to other atoms: "Tales figurae
praecipue aptae sunt, quae omnes res penetrent atque -- cum
et ipsae moveantur -- reliqua moveant; censent enim animam esse
id, quod praeb~t animalibus, atque ideo etiam vitae finiri cum
respiratione. tl42 Not only does the surrounding air, in compressing the animal bodies, work off various atoms which, being mobile at all ~imes, confer movement on the animals, but the vital
atoms are helped by the fact that similarly disposed atoms will
enter through respiration. The atoms outside moreover push 6h
the bodies which compress and restrain the animal, and so impede
the sepa ation of the atoms inside, so long as there is life
present. 4:;
When it comes to the question of knowledge, the Atomist
would say that this, like any other action, consists in a movement of atoms, and that the especially mobile atoms of the fire
were accordingly best adapted for producing it. Democritus did
not actually speak of the soul as a Nous, but he identified the
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soul in effect with what we would regard as the faculty that
has to with truth.
Democritus etiam acutius de hac re locutus est exhibendo rationes utrius~s horum factorum; anima, ait, atque intellectus sunt una
eademque res, quae e corporibus primis et indivisilibus est formata atque capax exercendi
motum propter exiguitatem et tiguram atomorum
suarum; sed figura maxime omnium volubilis, ait,
est sphaerica; et ex tali bus ;~ecise atomis
intellectus atque ignis compositt. sunt. 44

.'

Such opinions would indicate a commendable regard for
the soul, but they do not serve really to set it apart from
material things. The manner in which fi~ is introduced and its
identification with the thinking or soul atoms effected is no
doubt somewhat s~btler than that of Heraclitus, but it is, in thE
final analysis, quite as materialistic, and more explicitly so
than with the Ephesian.
Like Empedocles and Anaxagoras, the Atomist is saying
that the fact of knowledge and of life is one that must be ac~
counted for by the highest, or the most ff efficient" form of
matter, but it remains matter all the same. If the soul corresponds to our description, then it is clear that intellectual
knowledge, as we understand it, will have no place in the system. There was a good deal of justification fn"l"Cicero~s disgUsted pronouncement: "Illam vero funditus eiiciamus individuorum corporum levium et rotundorum concursionem fortuitam, quam
tamen Democritus concalefactam et spirabilem, id est, animalem,
esse volt. "45
"
In the Atomic scheme, the relations between all things ~
were reduced to the mechanical level, and this had to mean the
corresponding reduction of sensation. The interaction which is
found in sense perception cannot here be any different, when
one gets down to it, from the interaction of any atomic group
on another, for the fire-atoms of the soul are not substantially different from other atoms. "All diilt.eraction whatever consists in or involves contact: and this is as true of the interaction between a percipient and a perceived object as of any
other. Sensation is due in the last resort to a contact between
the objects ~f sense, ora.lio~~o()..( from these, all of which are
atoms combined in various ways, and the spherical atoms of .'
which the soul is composed."2t6 If, with the soul composed -like everything else -- of homogeneous atoms, sensation must
consist in atomic interaction, then we shall find that the impact of atoms from the outside on those which make up the soul
will const1tute sensat1on, and that the sense-organs will be as
pores that give passage to the travelling atoms.
For every body was continually sending
forth emanations or images resembling itself
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sufficiently in form and structure. These images
travelled by a process of successive transmission,
similar to that by which wave-motions are propa~
ted in water. They were, in other words, not movements of the particles of the object, which latter
must otherwise in time grow less and fade away,
but a modification in the arrangement of the particles immediately reproduced itself in the next
following, and s~ on through the medium to the
perceptive body. 7
In this way, the several senses are become modes of that one
sense of touch, which is exercised thanks to the actual contact
of the object and the sense, in a physical manner. The particles
which are introduced through the senses must be dispersed through
the body, in order that they may establish their contacts with
the soul. In the case of sight, accordingly, the objects of vision are not exactly those things which we opine that we are seeing, but rather the deikela (or eidola), or images, that have
been sent off from the thing. The essential element in vision is,
therefore, the image in the pupil of the Atomist's eye.
He held that vision is the result of the
image of the object mirrored in the eye. But
when we ask -- what exactly is mirrored? the
answer for him is not easy; since between obJ ect and eye come what he called dELxekt ••• ,
things also referred to as 6mtiPPOC.a.L I~S ){~"'1S
These &.(\(t~ , not the object, are ther~~ore
the immediate and proper data of sense.
~nasmuch as the air which intervenes between the source
of such emanations and the eye itself may tend to disperse or to
distort the image-waves, our vision does not afford us a precise
likeness of the ob'Ject. This conclusion is borne out by the effect which distance, that is, the amount of intervening air,
will have on the visibility of objects. Differences as to color
may be teaced to the tangible qualities of the images; thus,
white is smooth, while black is rough. Aristotle, further, though
that Democritus had done well in associating vision with the
liquor (water) in the eye, but accounted it matter for regret
that he should have identified vision itself with the apparition
of the object seen in the pupil, thanks to the corporeal disposition of that smooth, polished eye.

Et ita patet quod ipsum videre non consistit in hoc, quod est apparere talem formam
in oculo, sed consistit in vidente, idest in
habente virtutem visivam: non enim oculus est
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videns propter hoc quod est laevis, sed propter
hoc quod est virtutis visivae: ilIa enim passio,
scilicet quod forma rei visae in oculo appareat, .'
est reverberatio, idest causatur ex refractio~e
sive reverberatione formae ad corpus politum. 49
So too, when we come to the sense of hearing, we find
that the sounding body gives off particles of sounds, that are
communicated to the auditor by means of the air. Sound, in other
words, is a stream of atoma that imparta movement to the atoma
of air, according as they are like to ~~ in shape and size, and
so at last by impact on the body it attains to the soul atoms. 50
As Theophrastus has brought out, the sound may enter principally
at the ear, but it is disseminated throughout the body; this
is not harmonised with his teaching on the other senses, for they
mig~r just as well be diffused in this?,w"y, if hearing is to be
so.
Taste is dependent upon the diversities in the shape of
the atoma: the sweet is round and large, the sour, large and
rough, the acid angular, curving and thin, the salty, angular
and large, and so on. "It makes much difference also what the
bodily state is with which the shapes come into relation; for
from this it happens sometimes that the same stimulus ••• produces
contrary subjective effects, and that contrary stimuli produce
the same subjective effect. "52 The Atomists, to their credit,
were aware of the r8le of the subjective in sensation, but the
fact impressed rather too strongly and, as we may see, came to
destroy the objective value of our sense-knowledge.
The explanation of the sense of smell is more or less
like that of his kindred sense of taste, though he does not discuss it as fully.
'
With the sense of touch thus playing so large a part in~
his system, the Atomist, like others that we have seen, failed
to investigate that sense itself with the care that his efforts
elsewhere would seem to demand in this case. For Aristotle:
Democritus and most of the1physiologi'
who treat of sense do a very extraordinary
thing: they represent. am objects of sense
as objects of touch. If, however, this is
true it p~ainly follows that each of the
othe~ senses is a kind of touch which is
manifestly impossible. 53
Democritus was at variance with Protagoras, who held that
sensations are all possessed of an equal truth for the subject
that senses. The Atomist held -- not much more constructively -that, in reality, the sensations of the several special senses
are false, for they have nothing that corresponds them in the
objective order. This viewpoint, indeed, was implicit in the
entire tradition of the ontolators from the time of Parmenides
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on. The master had very defiilitely declared that ttall these
things are but names which mortals have given, believing them to
be true -- coming into being and passing away, being and~ot
being, change of place and alteration of bright cOlor",5 and
the atomist Was at pains to attribute to the Being proper what
as Melissus ar,u~d -- was true of the One Being. The Being had
accordingly beencfragmented into the atoms and the void, which
could alone be real. tiThe qualities of things existmerely gy
convention (V0fl-lt»," the Atomist maintained~5ttin nature {1u~(. )
there is nothing but atoms and void space.",:} He is quite insistent on this point, and goes into some detail, saying:
By Use (v 0\l"t?) sweet is sweet, by convention bitter is bitter, b~ convention hot is hot,
by convention cold is co~d~ by con~ention color
is color. But in reality (£"tt~) 50 there are
atoms and the void. That is, the objects of
sense are supposed to be real and it is customary to regard them as such, but in truth they
are not. Only the atoms and the void are real. 57
Even though something may be going on outside, the senses
are unable to give us a true apprehension of any such fact. The
same sensations may, and in fact do, have different meanings for
the other living beings -- though how we would come to know of
this in the Atomic set-up is not made clear. The same person may .
be variously affected by the same object. There is true in this
observation, but too much is made of it and the conclusion too
early drawn: "that we do not really knQw of what sort each thing
is, or is not, has often been shown". 5t3 "In fact," we are further told, "we do not know anything infallibly, but only that
which changes according to the condition of oyr body and of the
(influences) that reach and lmplnge upon it.tt:>~ More, "this
argument shows that in truth we know nothing about anytg~ng,
but every man shares the generally prevailing opinlon."
The
senses do not glve us any valid knowledge of the real, which,
as we have seen, is too small for purpo§es of observation."Verlly
we know nothing. Truth ls burled deep. flbl It ls nlce in a way
to feel that there is truth somewhere, but hardly helpful to be
told that it ls beyond our reach.
Democrltus does seem to try to avold the full consequences of a rejection of sensory knowledge, as when he says that
there is another and a higher kind of knowledge. Where the bastard knowledge of the senses decelves and lets us down, the trueborn wll1 succor us and show how things stand:
There are two forms of knowledge: one genuine, one obscure. To the obscure belong all of
the following: sight, hearing, smell, taste, feeling. The other form is the genuine and is quite
~istinct from this. (And then, distinguishing the

r
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the minimum sensibile of hearing, smell, taate, .'
and touch, and when the investigation must be
carried farther into that which is still finer,
then arises the genuine way of knowing, which
has a finer organ of thought. 62

He makes a worthwhile effort to safeguard the possibility of our
achieving a scientific knowledge, but we cannot see that he has
really succeeded in doing so.
The explanation of the genuine knowledge is expressed
as much in terms of mechanics as was that which he gave of the
bastard. "Uti sensatio, sic etiam intellectio est actio mere
physica et materialis, et hoc sensu Aristoteles potest dicere,
ex mente Democriti nullum esse discrimen inter animam (sentientem) et intellectum."63 Inasmuch as the soul is made up of atoms, and as all atoms in the last resort agree in one material
substance, the soul is nothing but a body, and even its t1finest"
or fiery portion will be affected in a material way. The atomist
would maintain -- let us bear in mind -- that "the atoms outside
us could affect the atoms of our soul directly without the intervention of the organs of s~nse. The atoms of the soul are not
confined to any particular parts of the body, but permeated it
in every direction, and there was nothing to prevent them from
having ll1Eediate contact nth the etxternal atgm&i and so cOming
to know them as they really are."64 The material must always
enter in some way and by its impulse give rise not only to motio
and the like, but even to the highest form of knowledge itself.
Image waves, which distance deteriorated in the case of sensible
knowledge, now by their contact produce thought itself. Cicero
again was right when he said that these people could do anything
with a bunch of atoms; certainly they make of them to be "imagines, quas idola nominant, quarum incursione non solum videamus,
sed etiam cogitemus."o5
Theophrastus informs us that knowledge obtained when the
soul was conveniently disposed after that movement which unde~
standing produces. Accordingly, the knowledge will be true, if
the temperature of the body is even, but false, if it is too
warm or too cool. 6 6 Now, we can not suppose that the atom1cRonglomerations outside are shooting off both sensible images, that
are no help, and some other images that will better represent
the atoms ~nd the void -- they are always too subtle for our observation. ., Hence, with the same atomic streams hitting the
soul particles that must be at the right heat, it does not seem
that there is any absolute distinction between sensation and
thought. Democritus, in deed" depicts a scene in which the senses
address the higher faculty: 'Poor Mind: it is from us ~gou hast
got the proofs to throw us with. Thy throw is a fall. If
Even if
he also speaks of a difference between the truth values of sensation and of understanding, and regards the former as obscure
and the latter as genuine, he could neither justify his words

-156nor make his meaning clear•
...He drew no dividing line between o.."(~g)I1.<i'lS .'
and lo'f)\)S as psychical entities. For him all knowledge, sensory or other, is effected by mechanical interaction between the atoms of bodies and
those of the soul. 69
'
The Atomist suffers from much the same failing as beset
Empedocles. The earlier thinker had been unable to account for
knowledge, for the union which must take place between the knower
and the object known, without supposing that there obtained a
physical union of the two: the thing known had to get into the
one who knows according to its physical mode of existence. The
same is substantially the case when we come to the Atomist; his
materialism is more consistent, and his failing the easier to
see for that reason. "C'est pareille r~verie de l'imagination
mat~ialiste, tt Jacques Maritain has pointed out, "que de vouloir,
avec D'3mocrite, qu'elle (c'est-1t-dire la qualit~ sensible) y
passe entitativement, oUr parce qu'elle n'y est pas entitativement, de78ier, avec les scientistes' modernes, qu'elle y puisse
passer. If
So long as one demands that the object known, however
imperfectly it may be known at that, must get physically into
the subject, that one is enslaved to matter, and cannot construct
a system truly metaphysical. Democritus may deserve considerable
credit for having addressed himself explicitly to the problem of
knowledge and for having put his answer in such definite terms.
The issues between the materialism for which he stood and the
dualism, of which we have found recurrent signs in the earlier
thinkers, were now more clearly defined. It was up to those who
found the Atomist theory unacceptable to essay as cogent and coherent an account of their side.
In the field of knowledge, espeCially, he b»ought it out
that if a man is to avoid materialism he cannot accept the theory
that knowledge obtains through an ontological union, which in
the case of a rational animal here situate could only be on the
corporeal level. The insUfficiencies of materialism, even when
organised and elaborated as by Democritus, called to men's attention that, if they would preserve human knowledge as valuable,
they must interpret it in terms of a union effected on a noncorporeal level, on a plane superior to the material. In fine,
they must develop a theory of forms, which can exist intentionally in the knower.
Disons donc en general qu'a co~e de l'etre
de chose, par lequel une nature est posee hors
du neant pour son propre compte, co~~e substance
ou comme accident, il faut admettre un autre
etre, une autre existence, qui en tant m~me qu'existence est pure tendance, une existence tenue,
imponderable, decantee, spiritualisee, (non pas
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chose t~nue qui e~isterait
la maniere ordinaire, comme les !.l~cOA" de Democrite, mais un
exister lui-m~me et comme tel purement tendan- .'
clel), qui suffit pour que la chose qui existe
sous cet etat produise un certain effet, mais
non pas pour qu'elle soit plantae dans l'6tre
a son propre compte, et qui demande, a cause
de cela m~me, a s'accrocher a quelque ~utre
chose existant pour soi, dans laquelle passera
ou exist era ce qui a cet ~tre de tendance. 71
Democritus was also, as we have remarked, interested in
ethical problems, and he has said, interestingly, that "the end
of action is tranquillity, which is not identical with pleasure,
as some by a false interpretation have understood, but a state
in which the soul continues calm and strong, undisturbed by any
fear or superstition or anr, other emotion. This he calls wellbeing and many other names. I 72 He rejects any way of life, however well provided it may be, wherein wisdom does not serve as
the guide. For, if a man will apply himself to wisdom in the
practical order, he will be able "to deliberate well, to speak
to the pOint, to do what is right." 7 3 Such a man, being content
with his lot, and being free from anr, envy or any pining after
that which he does not have, is the 'right-minded man, ever inclined to righteous and lawful de7as, ••• joyoUs day and night,
and strong, and free from care."
The gods of mythology did not appeal very much to Democritus, but he is said to have looked upon the whole of nature,
atoms and void together, as divine, and to have spoken of the
soul atoms as of gods. His views in these ethical and theological
matters could hardly be fitted in with a genuinely humanist philosophy. To have such a one entails recognition of the true character of the intellectual life and the acknowled~ement that the
universe depends on the Divine as its Cause -- and this the
naturally moving atoms could never allow for. Without a proper
concept of the intellectual order, the tranquil life, which contemplation of the Truth could alone effect, would not be possible
for men; without a God, as we need hardly demonstrate at length,
nothing has its meaning.
It is not without interest, we may observe in closing,
to remark that atomism has been the system of most succeeding
materialists" who would explain things -- if, indeed, such a
thing as an explanation is here conceivable -- in terms of matter
and its I1blind" forces. This was true in the case of the antique
hedonists, like Epicurus or Lucretius, who might indulge in fine
sentiments but were all the same constructing philosophies which
belied their names as well as the humane principles of thought
and life. The same, with somewhat l1gs of the higher sentiments,
continues to hold into our own day.
.
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his theory of knowledge is purely physical. It J. Erdmann,JUstory
of Philoso~,I. 60.
---- 42. de Anima I. ii. 404a.
43. Aristotle reminds us that Heraclitus had also
thought of the fire as the soul: "qui bus<+am anima videbatur esse
~gnis, cum hie et subtillssimus sit et maxima incorp,oreus ex
elementis, atque tum se ipsum caetera primo moveat. t Ope ci t. ,
~05a.
The incorporeality is not immateriality or spirituality
~trictlu speaking, but rather a relative immateriality,proper
Ivo such subtler bodies (Siwek, note 42 to de Anima I.).
44. Aristotle, ~cit., 405a.
45. Cicero, Ope cit., I. xviii. 42.
46. J. Beare, Greek Theories~Elemen~ary__Cognition,
pg. 205.
47. J. Marshall, Short History of Greek Philosophy,
pg. 79. "The hypothesis by which he attempted to explain percep~ion was both ingenious and bold; and many centuries elapsed
Defore a better one (sic) was sug~ested. He supposed that all
~hings were constantlu throwing off i:;;ages of themselves ••• ,
~hich, assimilating to themselves the surroundin~ air, enter
flhe soul by the pores of the sensitive organ. The eye, for ex- ,.
~ple, is composed of aqueous humors; and water sees.
But how
~oes water see?
It is diaphanous, and receives the image of
whatever is presented to it." G. Lewis, History of Pp.ilosophy,
I. 100.
48. Beare, Ope cit., pg. 25.
49. St. Thomas, In de Sensu et Se1l8ato lect. iv, 48.
50. tlDemocritus and others regarded sound as affecting the auditory apparatus materially or mechanicallym in the
form of an inrush of air. Sound is a stream of atoms emamating
from the son~t body and causing motion in the air between
this and the ear. The sound atoms are not supposed to reac~"
the ear alone, but together wit"!': ai r fragments, whi chr'res emble
them. These fragments, following the law that like consorts
with like, come together according to their similarity of shapes
and Sizes." Beare, Ope cit., pp. 101-2.
51. Theophrastus, de Sensu, 57.
52. .QP~ ci t., 67. Apud Beare ,.Q.E.:.Qih, pg. 164.
53. de Sensu et Sensato iv 442a--b. St. Thomas eo~~ente
'Quod autem hoc sit falsum, facile est videre; quia alli sensus
~ensus sentiunt per medium extraneum, non autem tactus" (In de
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-161Sensu, etc. lect. xi, 154. Beare, from whom we draw the original
quotation, says: "This cri ti cism appears to exhi bi t Aristotle
as incapable of profoundly appre~ending the idea of bio~gical
developmemt. Yet, strangely, he himself most firmly held the
theory that Touch is the original sense from which all others
have been di fferenti ated" (op. cit., pg. 182.). Recurring to
S. Thomas, we are told: "Sicut Philos. videntur dicere in 2.
de Anima, sensus tactus est unus genere, sed dividitur in multos sensus secundum speciem (et propter hoc est divers arum
contrarietatum). Qui tamen nmn separantur ab invicem secundum
organum, sed per totum corpus se concomitantur: et ideo eorum
distinctio non apparet." (Summa Theologica I. lxxviil. 3 ad
3umj cfr. ad 4um.).
54. Parmenides, fr. 8. (Burnet, Early Greek Philosonh'lj ,
pg. 176.).
"Now that all things, "he goes on to say, "have
been named night and light, and the names which belong to the
power of each have been assigned to these, and to those,everything is full at once of light and dark night, both equal, since
neither has aught to do with the other." (fr. 9, Ope cit., pp.
176-7.).
55. Diogenes Laertius IX. 45. "La vraie realite appartient a l'atome et au vide; les autres proprietes que nous
don-nons aux choses, saveur, chaleur ou coleur, leur appartiennent simplement par conventionj elles sont de simples affections
de la sensation qui naissent dans l'alteration de l'organe par
l'objet ••• Ainsi, en m~me temps qu'une physique mecaniste,na1t
tout naturellement Ie scepticisme aI' egard des sens ••• "Brenier,
Histoire de la philosophie, I. 79.
~ I
56. Lewes prefers to take it as o.\"T\~ "In causal
reality", and notes that "modern edUtors read t\t~, 'in reality'
I am inclined, however, to preserve the old ,reading, as more
antithetical to v6)J.~." (op. cit., I. 98.).
57. From Se%tus Empiricus, Math. vii. 135.(Apud
Bakewell, Source Book in Ancient Philo~, pg.60.
58. fr. 10. l Bakewell, Ope cit., pg. 59.) •
59. fr. 9. (op. ci t. ) •
60. fr. 7. ( of. cit.) •
61. Fr. 117.op. cit.).
62. fr. 11. (op. cit., pp. 59-60.).
63. Schaaf, Ope cit., pg.208. The reference to
~ristotle de Anima I.ii.
b4. Burnet, Greek Philosophy, I. 198.
65. de Finibus I. vi.
66. de Sensu 58.
67. "Sed quod ipse putaveri t, a corpori bus praeter
~magines sensibles adhuc alias imagines provenire, atomos qua
Ivales et vacua repraesentantes, vix supponi poss e videntur. If
~chaaf, OPe cit. ,pg. 209.
"Thought itself, whi ch grasps the truth
pf things, is nothing else than a motion of atoms, and in so
~ar is like perception ••• If now Democritus regarded thought as
Ivhe finest motion of the first atoms, he must have looked upon

the finest €.t&to~ also as the stimuli of that motion, viz.
those e(&tA)\~ in which the true atomistic form of things i~ copied. If So finds W. Windelband, History of Ancient Philosop~y,pg.
158. Schaaf cites this and disagrees with it, noting: "ad rem
tamen iure Zeller notare videtur: 'Non intelligi tur, quomodo
VaCuum ullo modo agere possit et quomodo atomi alio modo agant,
quam unitae, in corporibus ex eis compositis et quomodo ista
corpora composita alio modo agant in animam, quam per sensus'
( i16) • If Ope ci t.
68. Fr. 125. (Burnet, Ope dit.).
69. Beare, Ope cit., pg. 254.
70. J.Maritain, Les degres du savoir, pg.223. We
cannot forget the close relationship which always obtains betwee
a metaphysic and an epistemolog;;: "In ogni sistema, il problema
della conoscenza a quello che a, perche tale e non diversa e
la metafisica del pensatore. La teoria della realta oggettiva
e della soggettivita in ~emocrito ('opinione il dolce,opinione
l'amaro, opinione il caldo.opinione il freddo,opinione il
£olore: verit~ solo gli atomi e il vuoto'r); la identita di
sensazione e di pensiero; la relativita del pensiero al temperamento corporea, e si vada dicendo, rono una conseguena della
sua metafisica materialistica." F.Ogl4.ati, "II Problema. della
Conoscenza nella Filosofia moderna ad il Realismo scolastico,"
pg. 53; Acta Secundi Congressus Thomistici Internationalis,pp.
~7-63.
,
71. Maritain, Reflexions sur l'intelligence, pp.60-l.
The "intentional beingtt is very important in philosophy, as our
author pOints out; "quoi qu'il en soit, ce qui nous importe iei,
c'est son rOle dans la connaissance et dans les operations
immaterielles de celle-ci, c'est la presence intentionelle de
l'objet dans l'Ame et la transformation d l'Ame en l'objet,
fonction l'une et l'autre d~l'immaterialite (imparfaite pour
Ie a ens, absolue pour l' intelligence) des facul t~s eogni ti ves. "
(Lea degres du savoir, pp. 223-4.).
72. Diogenes Laertius, IX. 45.
73. fr. Bakewell, QP. cit., pg.60.
74. fr. 174. (op. cit., pg. 63.).
75. Schaaf (OR. cit., pp. 213 et seq.) discusses
this point at SOille length.
76. The ancient cases are well known, but we find the
influence of atomism recurring also in the Tv:iddle Ages: "Guill~ume de Conches admet ouvertement l'atomisme de Democrite, une
joctrine p~y,'ohe*'l~y$llogtqJlet1e la connaissance d 'un:"P€aliame
~ssez naif et d'or~gine orientale, il enseigne enfin que Ie
3aint-Esprit est l'~me du monde en termes tela qu'on ne s'etonne
;:>as qu'il se soit attir~ des diffieultes'd'ordre theologique."
~.Gilson,PhilosoRhie au moyen age, pg. 63. As to the modern
~evelopment: fiStemus adhuc apud Dalton; ipse utique fundamentum
)rimum sumpait ex atomismo Democriti - theoria scholasticorum
~i penitus ignota erat - sed addidit ut hypothesim (praeter eam
luae agit de paucitate minimorum) propositionem de aequali tate
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mlnmorum unlus elementl. Sed haec proposltl0 non est tam speclflcatl0 theorlae generalls Democrltl, quam correctl0 errorls,
qul ln hoc systemate est essentlalls. Democrltus enlm c~sequen
ter ad sua prlnclpla statuerat omnes omnlno quantltates ln suls
atomls lnvenlrl (et non paucas 111as, quas exlglt parvus numerus
elementorum chlmlcorum) ld quod c~m hypothesl, quam Dalton feclt,
convenlre neqult ••• Cetera verae naturae speclflcae ln atomlsmo
Democrltt admlttl non possunt. Sed eadem proposltl0 aequalltatls
mlntmorum tam naturalls est ln systemate perlpatetlco, ut lam
apud Aristotelem lnvenlatur et a scholastlcis communlter admittatur. Nonne theorla atomlca saecull praecedentls, culus fundamenta Dalton lecerat, saltem ln lnltlls potlorl lure dlcenda
est speclflcatl0 theorlae Arlstotellcae, quam Democrltlcae?tI
P. Hoenen, "De Constltutlone Corporum", pg. 182; Acta Secundl
Congressus Thomlstlcl Internatlonalls, pp. 173- 90.
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CHapter VIII: The Sophists.
Up to the present point of our study, the philosophic
endeavors of the early Greeks had been concerned for the most
part with physical and cosmological problems. Men had sought to
discover the origin and make-up of the external universe, and
had made the grievous mistake of thinking -- whether explicitly
or otherwise -- that they were then studying the whole of reality. Their systems were as a result deficient and, in the long
run, discouraging to the student, as we may gather from the eloquent testimony of Socrates as to his sad experience with the
Nous of Anaxagoras.l
The number of conflicting systems and the difficulties
of reconciling many of them with common sense contributed to a
decline of the early zeal for the pursuit of this kind of philosophy. Since so many and such notable men had failed to attain
the full truth of these matters and since some of them had furth
er proposed theories that reflected upon human knowledge, men
evidenced at once a growing diffidence with regard to ~anls
powers of knowledge and a desire to enquire into them.
'
Certain thinkers had already made excursions into these
wider fields. Anaxagoras had definitely brought up the subject
of the Mind and by suggesting some notion of efficient causality
had introduced a partially theological subject; Democritus had
dealt with human knowledge and certain ethical questions; Xenophanes had brought ethics to bear on religion; Pythagoras had
made of philosophy a way of life.
Praeparata iam erat tractatio problema tis
anthropologici, et naturalis evolutio fuisset,
ut philosophi sese accingerent ad ista alia objecta philosophiae eadem alacritate investiganda, uti antecessores perscrutati erant mundum
externum. 3
The first men who worked especially along these newer 11~es were
the Sophists, influenced at once by the failures of the older
physics and by the current impulses to define the relations of
man to the universe and to his fellows.
The term fI sophistes If originally referred to men who were
noted for their wisdom, generally of a practical sort, and for
their devotion to some kind of study. It was in this sense that
a variety of early poets, musicians and "philosophers" came to
be known as sophists, or wise men. Thanks to the famed modesty
of Pythagoras, those who engaged themselves in the quest after
causes later preferred to style themselves 'philosophoi tl , or
lovers of wisdom, rather than simply wise men. The old name,
while occasionally used with its original force, came to acquire
a different significance. Thus, in the Fifth Century (B.U.~, it
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world, imparting some species of knowledge or other, usually
for a fee. The ordinary subjects in which they would instruct
their followers were in the practical realm -- ways of getting
ahead. Protagoras, who is said to have initiated this mode of
teaching is quoted to this effect. Refusing to conceal his art
by any dodges, he declares: Ifl ••• acknowledge myself to be a
sophist and instructor of mankind". Much envied by reason of
his success and influence, he describes his work as "a stranger
finding his way imto great cities, and persuading the flower of
the youth in them to leave the company of their kinsmen or any
other acquaintances, old or young, and live with him, under the
idea that they will be improved by his conversation".5 The sophist was likely to meet with popular disapproval, not only of
his power and his teachings, but also of his habit of charging
for the improving conversations.
The name of sophist has of course fallen into disrepute
forssome of these reasons, and because of the practice of many
later sophists whD perverted their sM1ll and learning for the
sake of gain, and by their sceptical tendencies as well as their
excessive use of "sophisms" brought the work into disfavor and
seriously affected the truly philosophic sciences. The criticism
which Socrates and Plato directed at such fellows is well known,
and Aristotle has well summarised the meaning which sophistry
assumed in its degradation:

Sophistic is nothing but apparent wisdom
in no wise real, and the Sophist is only eager
to get rich off his apparent wisdom, which is
not the true. Evidently, these fellows seek
rather to appear wise than to be wise without
so appearing.6
Although the name, with its early associations of a most noble
kind, has thus been altered in its meaning, until it now has
much the significance that it had for Aristotle, we can see that
not all the II sophists tl were of such an unpleasant character.
That the scepticism whereof we spoke now appeared on the
scene of Greek speculation, we may ascribe to a number of causes
operating in that intensely alive period of Athenian greatness.
Not the least consideration was the mess which preceding schools
had left behind. All those assorted thinkers had tried to tell
people about the first data of consciousness, the material world
around them, and had succeeded in devising ingenious accounts
which were usually self-contradivtory and at variance one with
the other on fundamental points. The followers of Heraclitus and
the Eleatics, while vigorously assailing each other, agreed in
the not very constructive opinion that the senses are fallacious.
Accepting the corrosive Eleatic dialectics, Empedocles and Anaxagoras strove to harmonise the Being with experience, and ended
up by compromising both. They might speak of the trust which
should be reposed in the reason, but their systems left no place

fob such a unique power, which they would as a rule make to depend on some physicalactioR.
Now that Athenian hegemo~ had brought the currents of
Hellenic civilisation closer together, men had the opportunity
of studying these various answers, and, accordingly, of being
confounded by them. It was not very long before they saw and bemoaned aloud the failure of the old, physical philosophy" As
they saw it, the traditional science was broken down: it had
essayed to make the world intelligible, but had instead come for1h
with a number of divergent views which contradicted the evidence
on hand. Science might be explaining some universe or other, but
not this present one. Naturally, men began to ask themselves why
they should regard these strange worlds of the philosophers as
being any truer than the one in which we live. It is the man
who has these reputedly false senses and it is the man who thinkf
out the sciences. Wherefore, then, are his senses such false
witnesses, while his reason alone passes as trustworthy? Where
is its special wa~rant?
Scie~ce proceeds on the assumption that
there is some fundamental reality (
) which
we can discover, but what guarantees have we for
that? It is very plain that men's views of'right
and wrong, fair and foul, vary from people to
people, and even from city to city, so there is
no fundamental reality in them at any rate. In
the same way the scientific schools only agree
in one thing -- namely, that all other schools
are wrong. It is surely just as unlikely that
any of these schools should possess the truth
as that any of the nations, Hellenic or barbaric, should have .established among themselves
the true law of nature. Such were the thoughts
that must have kept suggesting themselves to
cultivated men in the middle of the fifth century

B.e]

Small wonder, then, that the Sophists were able to draw
from the very positions -- the "ways of truth" and "stories of
the goddesses" -- of their predecessors the means for doubting
or. even for denying all certain knowledge. The perpetual flux
of Heravlitus and the Eleatic repudiation of the plurality and
change of experience would have fitted in beautifully.
In addition to the philosophic shortcomings, political
and social factobs influenced the development of a sceptical
attitude. The triumph over Xerxes had brought boundless glory
and wealth to the Hellenic victors, and particularly to the
Athenians, with their league. Under the leadership of Pericles,
the violet-crowned city flourished at the peak of a great civili
sation. The arts were cultivated to an unrivalled degree of perfection: the sculptures of Phidias and the dramas of Sophocles
represented the human genius at its heights. Just as at the
time of the so-called Italian Renaissance, men were inflamed
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fast-moving events· had opened their vision. Blessed with the
leisure to indulge their insatiable curiosity, the Athen1an
gentlemen looked for the answers to the great problems of life,
sought
in other words -- a philosophy, but there was none
yet to be found.
Non sufficiebat amplius invocare unice
trad1tionem et communem persuasionem ad veritates philosophicaa tanti momenti admittendas,
uti sunt exsistentia Dei et obligatio legis
moralis. Attamen ab ipsis philosophis solutiones sufficientes horum problematum non offerebantur, quippe quae scientifice nondum tractata essent. Quid mirum igitur'squod tendentia
critica et scept1ca irrueret?
The assoc1at10ns with so many peoples which colonial expansion, increased commerce, and their relations with Persia
had brought about emphas1sed more than ever the apparent d1vergencies between men on basic quest10ns. Yet 1t struck them that
people might express seem1ngly qu1te different views, and yet
all get along fairly well: that seemed to be the 1mportant thing
-- to cash in on the great movements, to rise to the top, to
enjoy wealth, to exercise power, to get the most out of life.
If there were no satisfactory answers to the fundamental problems, then those wh1ch worked for a fuller life in the present
could be taken. In this way, studies of a pract1cal value in
training men to take part -- and profitable part, at that -- in
public life were brought into vogue. 9
Nor should we forget that at this time, too, democracy
(as it is called) was especially in favor among many Hellenes,
and was, of course, the system established at Athens itself.
The influence of Pericles might mollify the people or mitigate
the effects of the system, but, in the long run, he was a demagogue rather than the ch1ef of a truly organic commonwealth.
Whatever advantages such democracy may have, a respect for
standards and a feeling for true order are rare among them. The
native Greek genius did much to overcome the'democratic'virus,
but it could not free itself from all the bad effects. W1th
every free man as good as the next, truth itself came to be a
matter of individual, or at most of major1ty opinion. What the
demos regarded as the true and the good were to be rece1ved
as such. If anyone disagreed, he was allowed to toast the state
in hemlockl
.
Now, the Sophists who came forward to cater to the current tastes never formed a school, and were certainly of the
most diverse qualit1es. What characterised them as a group was
a preoccupation with the practical, which some did not conceive
too badly, and a renunciation of str1ct philosophic enquiry into
the several poss1ble objects of knowledge.. in favor of a sub~'-'
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It is the function of the philosopher to
be able to investigate all things ••• Sophistic
and dialectic turn on the same class of things
as philosophy, but this differs from dialectic
in the nature of the faculty required and from
smphistic in respect of the purpose of the philosophic life. Dialectic is, merely, critical
where philosophy claims to know, and SOPhisti8
is what appears to be philosophy but is not.

~

Generally speaking, the earlier sophists were less reprehensible
in their teachings than those who came after them. Thus Protagoras, with his faults and bad influence, failed to a~tack the
principles of morality as such.
Certainly, the sophists are entitled to our praiKe for
their cultivation and enrichment of many arts and sciences, as
well as for their development of a new technique in teaching.
With all their shortcomings, they at least posed many vital
questions, and by bringing philosophic difficulties so much into
the open stimUlated greater men to effect~heir solution. At
their hands, moreover, the art of disputation was perfected and
men's minds accordingly sharpened for better uses.
They strove, in fact, to excel in all the current arts,
and Cicero, noting their contributions to language studies, puts
in the mouth of his Catulus a glowing tribute to their accomplishments: "Namque illos veteres doctores auvtoresque dicendi
nullum genus disputationis a se alienum putasse accepimus semperque esse in omni orationis genere versatos. flll And then, he
goes on to speak of the universality of interests displayed by
Hippias of Elis:
Cum Ol~piam venisset maxima ilIa quinquennali celebritate ludorum, gloriatus est
cuncta paehe audiente Graecta nihil esse ulla
in arte rerum omnium quod ipse nesciret; nee
solum has artis, quibus liberales doctrinae
atque ingenuae continerentur, geometriam, musicam, litterarum cognitionem et poetarum atque
ilIa, quae de naturis rerum, quae de rebus
publicis dicerentur, sed anulum, quem haberet,
palliu~quo amictus, soccos
quibus indutus
esset, su~ manu confecisse. i 2
Looked at from the more serious side, this may well indicate
a fine feeling, somewhat misguided, for the all-around development of man. It was conceived that he should seek to grow to
his full stature as a being and make use of all his powers in
the conduct of a compleat life. Unfortunately, of course, the
Sophists were uncertain as to what was the proper end of life,
and accordin 1 as to what recise means should be ado ted in
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powers whivh would make for material success, or at least for
success in anthropocentric terms. The Sophists did, at l~ast,
call to men's attention the possibilities of a rounded a~d human~
culture, and by their own deficiences showed that any such a
culture demands a proper order as its basis. As H. o. Taylor
has said, "one cannot read the reports concerning them, and the
fragments of their utterances, without realising the largeness
of their thinking; and if their ideas seem crude and curious,
we also know how they passed into the theories of Plato and
Aristotle, to be made over ~r furbished so as to be presentable
to the human mind forever." j
Thus being the heirs of a bankrupt materialism, the
sophists were afflicted with both theoretical and practical scep
ticism. We know a good deal concerning the latter from the dialogues of Plato, in which the Sophist characters often insist
on the utilitarian character of any moral code and the doubt
which they see enshrouding the fundamentals of ethical life. It
is thus that Hip~ias is cited as of the ooinion that law is a
tyrant for men, J. and that Thrasymachus declares "the just is
nothing else than the advantage of the stronger ff ,15 while Callicles, who is to Adamson's way of thinking the representative of
a newer trend, away from the sophistic, asserts that "he who
would truly live ought to allow his desires to wax to the uttermost, and not to chastise them; but when they have grown to thei~
greatest he should have courage and and intelligence to minister
to them and to satisfy all his longin~i~ And this I affirm to be
natural justice justice and nobility.
However eloquently he
or his kind might expound this view and whatever the arguments
advanced, the fact remains that it amounts in reality to a refusal to seek after standards, to following the line of least
resistance.
Two of the sophists are especially remembered in the
history of philosophy, and with them our survey might well be
concluded. The first is Frotagoras of Abdera, who was in some
respects the father of the movement. In early life, he worked as
a porter, and -- incidentally -- invented a shoulder pad to be
used in his profession. His efficiency in this line caught the
notice of his distinguished fellow-townsmen, Democritus, under
whom he is said to have studied after that. Having acquired a
considerable proficiency in philosophy and rhetoric, he entered
too upon the work of teaching and in the long course of a long
career visited the greater part of the Greek world. He was the
first recorded to have been paid for his instructions, thus
starting tla practice not to be despised, since the pursuits on
which we spe~~ money we prize more than those for which no money
is charged".
His opinions on various points of language, the
art of rhetoric and methods of argumentation are by no means
without interest, but what has made him famous was his opinion which he was the first to hold -- that there are two sides to
every question, and that knowledge is relative.
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For his acquaintance with the conflicting systems of philosophy had persuaded him that, as Heraclitus had maintained, all
things are involved in ceaseless becoming, that the universe iS 18
just movement, and that apart from this movement there is nothin
This view he carried over from the universe at large to the think
ing subject, and enunciated the principle that "man is the measur
of all things, of things that are that they are, and of things
that are not that they are not tl • 19 In this formula, "he merely
stated that for each individual things are as they appear to be.
In other words, truth is for each individual that which he holds
to be true. Subjective truth is the only truth."20
It seems to be fairly clear that timan" refers to the individual by himself and that knowledge is taken as the knowledge
of subjective appearances, simply. Thus, the way is opened to
subjectivism, relativism, and, almost inevitablj to a sensualism
of the worst sort. Indeed, if the dictum were applied in all its
strictness, "it would signify not only that no two persons think
or perceive the same thing, but that no person feels or thinks
twice alike; it would mean a~io that there is and can be no real
fixed object of knowledge."
Contradictory opinions would be
equally true under such a system, although there is evidence that
Protagoras thought there could be better and worse among them,
usually according to the prevalent opinion of men. Even so, right
and wrong are left thoroughly subjective. "He used to say that
the soul was nothing apart from the senses, as we learn from
Plato in the Theaetetus, and that everything is true. '~he older
traditions have definitely broken down: there is in this surrender to error and doubt the evident need for a reform which, as
Plato has so well brought out, Socrates was to appreciate and tp
act upon.
It was bad enough to have mathematical certainties being
dragged into dispute, but the situation became impossible and in
human When the sophists declared that things divine were utterly
beyond the reach of reason:
j

As to the gods, I have no means of knowing
either that they exist or that they do not exist.
For many are the obstacles that impede knowledge,
both the obscurity of the question and the shortness of human life. 23
No one who has read the opening portions of either of St Thomas'
great Summae can question those difficulties or the moral need
which they create for a revelation, touching even on those matter
of which the human reason is capable. But it is plain that a truly humanist philosophy is rendered impossible by this exclusion
ot the divine as an object of our knowledge by the light of the
reason. After all, the capstone of the whole scientific structure
is to be found in a natural theology, and without this science
man's reason is frustrated in its search after the causes of the
things about and even deprived of means of knowing to judge con-
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cerning a professed re~elation. For one time at least, the Athenians were right in their prejudices when they attacked Prot agoras for such teachings.
• .
The other more famous Sophist hailed from Sicily -- Gorgias of Leontini, whose forceful character, mastery of language
and skilful approach to men and issues made him a very father of
the Sophists. His views, considered in one way, were opposite to
those of Protagoras. For the latter, like many a modern liberal,
might admit that everything is true, but the Westerner held that
nothing is true. Following the fashion, he wrote a book Concerning Nature, or the Non-Existent: it was an interesting qualification and testdlmony to his thoroughgoingness. In this work· he
has taken the trouble to set forth his views, under three rather
disconcerting heads:
First, nothing exists; second, if anything
did exist we could never know it; third, if perchance a man should come to know it, he wovld be
unable to describe it to his fellow men. 24
At any rate, we may reflect that this can't be truer than anything else.
Where Protagoras had begun with something like the Heraclitean flux, Gorgias seems to have upheld the western Eleaticism, the dialectic of which he follows in many places. That there
is no being is plain to him from the fact that anything which did
exist would be either derived or eternal. It could not -- as Parmenides and others had shown -- be derived either from that which
exists or that which does not exist; it could not be eternal, for
the eternal is infinite, whereas the infinite can neither be in
itself nor in anything else, and that which is nowhere does not
exist.
Even granting that it existed, we would still be unable
to know of it, for, if knowledge is to be possible, the thought
should be like the thing, or, rather, the very thing itself, else
that which exists could not be known: this would mean that the
non-existent is unknowable. But, if the knowable is the real,
there could be no error in stating that chariots raced upon the
ocean. And so on. The Sophist has done a good job of reducing
to their logical and absurd conclusions the old errors of the
~aterialists. His arguments seem the nightmare one might have
after studying those people. After his work it would be pretty
hard to maintain that being is univocal and univocally identified
with that which can be thought of it -- in the materialistic senSE
of the monists, or that knowledge obtains through the thought's
roeing that very physical thing which is known.
In his own scheme, he felt that knowledge, even if gained
could never be communicated. For communication would make use of
symbols, and symbols are different from the things symbolised.
"How can anyone by a word communicate the mental image of a
color -- the ear does not hear color, but sounds? And how can
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the mental image be in two persons who are different from one
another? fl 25 The questions could never be answered if knowledge
is thought to consist in ontological union. Intentional existence of the universalised form is the only avenue of escape from
the maze. Interestingly, Gorgias made his living by communicating
all this to those non-beings who would listen and pay. He was not
as logical as Cratylus, whose views along the same lines led him
to disdain speech. As for the teaching itself, there is scarcely
need for comment~6Apart from its value as a stimul~s, the theory
of Gorgias is anarchis~ simple and unshamed.
Quodsi, priusquam valedicamus sophistis, in
.ipsorum doctrinam respicimus eamque philosophia
praecedente comparamus, statim videmus, aspectum
philosophiae alium factum esse: antea praeprimis
problema cosmologicum tractabatur; nunc quaestio
cognitionis ad problema anthropologicum pertinens
est centrum inquisitionis et disputationis. Tempora sunt mutata, philosophiae nova periodus praeparatur. Theoria vero cognitionis proposita a sophistic magnopere differt a solutionibus, quas
philosophi praecedentes occasione data eidem problemati dederunt. Anaxagoras quoad rem spiritualitatem intellectus defendit, ipsi intellectui
assignavit objectum essentialiter diversum ab objectis sensuum, et sic intellectualismum praeparavit; Democritus vero omnem cognitionem fecit
actum mere materialem et sic est pater materialismi, etsi sibi non cohaerens facultatem appellatam intellectivam ulterius se extendere docuit,
quam sensus. Protagoras cognitionem intellectualem subjective spectatam a cognitione sensitiva
non distinguit eamque etiam coarctat ad objecta
sensitiva, et sic iure censetur esse primus repraesentans sensualismi.
Ipse et Gorgias et alii sophistae insuper
extenso indulserunt scepticismo. Sensualismus
proinde et scepticismus sunt proprii partus sophistarum, ~7philosoPhia sequenti ante omnia
superandi.
Notes to the Eighth Chapter:
1. Cfr. Phaedo, 97 et seq.
2. "Hitherto the attention of the Greek philosophers had
been concentrated on man's natural environment, the universe
within which man came into consideration only as a part of the
great whole, as an animal creature. The most varied attempts had
been made to explain world-origin and world-events. All laid
claim to correctness, without however a reconciliation of their
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opposing doctrines being possible. It is no wonder that the bold
enthusiasm of the earlier philosophers was replaced by a distrust of human powers of attaining knowledge of the ultimate
basis of natural phenomena, and that a certain fatigue and.'reservation in speculation made itself felt; that the growing realisation of the uncertainty of sense-perception prepared the
way for a fundamental scepticism. On the other hand man as an
intellectual being and his own peculiar creation, civilisation,
had hitherto attracted only an occasional fleeting glance from
the philosophers ••• Meanwhile in Ionia, side by si~e with Philosophy, a new kind of investigation had sprung up (l~TDp{~) .••
The comparison of different customs and forms of life with those
of their own people challenged reflection and criticism. It
raised the 1uestion how all that had come about and the doubt
whether one s own institutions were alone authoritative and valid
for all time, and whether civilisation was the creation of benevolent gods or the work of man himself ••• Sophism is then in the
first place a philosophy of civilisation and is distinguished in
its subject matter from the previous philosophy of nature. Its
object 1s man as an individual and as a social being together
with the culture created by him in language, religion, art, poetry, ethics, and politics." E. Zeller, Outlines of the History of
Greek Philosophy, pp. 75-6. Cfr. the observations made in the
ear11er portions of his Socrates and the Socrat1c Schools.
3. I Schaaf, Institutiones H1storiae Philosophiae Graecae
pg. 257.
4. Protagoras, 317.
5. op.cit., 316.
6. de Sophisticis Elenchis I.l 165. To be found in Bakewell, Source Book in Ancient Philosophy, pg. 69. "What 1s sophistry?tI asks W. Butler. "It is the mimicry of wisdom -- the form
and the att1re, without the substance and body, of well-ordered
reason." Lectures on the History of Ancient Philosophy, I. 357.
Jacques Maritain is very strong in h1s disapproval: "Sophistry
is not a system of ideas, but a vicious attitude of mind. Superficially the sophists were the successors and disc1ples of the
th1nkers of an earlier generation -- even the word sophist originally bore no derpgatory signif1cance -- in reality they differed from them completely. For the aim and rule of their knowledge
was no longer that which is, that is to say, the object of knowledge, but the interest of the knowing subjec~ An Introduction
~?h1losophy, pg. 65.
7. Burnet, Greek Philosophy: Part I, pg. 105.
8. Schaaf, op.cit., pg. 259.
9. "Prosperitas materialis qua Graecia victis Persis
gavisa est, gloria acqu1sita, qu1es et otium augent quidem amorem
scientiae; progressus democratiae impellit iuvenes ad artem d~
cendi acquirendam; at simul 1stae causae enervent mentes, mores
tum pr1vatos, tum publicos corrumpunt; quaeritur successus facilis atque rapidus, nulla habetur ratio de nobi1itate vel liceitate med&c:nram: inde scepticismus practicus." P. Geny, Brevis
Conspectus Historiae Philosophiae, pg. 56.
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10. Jletaphysica IV.ii 1004b. "We must regard the ahcient
sophistic art as philosophic rhetoric. For it discusses the themes that philosophers treat of, but whereas they, by the~ method
of questioning, set snares for knowledge, and advance step by
step as they confirm the minor points of their investigations,
but assert that they still have ho sure knowledge ( an interesting statement, this ), the sophist of the old school assumes a
knowledge of that whereof he speaks. At any rate, he introduces
his speeches with such phrases as 'I know', or 'I am aware', or
'Ihave long observed', or 'For mankind there is nothing fixed or
sure' (!). This kind of introduction gives a tone of nobility and
self-confidence to the speech and implies a clear grasp of the
truth. The method of the philosophers rese~bles the prophetic
art which is controlled by man and was organised by the Egyptians and Chaldaeans, and, before them, by the Indians, who used
to conjecture the truth by the aid of countless stars; the sophistic method resembles the prophetic art of soothsayers and
oracles. II Such was the appearance of the case in later topics to
Philostratus; Lives of the Sophists, I. 480.
11. de Oratore III. xxxii 16-9. There is also some truth
to the comment that "so far as philosophy is concerned (for the
sophist~ it is far more important for him to learn how to express eloquently an idea than it is to spend time discussing the
ultimate validity of the idea. II M. McDonald, Progress of Philosoph.y, pg. 25.
12. Cicero, op.cit., 19-29. Of Sophist Hippias it has
been said that "he was the enemy of all specialism ••• , prepared
to lecture on anything, from astronomy to ancient history. Such
a man had need of a good memory. And we know that he invented a
system o~mmemonics ••• This was the age when men were still sanguine of squaring the circle by a geometrical construction ••• He
invented the curve still known as the quadratrix ••• , which would
solve the problem if it could be mechanicallt. described. ff Burnet,
Ope cit., pg. 118. "Hippias," we also learn, 'set a high value
on truth as a virtue, preferring Achilles to Ulysses on account
of his superior veracity. Perhaps it was as an exercise in pure
truth that he inculcated the study of mathematics." A. Benn,
Early Greek Philosophy, pg. 94.
13. H. O. Taylor, frophets, Poets and Philosophers of
the Ancient World, pg. 153. Rejecting the supposition of a body
of "sophistic doctrine", Lewes speaks of an art whereby people
were taught to be their own advocates and says: "This was by no
means an immoral act. If it might or did lead to. immorality, few
Greeks would have quarreled with an art so necessary." He proceeds to say that none blames a barrister for using all his skill
in a case>;: even though the cause is a bad one: "On the contrary,
the badness of the cause makes the greatness of the triumph. fI
History of Philosophy, I. 114-5. Sophist morality continued, it
would seem.
14. Protagoras 337. "Running all through these problems
of civilisation, becoming of pressing moment so soon as they are
considered, is the distinction between nature and convention,

-175the natural and the artificial -- a distinction already emphasised in the theory of knowledge and existence by the Atomists.
We have evidence to show that the application of this di~tinc
tion -- even to such a problem as that of the signific~ce and
origin of words -- fell within the scope of the speculative work
of this time. It is not impossible that on this topic the counter-views of the Heraclitean school and of the Atomists were
brought with Protagoras to a sharp issue." R. Adamson, Devel.QJ2ment of Greek Philosophy, pg. 70. In the case of the present
sophist, flwe know on good authority that Hippias habitually distinguished between natural and customary law, the former being,
according to him, everywhere the same, while the latter varied
from state to state, and in the same state at different times."
A. Benn, The Greek Philosophers, I. 78.
15. Republic I.xii 338.
16. Gorgias 491. efr. Adamson, op.cit., pg. 69.
17. Phi10stratus, op.cit. I. 494. Aristotle observes
that men who are paid in adVance and then fail to convey are
justly held in blame. "The Sophists, however, are perhaps obliged
to take this course, because no one would give a sixpenae for
their knowledge". He does not condemn the payment of teachers,
but suggests that the rules of friendship should obtain as between master and disciple in philosophy: "for here the value of
the commodity cannot be measured by money, and, in fact, an exactly equivalent price cannot be set upon it, but perhaps it is
sufficient to do what one can, as in the case of the gods or
one's parents". Ethica Nicomachea IX.i 1164a-b.
18. Theaetetus 156.
19. Diogenes Laertius IX. 51.
20. Stoeckl, Handbook of the History of Philosophy, pg.
59. "Plato interprets this text in several different passages,
and he invariably understands it to mean that the present sense
perception of the individual is the norm of truth for that individual. What my senses report to me here and now is true for me
here and now, and what your senses represent to you is true •••
This obviously excluaes the possibility of error, since there
is no knowledge distinct from the present sensation, which is always just what it is, and represents an object just as it affects
me at a given instant. The philosopher's task, therefore, is not
to discover the true, since all knowledge is equally true, but
to find out which sensations it is best to have, in order that
he may put himself and other men in the way of experiencing only
them. Protagoras was no trifler. He belonged to the older school
of Sophists, who believed that salvation lay in turning from
science to problens of education and social life." L. Keeler,
The Problem of Error, pp. 1-2.
21. Burt, Brief History of Greek Philosophy, pg. 36.
22. Diognes Laertius IX. 51. "He said that man is the
measure of all things, meaning simply that that which seems to
each man also assuredly is. If this is so, it follows that the
same thing is and is not, and is bad and good, and that the
contents of all other opposite statements are true, because often

a particular thing appears beautiful to some and the contrary of
beautiful to others, and that which appears to each man is the
measure." Metaphysica XI. vi 1062b.
23. Diogenes Laertius, loc.cit.
24. To be found in Sextus Empiricus, Adv. Math. VII 67.
Bakewell, ~cit., pg. 67.
25. Stoeckl, op.cit., pg. 60.
26. As to the teaching of Gorgias, "its main result is
to isolate. It isolates each man from his fellows; he cannot
tell what they know or think, they cannot reach any co~mon groun
with him. It isolates him from nature; he cannot tell what nature is, he cannot tell whether he knows anything of nature or
reality at all. It isolates him from himself; he cannot tell for
certain what relation exists (if any) between what he imagines
he perceives at any moment and any remembered or imagined previous experiences; he cannot be sure that there ever were any
such experiences, or what that self was (if anything) which had
them, or whether there was or is any self perceiving anything."
J. Marshall, Short History of Greek Philosophy, pp. 94-5.
27. Schaaf, op.cit., pp. 295-6.
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Chapter IX: Some Reflections:
As we have had the opportunity of seeing, the philosophe
who came before Socrates -- the PhySicists as they have been
justly called, were concerned chiefly with the external universe
and bent their efforts to the discovery of the material principle of that reality which their senses knew and which seemed at
first to be the very sum of being. There were gropings beyond
that, the raising of problems which called for metaphysical solutions, talk of Minds and what resembled efficient causality, but
they were undisciplined and unaware of the full import either
of what they studied or sometimes said.
These thinkers are, after all, at home
only in arguments about generation and destruction and movement; for it is practically only
of this sort of SUbstance that they seek the
principles and causes. But those who extend
their vision to all things that exist, and of
existing things suppose some to be perceptible, and others not perceptible, evidently
study both classes, which is all the more
reason why one should devote some time to
seeing what is good in their views and what
bad from the standpoint of the inquiry we
have now before us.~
Thus, the early Ionians and the so-called younger physicists alike investigated the material cause of things and arrived
at various answers_ Some looked upon it as some one element:
Thales had his Water, Anaximenes his air, Heraclitus his Fire.
Others regarded it as some more or less indeterminate matter:
Anaximander spoke of his Boundless, Empedocles found four elemen
and two forces, Anaxagoras found an infinity of specifically
diverse elements, and the Atomists an infinity of homogeneous
ones. The Pythagoreans and the Eleatics, and especiall~ the
latter,/looked rather to that which things are, And so came to
formulate some notion of being itself. The Pythagoreans, moreover, with their philosophy of numbers, laid stress on the order
found in thing~and showed that ordered things can be explained
only in terms of w~t the intellect can apprehend -- even if
they did not rightly show what this is. The Eleatics, with their
talk of what is (or being), confounded logical unity with the
real while remaining on the physical level and pointed the way
to'a metaphysical science, one that could solve their difficulties.
These several views of the cause of things were not alays easy to reconcile with the presentations of the senses or
he testimony of common sense. The Milesians were perhaps not so
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impressed by the change in the universe, made of the ever-living
-- i.e., ever-changing -- fire the source of all that is ~eal
and in its name denied the implicit data of the senses as• to
the abiding of something throughout all the changes of things.
The Eleatics, intoxicated with that powerful idea upon which
they had come, ventured to place so high a value on their interpretation of it as to deny the undoubted experience of a changing
many; then, by their brilliant dialectic -- a dialectic possible
while men were still phYSicists though bootlegging some metaphysics, discomfited everybody else without vindicating their own
t~ory.
.
Both Heracliteans and Eleatics insisted that men ought
to follow after reason rather than the illusions of sense, and
both failed, of course, to see reason for what it is in ~eed,
and they accordingly through the necessary data of the senses
overboard. The efforts of men like Empedocles and Anaxagoras
to save both the Being and the sense experience were, as we have
seen, unsucceSSful, with a really significant contribution, however, in the Nous suggested by the latter. The underlying materialism of these various systems was at length organised into the
extremely ingenious systems of Leucippus and Democritus.~At the
same time, the confusing struggles of the schools drove others
to study man from a subjective viewpoint, which issued at last
in sceptical anarchy.
All these people were bringing up questions of a higher
order and proposing answers of the most unsatisfactory character.
Such discussions, as we have several times suggested, drove constructive thinkers to attain the metaphysical level and to essay
a solution of the vital problem of knowledge.
.
Indeed, it was not ~ntil rather late that men addressed
themselves explicitly to the matter of human knowledge, but all
along the way which we have followed their explanations of reali~y in general entailed of necessity that they should have some
attitude on the subject; often as not, the attitude deducible
from their systems was not altogether fortunate.
There is in that real order which is open to the investi~atlons of men a diversity and at the same time the evidences of
~ unity, which they feel impelled to bring out and to clarify.
~t is the concern of those thinkers who would retain their balanpe to recognise both these facts and to take them both into acpount when they undertake to devise a philosophy. As the experience of the Pre-Socratlcs abundantly shows, it is a~ifficult
vhing to preserve that balance. It is a far easier thing to reduce that which is not yet known, but should be the object of a
careful search, to that which is already known in some degree;
easier to establish an obvious and specious unity, that may exblude the plurality with which a start was made; easier to force
reality to conform itself to an explanation once devised, rather
than constantly to endeavor to fit one's explanations to the
~eal.

Hence, as the being is the proper object of the human
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being, it is inevitable that men will take the conditions of
our knowledge in terms of being; one's epistemology is, ~ere
fore, bound to be conceived after the same mode as one's metaphysics, so far as it is a consistent science of knowledge.
Ainsi, tous ceux qui ont neglig~ la dlversite du connattre, et qui, a la suite des Eleates,
ont considere la pensee comme une chese absolument une et unificatrice, ont toujours tendu a
cette doctrine moniste et mecan~~ttque selon laque]e l'etre est une unite une, €V ~v , qui n'admet point de coupure ni d'initiative ••• La connaissance, pour l'homme, est Ie vestibule du
reel: il en faut jalousement surveiller l'entree. 3
Even if the philosophy in question is a philosophy of the Flux,
the fact remains that the Flux is conceived as the one explanation, as the pseudo-unity, in the name of which metaphysics and
epistemology are perverted.
When Thales said ••• that everything is
water, though he certainly did not prove his
thesis, he at least made it clear that reason
is naturally able to conceive all that is as
being basically one and the same thing, and
that such a unification of reality cannot be
achieved by reducing the whole to one of its
parts. Instead of drawing that conclusion,
the successors of Thales inferred from his
failure that he had singled out the wrong
part. Thus Anaximenes said that it was not
water but air. It still did not work. Then
Heraclitus said it was fire, and as there
were always objections, the Hegel of the
time appeared, who said that the co~~on substance of all things was the indeterminate,
that is, the initial fusion of all the contraries from which the rest has been evolved.
Anaximander thus completed the first philosophical cycle recorded by the history of
Western culture. The description of the later cycles could not take us further, for it
is already clear, from a mere inspection of
the first, that the human mind must be possessed of a natural appetite to conceive all
things as the same, but always fails in its
endeavor to conceive all things as being the
same as one of them. In short, the failures
of the metaphysicians flow from their unguarded use of a P4inciple of unity present
in the human mind.
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It might be objected that by our own testimony true meta
physics was not to be found in the ancient philosophers. In that
those thinkers did not properly conceive either such a sQtence
or its object, the point is well made. Yet, they were trying to
get to the one source of reality, and they were accordingly
acting in the spirit of metaphysics, under the impulse of their
rational nature itself. !fIt is an observable character of all
metaphysical doctrines that, widely divergent as they may be,
they agree on the necessity of finding out the first cause of
all that is ••• In all cases the metaphysician is a man who looks
behind and beyond experience for an ultimate ground of all real
and possible experience. 115 Metaphysics thus regarded is found
among the ancients. From the first crude efforts of Thales onward they sought to find that ultimate ground. They were hearkening to that call which, as Aristotle said, every man hears,
the call to find out the truth, and especially the truth which
touches upon all things.
The efforts, therefore, of every Pre-Socratic bear witness to the intrinsically and ineradicably metaphysical character of the human mind, and their repeated strivings to find
better answers witness likewise to man's refusal to be satisfied
with anything less than a proper science of being. No matter
how interesting or consistent their schemes might be, they felt
the need for trying again. At first on the material plane alone,
they shortly exhausted its possibilities and tried to get higher.
If one received their answersl~t their face value, Iffrom these
facts one might think that the only cause is the so-called material cause; but as men thus advanced, the very facts opened the
way for them and joined in forcing them to investigate the subject ••• When these men and the principles of this kind had had
their day, as the latter were found inadequate to generate the
nature of things were again forced by the truth itself to inquire into the next kind of cause tt • 6 In this way, they came to
see that neither water nor fire nor the well-rounded what-is can
account for all that is present in the universe, for its unity,
order and goodness. One member of the drunken company, Anaxagoras of Clazomenae, suggested that the reason which is so manifest
in our own lives may be the cause of the wondrous disposition of
all things. It was but a hint, but a hint which was to have a
great future. Once this was broached, men were bound to investiate reason and to discover what truth there lay in the notion
that, if our minds derive ideas from things, those ideas can be
resent in the things only through having been implanted there
y some mind.
Insofar as they sought after the common ground, all these
en were tacitly acknowledging the intellectual character of
uman knowledge. Insofar, however, as their systems were imperfect and materialist, they were contradicting that character,
he impulses of which they were at the same time following. Conidering their unceasing efforts to rectify previous errors, the
re-Socratics may well be regarded -- as Aristotle tended to reard them, as men who were trying to build up a metaphysical

-181-

science, but who by reason of their early advent and the easiness
of a materialist answer failed to arrive at what they were actually driving.
The twofold character of the intellectual
intuition of being, to be given in any sensible
experience, and yet yet to transcend all particular experience, is both the origin of metaphysics and the permanent occasion of its failures.
If being is included in all my representations,
no analysis of reality will ever be complete,
unless it culminat~s in a science of being, that
is in metaphysics. 0
Men may be prone to be impressed by some noteworthy discovery as to some phase of reality, or even by some adumbration
of the whole, as was the case with the Eleatics. The ancients,
no matter how high they reached, were not yet able to see that
in the particular determination of being which they had -- although in having it they doubtless intuited being itself~ was
only partial. In making of such a part -- water, fire, atoms,
elements, or spherical being -- the universality of the real
they, they excluded all other aspects and so involved themselves
in those difficulties which we have seen. flAIl the failures of
metaphysics should be traced to the fact, that the first principle of human knowled~~ has either been overlooked or misused
by the metaphysicians. 'r We can appreciate, then, the value of
the work of the Sophists in bringing their contemporaries to
consider the question of what it is that we know. Up to their
time, men had had the intuition of being, were implicitly metaphysical in their outlook, but they did not clarify that allimportant idea of the being.
Historically, as we know, the perennial philosophy was
brought to its Platonic and Aristotelian peaks of perfection
thanks to the studies of Socrates, the man who "abandoned science, because he thought its explanations, not indeed of the
cosmos, but of humanAnature and human conduct, were superficial
and unsatisfactory".~ He saw that attention must be paid to the
preparation of the spectator if he is to appreciate the meaning
of reality, and his place in its spectacle. HiS work was valuable
not only for its insistence upon human dignity, but also in that
he urged men in every enquiry they undertook to state first of
all what it is that they are seeking, to look, in other words,
for what really do~s make things to be what they are. He obliged
men to discover what it is that they really do know of things,
to conform themselves to the object, rather than to remain content with their specious views.
As a result of this insistence, men at first attached
an excessive importance to the ideas, as apart from the realitie~
but it was not long before Aristotle, building on the work of his
predecessors, showed that the proper object of the human intel-
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it as presented in concrete, material objects which are far from
exhausting the being, and that they effect their knowle~e by
liberating the forms imprisoned in the matter, liberating them
so that their intellects may have the same form intentionally.
To this culmination, whether they knew it or not, the long succession of the great Pre-Socratics had been working, servants,
we may say with justice, of "the master of them that think" and
of the Angelic Doctor who utilised so much of the PhilosopHer's
work in a greater synthesis.
Notes to the Ninth Chapter:
1. Metaphysica I.viii 989b.
2. As Cornford has put it in his Religion to Philosophy,
"the first business of the intellect, driven by the impulse to
power, is to find its way about the world, to trace out the
shapes and contours of its parts, and to framea perfectly clear
plan of the cosmos. With this intent, it will take for its point
of departure that aspect of the physis which submits to this
treatment -- its aspect as material substance filling space. This
aspect will be emphasised to the ultimate exclusion of Soul, or
Life, and of God, in so far as these conceptions contain something that defies exact analysis and measurement, for you cannot
make a map of vital energy. All that will be left of God is the
attribute of imnutability, which can be ascribed to matter; all
that will be left of Soul is mechanical motion -- change of position in space. Such philosophy is governed in its progress by the
ideal which it finds in the science of spac~measurement; and it
reaches its own perfect fulfillment in Atomism."
3. J. Chevalier, L'id~e et Ie reel, pp. 13-4.
4. E. Gilson, The Unity of Philosophical Experience, pp.
311-2. tiDe la. L' extr~me importance que rev~t toute th~orie. de
la connaissance; de la, en particulier, l'inter~t qui s'attache
a la question de savoir quel est l'objet et quelle est la portee exacte de notre connaissance. Car c'est seulement a condition d'y donner une reponse claire et sure que nous pourrons
repondre
cette autre question, qui est la question ultime, la
question fondamentale: Ou chercher Ie reel? De Ta solution de
l'une depend la solution de l'autre. Elles sont inseparables."
Chevalier, op.cit.
5.Gilson, op.cit., pp. 306-7.
6.Met!!PhYsica I.iii 984a-b. "The long effort of these
speculative pioneers which we have briefly recapitulated had
equipped human thought with a number of fundamental truths. But
if, looking backwards with a knowledge of the mighty synthesis
in which all those truths, then partially perceived, have been
harmonised and balanced, we can contemplate with admiration the
gradual formation of the vital centres and arteries of philo-
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sophy, at the time, in fifth-century Hellas, these good results
were concealed not only by the medley of contradictory theories,
but by the number and gravity of prevalent errors, and it ,seem-ed as though the entire movement had achieved nothing but disorder and chaos. -- The Greek thinkers had set out with high
hopes of knowing everything, and climbing the sky of wisdom in
a single step. As a result of this immoderate ambition, and because they lacked discipline and restraint in handling ideas,
their concepts were embroiled in a confused strife, an interminable battle of opposing probabilities. 1f Maritain, An Introduction
to philosophy, pg. 64.
7. Gilson, OP.Cit.~ pp. 314-5.
8. op.cit., pg. 31 •
9. R. Livingstone, Greek Ideals and Modern Life, pg. 66.
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